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Risk preferences of economic agents are of fundamental importance for present day eco-
nomic analysis. The presence of uncertainty is undeniably a key factor in shaping economic
behavior. The canonical model of expected utility theory (EUT) and several structural as-
sumptions concerning the form of the value function have served as the working horses of
theoretical and applied microeconomics for over half a century.
From a choice-theoretic perspective, the central element of EUT is that probabilities
enter linear into the function determining choices. In applying EUT, it has become cus-
tomary to additionally assume unifying properties concerning the value function. The value
function evaluates outcomes and is multiplied with the respective probabilities to generate
overall decision utility. I will give a short exemplary discussion of some of these customary
assumptions on the value function.
Inside EUT, derivatives of the value function have been linked to economic behavior even
before an axiomatic characterization of expected utility has been provided. A positive first
derivative is equivalent to positive marginal utility. The combination of a positive first and a
negative second derivative is equivalent to risk aversion. These assumptions constitute basic
building blocks of every textbook on microeconomics. An important common feature of
these equivalences is that explicitly or implicitly it is assumed that the sign of the derivative
of a certain order is constant over the whole range of outcomes.
Assumptions concerning higher derivatives of the value function are less customary in
textbooks, but have nevertheless been applied extensively in economic models. One of the
economically most important forms of behavior is that of saving. From a microeconomic
view, the motives to save have been identified as a desire to smooth consumption over time,
and to prepare for unfavorable contingencies in the future. The latter motive is undoubtedly
linked to uncertainty. If the individual wants to save more if the future is uncertain, this
higher level of saving is denoted as precautionary saving. It has been clear since Leland (1968)
and Sandmo (1970) that the first two derivatives of the value function cannot explain such a
behavior. Instead, a positive third derivative as an additional assumption is a sufficient and
necessary condition for precautionary saving to exist. Similarly, a negative fourth derivative
2
Part I: Introduction
has been linked to risk attitudes under a stochastically independent background risk. The
literature on these higher-order risk preferences in EUT models has developed substantially
in the last two decades. Nevertheless, some basic puzzles concerning the empirical validity
of such models remain.
Another set of assumptions concerning the value function deals with the question of how
several influences of behavior interact to form the utility according to which decisions are
made. In case of more than one influence on utility this is termed multi-attribute utility.
The utility depends on several arguments or attributes.
A very classical example of multi-attribute utility is how levels of consumption in differ-
ent future points in time shape the utility function that describes behavior in the present.
Expected utility theory per se does not restrict the functional form of such inter-temporal
utility functions beyond the linearity in probabilities. However, it seems fair to state that
the customary application in expected utility puts a lot more structure on the inter-temporal
utility function. To assume a (quasi-)additive structure of inter-temporal utility has become
so common that its explicit statement is often omitted.
In addition to inter-temporal aspects, multi-attribute utility has been immensely produc-
tive in answering questions on how several goals at a given point in time can jointly influence
the overall decision utility. In contrast to inter-temporal utility, it has been precisely the
omission of an additive structure that allowed the fruitful analysis of the complex interplay
between different goals. Although economists sometimes assume additive separability in or-
der to obtain tractability in complicated models, it is without dispute that this comes at the
cost of a lower degree of realism.
Expected utility has normatively desirable features that makes it a relatively undisputed
favorite for prescriptive decision making. It ensures a high degree of consistency and ratio-
nality. However, in terms of a descriptive theory that aims at describing behavior of typical
economic agents, its strengths become its weaknesses. The empirical findings of systematic
violations of basic axioms of expected utility by economic agents have subsequently called
into question, whether reasonable predictions of behavior should be based on the hypothesis
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of expected utility maximization.
There are two meaningful responses to the perception of the failure of expected utility
theory as a descriptive theory. The first response is to develop detailed models of economic
behavior that extend expected utility. The second response is the development of methods
that do not require the assumption of a specific model of behavior.
The new alternative theoretical models should incorporate insights on what determines
economic behavior from empirical studies, experimental evidence, psychology and common
sense. They should be built subsequently, based on the work of other researchers and they
should try to further improve these models. Part II of this thesis aims to contribute to
this endeavor. I briefly outline the theoretical modifications of expected utility that have
advanced the search for an improved model.
A radical approach would be to abandon the assumption that behavior can be described
by the outcome of an optimization process. In place of the hypothesis of optimization steps
the assumption that individuals follow a set of heuristics. While the psychological evidence
for simple heuristics may be favorable in many situations, this approach comes at a huge cost.
If one allows for many different simple and situation-specific heuristics, one leaves behind
the ambition to find a relatively universal explanation of human behavior. The question
which heuristic should be applied in which situation becomes tedious and to a certain degree
arbitrary. Also, out of context predictions seem unobtainable. If a heuristic is used to
describe behavior in a well-observable setting and this explanation is very context-specific,
difficulties arise in extending this theory to other contexts. However, these out of sample
predictions are the ultimate goal of any theory.
A less radical deviation from the standard model is to account for the fact that individuals
might act altogether in accordance with the optimization of a objection function, but in
doing so make systematic mistakes. These biases are often occurring in well-defined classes
of decision problems. Examples are inter-temporal or inter-contextual inconsistencies. These
can often be described as self-control problems. Here, the individual might want to commit




A fruitful extension of the expected utility model has been to maintain the formal struc-
ture, but to define the exact content of the argument of the value function more carefully.
In textbook models, the argument of the value function is predominantly stated as wealth,
disposable income, or the consumption of narrowly defined goods and services. However,
by incorporating a wider range of objectives into the value function, the basic structure of
EUT can be maintained and the descriptive accuracy highly enhanced. Examples for helpful
enhancements are the incorporation of emotions, aspirations, habits, and feelings of fairness,
equity and justice into the value function. An extension used in in chapter 2 of this thesis is
the notion that the expectation of future consumption and changes in this expectation can
be carriers of utility in the present. I will refer to such models as anticipatory utility.
The extensions of EUT discussed so far have contributed to a certain degree in improving
the standard model. However, the vast majority of extensions have taken the approach to
make less substantial changes. Instead, they have investigated which small departures in
the structural assumptions lead to better predictions. These changes in the structure can
be distinguished according to whether the focus is on the influence of probabilities or on the
shape of the value function.
The predominant focus of theoretical economic research on decision making in the 1980s
and 1990s that was seeking to extend EUT attempted to include nonlinear influences of prob-
abilities. These extensions tried to capture the perception that individuals have difficulties
in assessing probabilities which are very small. This was achieved by applying a probability
weighting function to every probability before aggregating over the states of nature. Early
models based on a longer tradition in psychology took a dual approach were each probability
is transformed by a function independently of the corresponding outcome. It was soon noted
(e.g. by Fishburn, 1978) that this leads to violations of stochastic dominance, which discred-
ited the model. A solution was found by Quiggin (1982), who introduced rank-dependent
expected utility which allows a non-linear influence of probabilities without violating stochas-
tic dominance. The central questions in this field seem to be solved. Therefore, recent studies
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focus on the precise parametrical characterization of the probability weighting function. The
remaining obstacles concerning probabilities are likely to stem from the fact that individuals
fail to execute Bayesian updating, or lack the capability to form subjective probabilities in
the first place.
Only in recent years the importance of the shape of the value function was recognized
by a broad group of researchers. Of special importance to the shape of the value function is
the concept of a reference point. The reference point is the notion that an important aspect
leading to a decision is the comparison of the alternatives in relation to a mental anchor. If
a potential outcome exceeds this reference point it is perceived as a gain, if it falls below the
reference point it induces sentiments of loss.
The influence of reference points is well-established in psychology. It originates from the
field of psychophysics, which can be defined as the quantitative analysis of the relationship
between physical stimuli and the resulting sensations. A classical example is an experiment
where subjects first place one hand in cold and one hand in hot water. After some time,
both hands are placed into water of intermediate temperature. Although both hands are
now exposed to an identical temperature, the subject thinks that the hand which was placed
in the hot water before, is now exposed to a lower temperature, and vice versa. The reason
is that the reference temperature is different for both hands, and the present temperature is
partly evaluated by a comparison to this reference temperature.
In the economics literature, the role of the stimuli is played by the extent that wants are
met. Early economics literature on reference points were Markowitz (1952) and Kahneman
and Tversky’s (1979) prospect theory. In these early models the reference point is assumed
to be a real-valued variable. The influence of such a reference point on the shape of the value
function then can be twofold.
First, the reference point determines the reflection point of the value function. The
reflection point captures the idea that the second derivative of the value function does not
need to have a constant sign. In the model by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), the value
6
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function is concave above the reference point and convex below the reference point.1 This
would capture the idea that individuals are risk-seeking in losses and risk-averse in gains.
The empirical assessment of whether individuals are really risk-seeking in losses is still mixed
and seems to depend on the context. The assumption of a reflection point itself is compatible
with arbitrary levels of differentiability of the value function.
Second, the reference point also determines loss aversion. If the value function is rep-
resented by a graph, loss aversion is a concave kink at the reference point. By allowing
for a kink, one abandons the property of differentiability over the whole range of the value
function. Often it is assumed that the value function is differentiable at all other levels than
the reference point. Therefore, calculus can still be used when analyzing behavior concern-
ing situations with outcomes entirely strictly above (or entirely strictly below) the reference
point.
The literature on reference points has developed substantially in recent years. Two major
developments can be identified. First, the reference point is no longer generally assumed to
be a single point. In recent models (Sugden 2003; Delquie´ and Cillo, 2006; Ko˝szegi and
Rabin, 2006, 2007, 2009) the reference point is a whole distribution potential outcomes are
compared to. This captures the idea that individuals can make multiple comparisons in order
to evaluate the desirability of an outcome. Second, the reference point was endogenized
by Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006, 2007, 2009). This is of high importance since an arbitrary
exogenous reference point was one of the main obstacles raised by critics of such models.
Ko˝szegi and Rabin derive how recent expectations can shape the reference point.
A more detailed overview over the recent development on reference points, its applications
and empirical assessment is provided in chapter 1 of part II of this thesis. Nevertheless, it
seems appropriate to stress that existing models of reference-dependent preferences focused
almost entirely on risk aversion and behavior that follows directly from risk aversion. Some of
1In the model of Markowitz (1952) the reverse is true for small deviations from the reference point.
However, he assumes as well that for larger deviations from the reference point the value function becomes
locally concave in gains and locally convex in losses. This would indicate the existence of three reflection
points. Also, the classical value function of Friedman and Savage (1948) exhibits two reflection points,
although they do not refer to the concept of a reference point.
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the results in Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2007) can be interpreted as statements on behavior under
background risk and Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009) include a short discussion of precautionary
behavior. However, no systematic treatment of higher-order risk preferences was attempted
so far. The existing results were derived only in narrowly defined models. I therefore consider
it worthwhile to fill this gap.
Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) defined higher-order risk preferences in terms of simple
gamble definitions. Chapter 1 in part II of this thesis employs these model-independent
definitions in a systematic way to study higher-order risk preferences in models of reference-
dependent preferences. This theoretical application is joint work with Johannes Maier from
the University of Munich. We find that in the framework of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006, 2007),
individuals exhibit even- but never odd-order risk attitudes. We further use these results
to explain empirical patterns of seemingly sub-optimal behavior concerning precautionary
saving and insurance demand, that have been described as puzzles in the literature.2 In
order to show that our results only obtain when expectations shape the reference point, we
also analyze alternative models and find that they deliver other or even opposite patterns of
higher-order risk preferences.
Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009) extend their framework of endogenously defined reference-
dependent preferences to the realm of anticipatory utility. They also provide a multi-
attribute formulation of their model. However, in chapter 2 of part II of this thesis I will
argue that the precise form of the model proposed suppresses the major advantages of multi-
attribute utility. Ko˝szegi and Rabin’s (2009) definition of reference-dependence restricts
utility to be additively separable.
In chapter 2, I will outline an alternative formulation that follows the same basic intuitions
as Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009), but which is also applicable if utility is not additively separable
in arguments. It is shown that for utility functions with a single dimension, the two models
coincide. However, if the utility function has several dimensions, the two models differ,
2See, for instance, the overview article by Caroll and Kimball (2008) on empirical evidence on precau-
tionary saving falling short of optimal levels in traditional models. See Gollier (2003) on an apparent excess
of insurance demand in the presence of buffer stock saving.
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even if the utility function is additive separable. Therefore, although my model has a larger
domain of applicability, it is not a mere generalization of the previous model. Two examples
are discussed to show that this difference with additive-separable utility applies to practically
relevant situations. First, only in my model, simultaneous changes in different dimensions of
consumption that would not result in an overall effect on pure consumption utility, do not
have an effect on reference-dependent anticipatory utility. Second, an update in beliefs over
the correlation of risks affecting different dimensions of pure consumption utility, generates
a change in decision utility only in my model.
The in-depth engagement in the advancement of theoretical economic models raises a
general methodological question regarding the final goal of this task. It is closely related
to the fraction of individuals one seeks to model by a given model. Are we searching for
a unifying theory to describe the vast majority of individuals in any setting? Or would
we be satisfied with a tractable set of theories where each theory would describe a subset
of individuals? For example, Harrison, Humphrey and Verschoor (2010) find in a series of
experiments that about half of their subjects can be described relatively accurately by EUT,
while the other half generally acts in accordance with prospect theory (PT).
If heterogeneity of individuals basic preference structure is accepted, we face the serious
problem of how to construct methods of preference measurement that can be applied to
the whole set of individuals. Statements, such as that one subject is more risk averse than
another one, are difficult, if the applied method relies on assumptions specific to EUT or PT.
General propositions on behavior, especially comparing individuals, become hard to obtain.
Even if we do not accept that individuals may be fundamentally different in their basic
preference structure, we might face a similar problem. The constant advancement of the-
oretical models can make a method of measurement based on a specific formulation of a
theory rapidly out-dated. Empirical assessments of preferences building on different specific
models may be incomparable. Also, the challenge arises of how to deal with uncertainty
of the modeler on which is the right model. Should he conduct a multitude of preference
elicitations, each tailored to a different model?
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A way out of both of these dilemmas is the development of model-independent tools. By
these, I refer to methods that do not require the assumption of a specific model of behavior.
Instead, they apply to a wide range of models that have been proposed. This does not mean
that we make no assumptions at all. We always need some assumptions, otherwise we are
not in the position to measure anything. However, the required assumptions are of a general
nature and are shared by a wide range of models. If the method is based only on these
general assumption, its results can be informatively applied in all these models. Part III of
this thesis, which is based on joint work with Johannes Maier, contributes to this literature
in the form of two experimental studies.
In the analysis of risk preferences, the most fundamental model-independent measure
concerns risk aversion. A theoretical concept of risk aversion that does not rely on a specific
model would be, for example, whether an individual prefers a sure payment of the expected
value of a lottery over the lottery itself. There is a vast amount of experimental work that
can be interpreted in this sense. Therefore, we consider the issues as settled with respect to
this qualitative direction of risk aversion.
However, the measurement of the intensities of risk aversion is model-dependent for the
prevailing experimental methods. This is despite the fact that there also exist well established
model-independent definitions of an increase in risk.3 Building on these, we can define an
individual as more risk averse than another one if she is ready to accept more increases in
risk as a trade-off to a certain reward.4 This establishes a definition of being more risk averse
that can be applied in any commonly proposed model. In chapter 3 in part III of this thesis
I discuss our model-independent methodology to measure risk aversion in the laboratory.
We implemented the method in an experiment jointly with the risk aversion elicitation
method of Holt and Laury (2002). Nowadays, this is the risk aversion elicitation method
most widely used in economic experiments, although it is based on specific assumptions of
EUT. By implementing both methods simultaneously in our experiment, we can compare
3The most prominent definition of increasing risk is the concept of mean-preserving spreads by Rothschild
and Stiglitz (1971) which will also be applied by us.
4Such a definition is closely related to the work of Diamond and Stiglitz (1974).
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the results of both methods in a within-subject analysis. We show that the differences in the
two methods are not only of a methodological nature, but also that they yield substantially
different results.
Although the experimental evidence on risk aversion is vast, on higher-order risk prefer-
ences it is quite scarce. The few experimental studies that exist are very recent. Therefore,
there are no established experimental methods to measure higher-order risk preferences. We
provide a contribution to this emerging field of study that I discuss in chapter 4 in part III
of this thesis. The experimental studies can be based on the model-independent definitions
of higher-order risk preferences by Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006). Therefore, they meet
the criterion of model-independent measurement outlined above.
Deck and Schlesinger (2010) is so far the only published experiment on higher-order risk
preferences. They find evidence for prudence (downside risk aversion), but at the same
time against temperance (outer risk aversion) in their subject pool. Within EUT the com-
monly assumed parametric value functions (such as those of constant absolute or relative
risk aversion) cannot exhibit this combination. In contrast, such a combination is compatible
with proposed parameterizations of prospect theory. Deck and Schlesinger (2010) therefore
interpret their findings as support of prospect theory.
A key feature of many non-EUT models including prospect theory is the distinction
between gains and losses. In experiments, gains and losses are most often only differentiated
by the framing of subjects decisions. This is mainly due to institutional constraints that
prevent researchers to inflict real monetary losses on subjects. However, framing effects are
elusive and considered by some economic methodologists as non-informative for economic
questions. Therefore, we specifically designed our experiment to induce real monetary losses
on subjects. To do so, we implemented a design that separates the experiment over two
dates, several weeks apart. At the second date we were allowed to inflict real losses on the
subjects, confined by their earnings of the first date.
We found that subjects generally are prudent and temperate. This general pattern holds
for decisions in gains as well as in losses. Our findings of temperance are in contrast to the
11
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results of Deck and Schlesinger (2010) and therefore lead to diverging conclusions. Also, in
our experiment, risk preferences of different orders are highly correlated.
In part IV of this thesis I provide a brief conclusion of the presented results. Also, an
outlook is given on how the taken route of research can be traveled further in the direction
of more general concepts of uncertainty than risk.
12
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While the well-known second-order effect of risk aversion describes a preference for less
uncertainty, higher-order risk preferences characterize how this preference changes under dif-
ferent circumstances. For instance, the third-order effect of prudence plays an important role
for changes in risk aversion due to variations in wealth, and the fourth-order effect of temper-
ance is crucial for changes in risk aversion in the face of a background risk. The theoretical
literature on these higher orders is well-developed (building on Kimball, 1990, 1992) since
the importance of prudence for phenomena like precautionary saving was recognized early
(Leland, 1968). While numerous empirical studies find supportive evidence for the presence
of precautionary saving, they also show that it is usually too low to be consistent with those
theoretical models and common assumptions about risk aversion.1 Also, contrary to obser-
vation, optimal precautionary saving should theoretically lead to substantial crowding out
of insurance demand (Gollier, 2003).
∗This chapter is based on joint work with Johannes Maier. Both authors contributed equally to this
work.
1For instance, the test of Dynan (1993, p1104) “. . . yields a fairly precise estimate of a small precautionary
motive; in fact, the estimate is too small to be consistent with widely accepted beliefs about risk aversion.”
In an overview article Carroll and Kimball (2008, pp583-584) conclude that “. . . estimates of relative risk
aversion imply precautionary saving motives much stronger than those that have been used empirically to
match observed wealth holdings. This discrepancy remains unresolved.”
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Until now, theoretical models analyzing higher-order risk preferences were constrained to
the framework of expected utility theory (EUT) in which they correspond to the derivatives
of the utility function. In contrast, in order to resolve various empirical puzzles concerning
second-order risk preferences, a prominent strand of literature (starting with Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979) evolved that stresses the dependence of preferences on a reference point. The
latest advancement in this literature was made by Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006, 2007) who en-
dogenize recent expectations as the reference point. We analyze higher-order risk preferences
within their model of reference-dependent preferences. We further show that our results can
explain seemingly sub-optimal levels of precautionary saving and insurance demand. As a
robustness analysis, it is also shown that alternative models, like disappointment, regret, or
exogenous reference points yield different results and cannot resolve these empirical puzzles
concerning higher-order risk preferences.
Section 1.2 presents the two concepts that are merged in this chapter and gives the the-
oretical background that is needed in order to understand how we derive our results. In
section 1.2.1 we follow Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) and define lotteries that represent
higher-order risk preferences independently of a specific model. It is their gamble represen-
tation that allows us to analyze higher orders in the model of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2007)
which is presented in section 1.2.2. In order to make our results comprehensible as well as
comparable to each other, we transform choices such that they reflect preference relations as
if the reference point was zero. This method of transformation is explained in section 1.2.3.
Our results are presented in section 1.3. We show that individuals with expectation-based
reference-dependent preferences are neither prudent nor imprudent while second- and fourth-
order effects are still present. More specifically, using common functional forms of gain-loss
utility we show that individuals are risk-averse and intemperate, but they are indifferent
toward the third order independent of the functional form of gain-loss utility. While risk
aversion is also predicted by classical EUT models, third- and fourth-order behavior differs
substantially under reference dependence. We generalize these results for risk preferences
of arbitrary order n and show that those of odd orders (except order one) are absent while
15
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those of even orders are still present. The intuition for this result is based on the fact that
odd-order risk preferences can always be thought of as a decision on the location of risk(s),
whereas even-order risk preferences are concerned with the aggregation of risk(s). Due to
the anticipation of choices, the location does not matter for sensations of gains and losses.
In section 1.4 some of the possible economic implications of our results are discussed.
In general our results show that it may be highly problematic to derive optimal behavior
that rests on preferences of higher orders from measures of risk aversion. With reference-
dependent preferences combinations of certain risk attitudes are possible that cannot be
consistently derived within EUT. More specifically, we show that empirical findings on seem-
ingly sub-optimal amounts of precautionary saving under classical EUT can be attributed to
the optimal behavior of individuals with expectation-based reference-dependent preferences.
The reason is that reference dependence contributes positively to risk aversion, but leaves
prudence unaffected. Within classical EUT models optimal precautionary saving is directly
derived from measures of risk aversion. However, if individuals have reference-dependent
preferences instead, measured risk aversion will indeed be higher but not the optimal amount
of precautionary saving. Also, the theoretically puzzling existence of costly insurance when
capital markets are well developed and individuals can accumulate buffer-stock wealth is
less surprising for such individuals. Under reference dependence second-order effects become
relatively more important than third-order effects.
In section 1.5 we consider several other behavioral models in order to show that the same
results do not obtain under alternative specifications of the reference point. Section 1.5.1
considers disappointment models where the reference point is the expectational mean of the
chosen alternative (Bell, 1985; Loomes and Sugden, 1986). Here, we do not observe the
absence of odd-order risk preferences while even-order risk preferences are similar to those
of expectation-based reference dependence. In recent empirical work it has been difficult
to distinguish between these two models of reference dependence. Our third-order result
therefore suggests a new way how to differentiate between expectation-based reference de-
pendence and models of disappointment. In section 1.5.2 we analyze higher orders in models
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of regret (Bell, 1982, 1983; Loomes and Sugden, 1982) where the reference point is the alter-
native that was not chosen. It is shown that decisions taken to avoid regret are unaffected
by even-order effects, but odd-order effects still exist. This suggests that regret influences
higher-order risk preferences in the opposite way as expectation-based reference dependence.
Risk preferences of any order (except order one) differ between these two models, but regret
induces similar odd-order risk preferences as disappointment models. Models with reference
points shaped by expectations and regret are usually analyzed separately rather than jointly
in a unified framework. However, our analysis shows the close relationship they share. Risk
preferences of a particular order are only affected by either expectations or regret as the ref-
erence point, but never by both. Lastly, we analyze exogenous reference points, such as the
status quo, in section 1.5.3. Here, results vary with the various reference points considered
and attitudes concerning gains and losses. However, just as in the case of disappointment
and regret, exogenous reference point do not yield the same results as expectation-based
reference dependence on higher-order risk preferences. Our robustness analysis of section 1.5
therefore shows that alternative specifications of the reference point imply different results
and cannot explain empirical puzzles that have been found with respect to higher orders.
Section 1.6 is devoted to the conclusion where we summarize our results and discuss
further extensions. All proofs appear in the appendix of section 1.7.
1.2 Theoretical Background
1.2.1 Higher Orders
Within EUT it has long been recognized that risk preferences are not exhaustively de-
scribed via the concept of risk aversion alone. Already Leland (1968) and Sandmo (1970)
identified the importance of a positive third derivative of the utility function for motives
of precautionary saving. Since Kimball (1990) the feature of preferences that is necessary
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and sufficient for such precautionary behavior is termed prudence.2 An equivalent concept
to prudence, termed downside risk aversion, was established by Menezes, Geiss and Tressler
(1980). It describes an aversion to mean-variance preserving transformations that shift risk
from the right to the left of a wealth distribution. Afterward, an extensive literature de-
veloped that discussed also higher derivatives of utility functions and their implications for
economically important decisions under uncertainty. For instance, negative fourth deriva-
tives of the utility function were shown to be crucial for risk aversion to increase with the
existence of a zero-mean background risk (see Gollier and Pratt, 1996; or Eeckhoudt, Gollier
and Schlesinger, 1996). This fourth-order property of the utility function was termed tem-
perance by Kimball (1992) and outer risk aversion by Menezes and Wang (2005). Eeckhoudt
and Schlesinger (2008) show that temperance is necessary and sufficient for precautionary
saving to increase as the downside risk of future income rises.
Outside standard EUT, preferences of higher orders have not been considered explicitly
in the literature yet. Building on the concept of nth-degree risk by Ekern (1980), Eeckhoudt
and Schlesinger (2006), however, provided definitions of all higher-order effects in terms of
preferences over simple lotteries.3 This representation is quite general since it is independent
of a specific model. The authors showed that when applied in an EUT framework their
definitions correspond to the common definitions in terms of derivatives used so far. Because
we are interested in higher-order risk preferences under reference dependence, we employ
these gamble definitions in our analysis.
Denote initial wealth by y ∈ R.4 Let k ∈ R be a sure reduction in wealth with k > 0. ε˜i
are symmetric random variables which are non-degenerate, independent of all other random
2Despite being not necessary and sufficient, prudence has also been shown to play an important role in
other economic applications, like for instance rent-seeking games (Treich, 2010), auctions (Eso˝ and White,
2004), bargaining (White, 2008), principal-agent monitoring (Fagart and Sinclair-Desagne´, 2007), global com-
mons problems (Bramoulle´ and Treich, 2009), inventory management (Eeckhoudt, Gollier and Schlesinger,
1995), or optimal prevention (Eeckhoudt and Gollier, 2005; or Courbage and Rey, 2006). It has also been
used in a more normative context to derive an optimal ecological discount rate (Gollier, 2010) or to justify
the so-called precautionary principle (Gollier, Jullien and Treich, 2000; and Gollier and Treich, 2003).
3These lotteries have also been used in recent experiments to investigate higher-order risk preferences
empirically (see Deck and Schlesinger, 2010; Ebert and Wiesen, 2010; or chapter 4 of this thesis.
4The non-randomness of initial wealth is only used for simplicity.
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variables that affect wealth, and have E[ε˜i] = 0.5 Now, we define the following standard
gambles, where each element denotes an outcome and each outcome of a specific gamble
















[y − k; y + ε˜1]
[A1;B1 + ε˜1]



















[y; y − k + ε˜1]
[B1;A1 + ε˜1]





Intuitively, B1 vs. A1 is equivalent to the question whether more is preferred to less. B2
vs. A2 is the comparison between a certain level of wealth and a risky alternative with
an identical mean. B3 vs. A3 is equivalent to the question whether one prefers to add an
unavoidable random variable to the higher or lower outcome. It is also equivalent to the
question whether one prefers to accept a sure reduction in wealth in the certain or uncertain
state. B4 vs. A4 can be seen as the question whether one prefers to aggregate or disaggregate
two independent random variables.

















(⇔ u′(x) ≥ 0 in EUT models)
(⇔ u′′(x) ≤ 0 in EUT models)
(⇔ u′′′(x) ≥ 0 in EUT models)
(⇔ u′′′′(x) ≤ 0 in EUT models)
5Except the assumption of symmetry, all ε˜i are identically defined in Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006).
6We defined all gambles having a mean of y if k = 0 instead of 0 as in Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006).
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or, more generally
risk apportioning of order n ⇔ Bn % An ∀y, ε˜1, . . . , ε˜int(n
2
), k(⇔ un(x) ≤ (≥) 0 if n
2
∈ (/∈) N in EUT models)
where un(·) denotes the nth derivative of u(·). Note that all commonly used utility functions
in EUT, like for instance those exhibiting constant relative or absolute risk aversion, have
derivatives that alternate in signs with u′(·) being positive (see Brockett and Golden, 1987),
a property termed mixed risk aversion by Caballe´ and Pomansky (1996).
1.2.2 Reference Dependence
Reference-dependent preferences were established in economics via Kahneman and Tver-
sky’s (1979) prospect theory. It introduced four novel aspects: reference dependence, loss
aversion, diminishing sensitivity concerning gains and losses and non-linear probability weight-
ing. Our main focus is on the first feature. Some results will be completely independent of
whether the second and third features are present while other results will vary with their
existence. The fourth feature of probability weighting will be absent from the whole analysis.
In this respect we follow the models we discuss in this chapter.
Focusing on reference dependence immediately leads to the question of what the reference
point is. In the traditional literature on prospect theory the reference point is a real numbered
variable that is completely exogenous. It is a simple point which every potential outcome is
compared to, and it is not influenced by the decision-maker in any way. Often, the status
quo was advocated as a candidate for this reference point (e.g. Kahneman and Tversky, 1979;
or Tversky and Kahneman, 1991). However, even this early literature noted that this might
not be the relevant comparison in many important situations. “For example, an unexpected
tax withdrawal from a monthly pay check is experienced as a loss, not as a reduced gain.”
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, p286). Later, considerations that expectations may play a
role were explicitly included into formal analysis (see Bell, 1985; Loomes and Sugden, 1986;
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Sugden, 2003; Delquie´ and Cillo, 2006; and Ko˝szegi and Rabin, 2006, 2007, 2009).
In early models of disappointment (see Bell, 1985; and Loomes and Sugden, 1986) indi-
viduals compare potential outcomes to the mean of the choice. Every option that can be
chosen has therefore its specific reference point which is thus endogenous. An advancement
of disappointment models has been proposed by Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006, 2007). Here,
the reference point is not simply the mean but rather the full distribution of outcomes
resulting from the chosen alternative. We refer to such reference points as expectational
references. This specification is motivated by the observation that individuals can make
multiple comparisons to evaluate an outcome. It also accounts for the fact that individuals
realize uncertainties and incorporate them into their reference point.
Expectational references have since been applied in order to explain various important
phenomena. For instance, Heidhues and Ko˝szegi (2008) use them in a model of price com-
petition to explain sticky prices. Herweg (2010) shows that the flat-rate bias when choosing
optimal tariffs can be explained when consumers have expectational references. Heidhues
and Ko˝szegi (2010) use expectational references in order to explain why “sale” prices in ad-
dition to regular prices only exist in certain environments. Herweg, Mu¨ller and Weinschenk
(2010) analyze a moral hazard setting with expectational references in order to explain bi-
nary payment schemes. Closely related, Macera (2010) shows in a two-period model that
contracts deferring all present incentives into future payments, like e.g. yearly productiv-
ity bonuses combined with a present fixed wage, are optimal with expectational references.
Lange and Ratan (2010) study bidding behavior of agents with expectational references in
different auction formats and explain why in laboratory experiments but not necessarily in
the field overbidding should be observed.
Empirical work also points toward expectations as the relevant reference point. Meng
(2009) uses expectations as the reference point in order to explain the disposition effect, i.e.
the observation that stock market investors tend to keep their loosing assets for too long and
sell their winning ones too soon, and further finds expectations as best estimate of investors’
reference point from individual trading data. Card and Dahl (forthcoming) show that the
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rate of family violence when the local professional football team loses depends on the extent
to which losing the game was expected. Mas (2006) shows that the larger the difference is
between requested (by the union) and received wages the more police performance declines.
Pope and Schweitzer (forthcoming) show that expectation-based loss aversion is present
among professional golfers suggesting that it is a bias which survives experience, competition
and large stakes. Post et al. (2008) analyze game show data and find that behavior of
contestants is consistent with reference points shaped by expectations. Crawford and Meng
(forthcoming) (building upon previous work by Camerer et al. 1997; and Farber, 2005, 2008)
propose and estimate a labor supply model of New York City cabdrivers with reference-
dependent preferences where income- as well as working hour-targets are both determined
by rational expectations. Using new data of New York City cabdrivers and using a natural
experiment Doran (2009) finds that a permanent wage increase causes hours worked to
remain constant, a finding consistent with expectations as the reference point.
Labor supply decisions have also been tested in a laboratory experiment by Abeler et al.
(forthcoming). They manipulate subjects’ rational expectations and find that effort provi-
sion is affected in the way predicted by expectation-based reference-dependent preferences.
Ericson and Fuster (2010) show in an exchange and in a valuation experiment that the ref-
erence point is determined by expectations rather than by the status quo and discuss why
some researchers have not found endowment effects in different settings. Knetsch and Wong
(2009) also conduct exchange experiments and suggest that expectations shape the reference
point. A recent experiment by Gill and Prowse (forthcoming) finds that expectations are the
relevant reference point when subjects compete in a real effort tournament. Finally, Loomes
and Sugden (1987), Choi et al. (2007), or Hack and Lammers (2009) find supportive evidence
for expectations as the reference point in risky choice experiments.
All the above mentioned literature is concerned with first- or second-order effects of
reference-dependent preferences. In this chapter we are rather interested in higher-order
effects. To our knowledge there has been no attempt to consider higher orders under reference
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dependence. We follow Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2007) and define overall decision utility V (·) as






The outcome x ∈ R and the reference point r ∈ R are independently drawn from the
probability distributions F and G, respectively. Pure consumption utility depending solely
on the outcome x is denoted by m(x) and thus the expected pure consumption utility is
M(F ) =
∫
m(x)dF (x). The function
u(x|r) = u(m(x)−m(r))
captures sentiments of gains and losses that occur if the outcome x is realized and the
reference point was r. The expected level of gain-loss utility is denoted by U(F |G) =∫∫
u(x|r)dG(r)dF (x). The assumption of independently distributed x and r captures the
notion that the evaluation of all possible wealth outcomes is based on comparing each of them
to all possibilities in the support of the reference lottery. What we refer to as expectational
references (Ko˝szegi and Rabin, 2006, 2007, 2009) equates the reference and the outcome
distribution and therefore G = F .7
Some of our results in the following section hold independently of the functional form
of gain-loss utility u(·). The remaining results depend on its specific shape. For the latter
cases we will consider u functions that are usually proposed in the literature. This includes
standard (weakly) concave as well as loss-averse S-shaped u functions. S-shaped u functions
are defined as being (weakly) concave in gains and (weakly) convex in losses (i.e. u′′(τ) ≤
0 ∀τ > 0 and u′′(τ) ≥ 0 ∀τ < 0). Following Ko¨bberling and Wakker (2005) we refer to loss
aversion as a kink at the reference point zero (i.e. limτ→0
u′(−|τ |)
u′(|τ |) ≡ λ > 1). Furthermore, when
S-shaped utility is assumed we refer to loss-averse u functions as the standard case where
7Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006, 2007, 2009) further develop an equilibrium concept that restricts which choices
can be rationally expected. We will discuss this at the end of section 1.3.
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utility is diminishing faster or equally in gains than in losses (i.e. u′′(τ) ≤ −u′′(−τ) ∀τ > 0).
This includes the case where u(·) is piecewise linear with loss aversion. Often results differ for
strict formulations of the functional characteristics above and the limiting cases. A limiting
case of S-shaped u functions without loss aversion are symmetric S-shaped u functions. A
linear u(·) is a limiting case of both weakly concave and S-shaped functions without loss
aversion. Both limiting cases have in common that they are (two-fold rotational) symmetric
around the reference point. This property is crucial in explaining why their results differ
compared to their strict (and asymmetric) counterparts.8 Note that both strictly concave
and loss-averse S-shaped u functions share the common feature that losses loom larger than
corresponding gains (i.e. u′(τ) < u′(−τ) ∀τ > 0).9 Throughout it is assumed that u(τ) is
strictly increasing, continuous and sufficiently often differentiable for all τ (∀τ 6= 0 if λ > 1),
and that u(0) = 0.
While we consider various general functional forms of u(·), we again follow Ko˝szegi and
Rabin (2007) in that we restrict m(·) to be linear (i.e. m′(·) > 0,m′′(·) = 0).10 The reason
for this assumption is twofold. First, in models where m(·) is assumed to be concave instead
usually strong restrictions on the functional form of u(·) are needed to keep the model
tractable.11 Since we are interested in the effect of reference dependence on higher-order risk
8A loss-averse S-shaped u function is the typical assumption in the literature on reference dependence.
The reason why we additionally discuss concave as well as (two-fold rotational) symmetric u functions is the
following. In section 1.5 we consider alternative models, like disappointment or regret theory, in order to
show that the results on expectational references cannot be derived using such alternative models. These
alternative models can also be captured by (1.1) but with a different specification concerning the reference
point. A common assumption in the regret literature is a concave u function. In their disappointment
theories, Loomes and Sugden (1986) assume a u function that is convex in gains and concave in losses but
has the property of being (two-fold rotational) symmetric, while Bell (1985) assumes a piecewise linear u(·).
Since there exists no a priori reason to assume that a specific functional form is limited to a specific reference
scenario we rather consider all possibilities throughout.
9While evidence for this feature in the literature on reference dependence is vast, for evidence that regret
looms larger than rejoicing, see e.g. Inman, Dyer and Jia (1997) and Camille et al. (2004).
10With the exception of their proposition 9, this assumption is made throughout by Ko˝szegi and Rabin
(2007) and for some results in Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006). Other more applied models in the literature
impose this assumption as well (see e.g. Heidhues and Ko˝szegi, 2010; Lange and Ratan, 2010; Meng, 2009;
or Gill and Prowse, forthcoming). In the context of regret, Bleichrodt, Cillo and Diecidue (2010) show in an
experiment that m(·) is not significantly different from linear. In the disappointment models of Bell (1985)
and Loomes and Sugden (1986) m(·) is assumed to be linear as well.
11These models restrict attention to piecewise linear gain-loss utility (see Heidhues and Ko˝szegi, 2008,
2010; Crawford and Meng, forthcoming; Meng, 2009; Herweg, Mu¨ller and Weinschenk, 2010; Herweg, 2010;
Lange and Ratan, 2010; Macera, 2010; and some results in Ko˝szegi and Rabin, 2006, 2007).
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attitudes, we rather consider different functional forms that directly affect gain-loss utility
u(·). Second and more importantly, higher orders are already well analyzed within classical
EUT models. Assuming a concave m function would simply reintroduce higher-order effects
of EUT into the gain-loss function and would therefore dilute the pure effect of reference
dependence on higher-order risk attitudes.12 Moreover, reference dependence is especially
considered as important in situations where classical consumption utility is almost linear.
In order to generate reasonable risk taking behavior, Rabin (2000) shows that consumption
utility is compatible with risk neutrality for amounts as high as a monthly salary.
1.2.3 Higher Orders under Reference Dependence
For notational convenience we will use F |G % F ′|G′ interchangeably to V (F |G) ≥
V (F ′|G′) throughout the chapter. Since we are interested in higher-order risk preferences
under reference dependence, we apply the gamble definitions of section 1.2.1 to the outlined
model (1.1) in the following way.
Definition 1 A reference-dependent individual is said to be risk apportioning of order n (its
opposite, neither nor) if and only if Bn|G  (≺,∼) An|G′, or synonymously if and only if
V (Bn|G) > (<,=) V (An|G′), for all y, k, ε˜i.
Expectational references equate the reference distribution to the distribution of the chosen
alternative, and we can therefore further specify the reference point.
Definition 2 If the reference point is determined by expectational references, G = Bn and
G′ = An.
Because we only have to consider pairwise choices in our analysis, it is often useful to
transform the comparison of Bn|G vs. An|G′ into a comparison that is easier to comprehend
but is behaviorally equivalent to the original comparison. We will systematically use two
transformations that simplify comparisons. First, we will transform every gamble given a
12For instance, Macera (2010) needs to restrict consumption utility to be not too concave such that the
reference-dependent effect still dominates the consumption-utility effect.
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specific reference point distribution into an equivalent gamble with a hypothetical reference
point of 0. Second, we will reduce both gambles that are compared to the components
in which these two gambles differ. Both transformations make it much easier to derive
behavioral predictions in cases where our results depend on the gain-loss utility u, since its
functional characteristics are formulated in relation to the reference point 0. They further
ensure that our results are comparable to each other.
For an illustration consider a situation in which either B2 or A2 has to be chosen. In
this hypothetical situation the assumed reference point distribution is [y + ε˜′1 + ε˜
′
2] if B2 is
chosen and the assumed reference point distribution is [y; y + ε˜′2] if A2 is chosen.
13 Under
which conditions in the original comparison, which is
B2|[y + ε˜′1 + ε˜′2]  (≺,∼) A2|[y; y + ε˜′2]
⇔ [y]|[y + ε˜′1 + ε˜′2]  (≺,∼) [y + ε˜1]|[y; y + ε˜′2], (1.2)
a certain preference relation holds may be hard to conceive intuitively. However, we can
restate (1.2) by an equivalent comparison in which the reference point of both alternatives
is [0]. This makes an intuitive assessment possible. Using the fact that ε˜i is symmetric we
can say that
M([y]) + U([ε˜′1 + ε˜
′
2]|[0]) > (<,=) M([y + ε˜1]) + 12U([ε˜1]|[0]) + 12U([ε˜1 + ε˜′2]|[0]) (1.3)
is equivalent to (1.2). Since m(·) is linear, E[ε˜i] = 0, and hence M([y]) = M([y + ε˜1]) and
M([ε˜1]) = M([ε˜1 + ε˜2]), (1.3) in turn is equivalent to
13ε˜′i and ε˜i are identically and independently distributed random variables. Note that this is a direct
implication of the assumption that reference and outcome distributions are independent. We denote all
random variables stemming from the reference point with a ′ to clarify the fact that ε˜i + ε˜′i denotes the
convolution of two random variables rather than the sum of outcomes.
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⇔ [ε˜′1 + ε˜′2]|[0]  (≺,∼) [ε˜1; ε˜1 + ε˜′2]|[0].
Although this comparison is already easier to conceive than the original comparison, we can
further simplify (1.4) by eliminating components that are common in both gambles and can







2]|[0]) > (<,=) M([ε˜1]) + U([ε˜1]|[0])
⇔ [ε˜′1 + ε˜′2]|[0]  (≺,∼) [ε˜1]|[0].
Clearly, the question whether an individual prefers the convolution of ε˜1 and ε˜2 over ε˜1 given
the choice-independent reference point of 0 is more intuitive than the original comparison in
(1.2). For most commonly used functional forms of u(·) an answer could be derived easier
when the problem is stated in such residual gambles, whose preference relation is nevertheless
equivalent to that of the original gambles.
We denote these residual gambles by [Bn|G〈An|G′〉] |[0] and [An|G′〈Bn|G〉] |[0], respectively,
and apply them to the comparisons of Bn and An for all n ≥ 2, where M(Bn) = M(An) and
thus only the reference-dependent part differs. Generally, [Bn|G〈An|G′〉] |[0] contains all com-
ponents that occur in Bn|G with higher probability than in An|G′. Similarly, [An|G′〈Bn|G〉] |[0]
only contains those components that have a higher probability in An|G′ than in Bn|G. We de-
rive the densities of the residual gambles by applying the following procedure. The probabil-
ity density function of [Bn|G〈An|G′〉] |[0] is fBA(x) = max {[fB(x)− fA(x)]/f ; 0} where fB(x)
is the density of Bn|G, fA(x) is the density of An|G′, and f =
∫
max{fB(x) − fA(x); 0}dx.
Similarly, the density of [An|G′〈Bn|G〉]|[0] is fAB(x) = max {[fA(x)− fB(x)]/f ; 0}. These
transformations ensure that the probability mass of the residual gambles is one without
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changing relative densities. While such definitions may seem notationally cumbersome they
precisely indicate how a residual gamble was derived. A special case arises if both gambles
contain the same components with identical probabilities. The relation in the original com-
parison is then equivalent to the comparison of any arbitrary gamble C with itself, formally
C|[0] is compared to C|[0]. Any such situation is then characterized by indifference without
any further assumptions concerning the functional form of u(·).
1.3 Results
Our first result states that preferences are monotone. Note that the component of gain-
loss utility does not influence this preference in any way, so the result is solely driven by
pure consumption utility. Intuitively, in risk-less decisions, no feelings of gain or loss can
arise when the outcome was expected.
Proposition 1 If preferences depend on reference points formed by expectations, individuals
have monotone preferences, that is B1|B1  A1|A1.
In contrast to proposition 1, our results for all orders higher than one will be driven
solely by the gain-loss utility component of overall decision utility (as formally expressed in
lemma 1 in the appendix). Intuitively, because of the linearity of m(·) the expectational
mean of two options is all that matters in terms of pure consumption utility, and it is easily
verified that E[Bn] = E[An] for all n ≥ 2 holds.
Our second result states the sufficient and necessary condition for second-order risk pref-
erences. It replicates findings of the existing literature.
Proposition 2 If preferences depend on reference points formed by expectations, individuals
are risk-averse (risk-seeking, risk-neutral), that is B2|B2  (≺,∼) A2|A2, if and only if
[0]|[0]  (≺,∼) [ε˜1 + ε˜′1]|[0].
Proposition 2 specifies risk aversion in a framework of expectational references. Since in the
comparison of B2|B2 vs. A2|A2 densities of similar elements can be reduced as described in
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the previous section, we can derive the last equivalence. Thus, [B2|B2〈A2|A2〉]|[0] equals [0]|[0]
and [A2|A2〈B2|B2〉|[0] is equal to [ε˜1 + ε˜′1]|[0]. Our result resembles the classical definition of
risk aversion if the choice is transformed such that the hypothetical reference point is [0].
An individual who dislikes the convolution of any symmetric and zero-mean ε˜1 is classified
as being risk-averse.
As an illustrative example, suppose ε˜1 = [−ε1; ε1] with ε1 > 0. Then, if an individual
chooses the gamble B2 and this is also his expectation, the choice would result in the utility
of M([y]) + U([0]|[0]) since the deterministic outcome of y is always correctly anticipated.
However, if this individual chooses the gamble A2 and this is also his expectation, four
combinations of outcomes and reference points will be considered. With probability 1/2 the
outcome is y + ε1. But only in half of these cases this outcome was also anticipated and
reduces to 0. In the other half of these cases y − ε1 was expected instead, which yields the
sensation of a gain of 2ε1. Also, with probability 1/2 the outcome is y − ε1. In half of these
cases this bad outcome was anticipated and reduces to 0. In the other half of these cases the
good outcome y+ε1 was anticipated, yielding the sensation of a loss of 2ε1. Thus, the choice
of A2 would deliver a utility of M([y−ε1; y+ε1])+U([0; 0;−2ε1; 2ε1]|[0]). Since for a linear m
function it follows that M([y]) = M([y−ε1; y+ε1]), this individual prefers B2 over A2 if and




u(−2ε1) + 14u(2ε1). This can be further simplified to the condition
u(0) > 1
2
u(−2ε1) + 12u(2ε1). In gamble notation, B2|B2 = [0]|[0]  [0; 0;−2ε1; 2ε1]|[0] =
A2|A2 reduces to [B2|B2〈A2|A2〉]|[0] = [0]|[0]  [2ε˜1]|[0] = [A2|A2〈B2|B2〉]|[0].
It directly follows from proposition 2 that for u functions which are usually proposed in
the literature individuals are risk-averse.
Corollary 1 If preferences depend on reference points formed by expectations, individuals
with
(i) u′′(·) < (>,=) 0 over the whole range are risk-averse (risk-seeking, risk-neutral);
(ii) loss-averse S-shaped u(·) are risk-averse;
(iii) u(·) being (two-fold rotational) symmetric around the reference point are risk-neutral.
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The next result is concerned with third-order risk preferences.
Proposition 3 If preferences depend on reference points formed by expectations, individuals
are never prudent or imprudent, that is B3|B3 ∼ A3|A3. This holds for all formulations of
u(·).
Proposition 3 constitutes a crucial result of our analysis. Since B3|B3 always contains the
same elements with identical probabilities as A3|A3, both choices are equally valued re-
gardless of the shape of u(·). Therefore, reference-dependent utility does not contribute to
third-order risk preferences despite its effect on the second order.
For an illustration consider again an example where ε˜1 = [−ε1; ε1]. If the choice of
an individual is B3 and he was expecting this choice, his utility will be determined by





u(−k − ε1) + 18u(−k + ε1) + 18u(k − ε1) + 18u(k + ε1) + 116u(−2ε1) + 116u(2ε1).
However, if the individual chooses A3 and he was expecting this to be his choice his utility
will be identical to the expression above and hence U(B3|B3) = U(A3|A3). Since also
M(B3) = M(A3) holds, we can conclude that V (B3|B3) = V (A3|A3) for all functional forms
of u(·).
The result of proposition 3 is in stark contrast to the usual properties of models in EUT.
As an example, functional forms exhibiting constant or decreasing absolute risk aversion
imply prudence in EUT. Within EUT only rarely used utility functions, like those with
quadratic utility, never exhibit prudence or imprudence. In contrast, assuming dependence
on expectational references eliminates any third-order risk preference. Since this holds for
arbitrary u functions, proposition 3 has very general implications that are discussed in sec-
tion 1.4. We will show that under reference dependence precautionary saving is lower and
insurance demand higher than in a classical EUT model of pure consumption utility.
In the next proposition we consider fourth-order risk preferences.
Proposition 4 If preferences depend on reference points formed by expectations, individuals
are temperate (intemperate, neither nor), that is B4|B4  (≺,∼) A4|A4, if and only if
[ε˜1 + ε˜
′
1; ε˜2 + ε˜
′
2]|[0]  (≺,∼) [0; ε˜1 + ε˜′1 + ε˜2 + ε˜′2]|[0].
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Proposition 4 specifies temperance when preferences depend on expectational references. It
is similar to proposition 2 in that it resembles the general definition of temperance in case the
choice is transformed such that the reference point is [0]. Since densities of identical elements
in B4|B4 and A4|A4 can be reduced in comparison, [B4|B4〈A4|A4〉]|[0] equals [ε˜1 + ε˜′1; ε˜2 + ε˜′2]|[0]
and [A4|A4〈B4|B4〉]|[0] is equal to [0; ε˜1 + ε˜′1 + ε˜2 + ε˜′2]|[0].
Unlike in propositions 2 and 3, fourth-order risk preferences differ for various shapes of
u(·) that have been proposed in the literature.
Corollary 2 If preferences depend on reference points formed by expectations, individuals
with
(i) u′′′′(·) < (>,=) 0 over the whole range are temperate (intemperate, neither nor);
(ii) loss-averse S-shaped u(·) are intemperate;
(iii) u(·) being (two-fold rotational) symmetric around the reference point are neither tem-
perate nor intemperate.
As case (ii) of corollary 2 is the standard assumption in the literature on reference depen-
dence, we find a clear difference in the predictions of standard EUT with commonly used
utility functions and loss-averse models concerning temperance. The implication of proposi-
tion 4, that typical loss-averse u functions always induce intemperance, is in line with Ko˝szegi
and Rabin (2007, p1060) who show that in their model with a piecewise linear loss-averse
u function and a linear m function “. . . behavior also approaches risk neutrality with even
moderate amounts of background risk.”14
To receive some intuition for case (ii) of corollary 2 consider the example where ε˜1 =
[−ε1; ε1], ε˜2 = [−ε2; ε2] and ε1 = ε2. Then, if the choice is B4 and this was also expected, the
14Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2007, p1052) “. . . identify common ways in which the decision maker becomes
less risk-averse if she had been expecting, or is now facing, more risk.” This is in line with our results
not only for surprise situations (comparing their proposition 1 with our Table 1.3 in section 1.5.3), but
also for expectational references. More specifically, in their proof of proposition 5 (p1068) they show that,
for some lotteries G and F , U(F |F ) ≤ U(G + F |G + F ) − U(G|G) holds. Rewriting this inequality as
U(F |F ) +U(G|G) ≤ U(G+F |G+F ) offers the direct interpretation that a person satisfying this inequality
would rather aggregate than disaggregate the two lotteries. This is exactly the interpretation of intemperance.
Moreover, by applying F = y+ ε˜1, G = y+ ε˜2, and u(0) = 0 it can be shown that this inequality corresponds
to (weakly) choosing [A4|A4〈B4|B4〉]|[0] over [B4|B4〈A4|A4〉]|[0].
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individual will experience with probability 1/4 a gain of 2ε1 and with probability 1/4 a loss
of the same size. With probability 1/2 he will experience neither a gain nor a loss. If the
individual chooses A4 instead and also expected this choice, he will face a gain of 2ε1 with
probability 1/8 and a gain of 4ε1 with probability 1/32. However, with probability 1/8 he
will also face a loss of 2ε1 and with probability 1/32 a loss of 4ε1. With probability 11/16 he
will experience neither a gain nor a loss. Note that choosing B4 results in feelings of loss with
a higher probability than choosing A4. At a first glance, A4 may still seem less attractive
because the maximal potential loss is higher. However, because of the weakly decreasing
sensitivity in losses, a loss of 4ε1 can have at most twice the effect as a loss of 2ε1. Hence,
the danger of a larger loss with A4 is always overcompensated by the smaller probability of
experiencing a loss.
Propositions 3 and 4 are special cases of the following theorem that identifies risk pref-
erences of arbitrary order n when reference points are formed by expectations.
Theorem 1 If preferences depend on reference points formed by expectations, individuals
are,
(i) for even orders (n
2
∈ N) and n ≥ 4, risk apportioning of order n (its opposite, neither






















(ii) for odd orders (n
2
/∈ N) and n ≥ 3, never risk apportioning of order n or its opposite,
that is Bn|Bn ∼ An|An. This holds for all formulations of u(·).
In order to get an intuition for the general structure of the results of propositions 1 to 4 and
theorem 1, consider first the case where n = 1. If a certain outcome is expected, it will not
generate any feelings of gains or losses. Hence, any first-order effect is solely driven by the
difference in pure consumption utility. However, for n ≥ 2 the expected value of the pure
consumption utility of Bn and An is identical because of the linearity of m(·). Therefore, for
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n ≥ 2 only the gain-loss component of utility determines the assessment of the two gambles.
With n = 2 (see proposition 2), expecting a risk does not eliminate the risk in outcomes.
This is because both random variables are realized independently. Thus, it is possible that
a high expectation coincides with a low outcome (generating a sensation of loss) or that a
low expectation is exceeded by a high outcome (generating a sensation of gain). In contrast
to the second order, for n = 3 the question is not whether to take or avoid a risk but rather
whether to add an unavoidable risk in a high- or low-wealth state. Since the decision is
anticipated, location is irrelevant for feelings of gains and losses. Therefore, individuals do
not care where to add the risk. Unlike the third order, with n = 4 the question is not whether
to add risk either to a high or to a low state, but rather whether to add it to a certain or
uncertain state. Generally, aggregating or disaggregating risk(s) affects gain-loss utility and
this is captured by even-order risk preferences. By contrast, odd-order risk preferences of
orders higher than one can always be thought of as a decision on the location of risk(s).
With expectational references the choice of location becomes irrelevant.
More formally, for even orders −Bn  (≺,∼) − An if and only if Bn  (≺,∼) An since
all ε˜i are symmetric and there is no reduction of k. Thus, an individual prefers Bn|Bn over
An|An if and only if he is risk apportioning of order n. For odd orders ε˜i are still symmetric,
but there is now always a reduction of k which reverses into an additional k when Bn and
An become negative. Thus, we get that −Bn  (≺,∼) −An if and only if Bn ≺ (,∼) An.
Because the two effects with expectational references are of equal magnitude and opposing
direction they cancel out and an individual is therefore always indifferent between Bn|Bn
and An|An for odd orders.
While risk preferences of even orders with expectational references resemble those without
reference dependence for a given functional form of u(·), they substantially differ for odd
orders. In fact, risk preferences of odd orders are completely absent with expectational
references. In EUT risk preferences of any order n depend on those of order n − 1 and are
therefore strongly related. If the (n− 1)th derivative of u(·) is known, the nth derivative can
be directly computed. In contrast, theorem 1 shows that with reference dependence this is
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no longer the case. Especially when the evaluation of an odd order delivered indifference, one
cannot conclude that the next-higher order delivers indifference as well. This is of general
importance for the empirical derivation of higher-order risk preferences via measures of risk
aversion. We discuss such implications of theorem 1 for the relationship between risk aversion
and precautionary saving in section 1.4.
Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2007) describe in which circumstances reference points that are
formed by expectations seem appropriate. These can be separated into two broad cate-
gories. First, some decisions are anticipated well before they have to be made. Then, the
individual also anticipates how he will decide. Therefore, at the time the decision is made
the individual has already expected his actual choice. Consistent choices in these situations
are preferred personal equilibria (PPE) as defined by the authors. An example for an eco-
nomically interesting scenario would be the decision over savings. The individual may think
about saving well before doing so and then has already incorporated this behavior into his
reference point when conducting the transaction. Second, some decisions are real choices
that cannot be reversed but whose actual outcome is realized much later. Here, individuals’
references have time to adjust to the choice already made. Decision-makers anticipate the
adjustment before deciding. According to Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2007) all choices are then
choice-acclimating personal equilibria (CPE). This seems relevant in situations where one
can commit to choices well in advance of events. Interesting examples include many insur-
ance and pension decisions. Here, contracts are often binding and are agreed upon years
before the risks are realized.
Both scenarios are analytically identical since the reference distribution is the same as the
chosen outcome distribution. Thus, our results are applicable to both equlibrium concepts.
However, the two concepts differ with respect to the existence of such personal equilibria.
All choices are equilibria if commitment is possible and CPE is the relevant concept.15 By
contrast, if commitment is not possible but decisions have been anticipated not all decisions
15Recent experiments by Abeler et al. (forthcoming) and Gill and Prowse (forthcoming) support CPE as
the relevant concept. The latter even find that reference points adjust essentially instantaneously to choices
made.
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can rationally be expected and constitute a PPE. In these cases equilibria existence is an
important issue because rational agents cannot trick themselves to expect a later choice
they have no incentive to follow. In other words, if the agent wanted to deviate from his
expectation once he makes the decision, this expectation could not sustain in the first place.
All choices that can be rationally expected are defined as unacclimated personal equilibria
(UPE) as introduced by Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006, 2007). The UPE that maximize ex-ante
decision utility V (·) are PPE and are therefore the chosen alternatives. In our context this
translates into the following existence condition
Bn|Bn is an UPE ⇔ Bn|Bn % An|Bn and
An|An is an UPE ⇔ An|An % Bn|An.
1.4 Implications
Results of the previous section may have strong implications in situations where decisions
under uncertainty cannot solely be explained via risk aversion. Then, higher-order risk
preferences are needed to explain phenomena like precautionary saving, precautionary labor,
or the influence of background risk. Until now, in attempts to explain these phenomena only
the effect of pure consumption utility in EUT models has been considered. Applying the
preceding analysis allows us to investigate the influence of reference dependence in such
settings. In the following, we will discuss two implications in more detail, the optimal
amount of precautionary saving and the interaction of precautionary saving and insurance
demand.
Often quantitative measures of one order were used to predict behavior concerning a
higher order. For example, measures of risk aversion were thought to determine exactly the
optimal amount of precautionary saving because both were solely derived from the func-
tional form of consumption utility. As reported by Browning and Lusardi (1996) or Carroll
and Kimball (2008) for instance, precautionary saving is often empirically observed but to
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a lesser extent than thought to be optimal. “Structural models that match broad features
of consumption and saving behavior tend to produce estimates of the degree of prudence
that are less than those obtained from theoretical models in combination with risk aver-
sion estimates from survey evidence.” (Carroll and Kimball, 2008, p584). Also, Ballinger,
Palumbo and Wilcox (2003) found in a laboratory experiment simulating life-cycle decisions
that precautionary saving falls short of optimal theoretical predictions. When utility is partly
dependent on expectational references, the reference-dependent component contributes posi-
tively to risk aversion but leaves prudence unaffected. Therefore, such a reference-dependent
model would predict less precautionary saving than the standard model. This is consistent
with the empirical and experimental literature.
Closely related and building on the well-known finding that saving and insurance are
substitutes16 is what Gollier (2003) called the ‘insurance puzzle’. When financial markets
are complete, individuals should prefer to cope with risk via buffer-stock saving rather than
by purchasing costly insurance. In other words, allowing for precautionary saving leads
theoretically to a crowding out of insurance demand in dynamic life-cycle models. “The
bottom line is similar to the one underlying the literature on the equity premium puzzle:
the theory cannot easily explain why people are so reluctant to accept risk.” (Gollier,
2003, p21). Again, assuming preferences that depend partly on expectational references
can serve as an alternative explanation to market imperfection. Intuitively, since insurance
demand is driven by second-order effects but precautionary saving by third-order effects, the
reference-dependent component generates additional insurance demand but does not affect
precautionary saving decisions.
To illustrate these implications of our results we analyze a simple two-period setting
(T = 2) without discounting and interest on savings. As benchmark model we consider a





with V bt =
∫
c(xt)dF (xt). xt is consumption in period t and c(·) denotes pure consumption
16To our knowledge, the first formal analysis showing that these two are substitutes was by Moffet (1975)
within a simple two-period model. For a more general treatment without additive separable utility, refer to
Dionne and Eeckhoudt (1984).
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utility that is assumed to be strictly increasing and strictly concave.
To facilitate comparisons between implications of such a benchmark model and a reference-
dependent model we specify the latter as a hybrid model. This hybrid model slightly deviates
from the reference-dependent model before in that the pure consumption utility part has now
the same properties as our standard EUT benchmark model while the gain-loss part stays
unchanged and still has the properties of the previous analysis. More formally, individuals










u(xt − rt)dG(rt)dF (xt), where rt
denotes the reference point in t. The reason why we allow the pure consumption utility
part to be concave in wealth in the hybrid model is that this leads to an equivalence of
both models in risk-less situations. Within both models we will compare behavior in risky
and risk-less situations. As we are interested in the implications of reference dependence
for risk preferences we would like to keep behavior in risk-less situations constant between
the two models. In order to isolate the pure effects of reference dependence and to avoid
reintroducing classical EUT effects into gain-loss utility we still assume that the gain-loss
part depends on absolute differences of outcomes and reference points.
Consumption in period 1 is income y which is potentially reduced by saving ks and
an insurance premium. The insurance premium consists of the premium of an actuarially
fair insurance ki plus proportional loading λ. Thus, the final consumption in period 1 is
x1 = y − ks − (1 + λ)ki and the distribution representing the beliefs over x1 is simply
F (x1) = [y − ks − (1 + λ)ki]. Consumption in period 2 is the same income y plus a random
component ε˜1 whose two realizations occur with equal probability, ε˜1 = [−ε1; ε1]. Savings
ks increase outcomes in both states but insurance only in the bad state. Since the premium
of an actuarially fair insurance was defined as ki, the amount of indemnity is 2ki when
the probability of the bad state is 1/2. Therefore, x2 can take on two different values,
x2 = y − ε1 + ks + 2ki and x2 = y + ε1 + ks. The beliefs over x2 are then the distribution
F (x2) = [x2;x2]. In the following, we will restrict insurance to have either partial or full
indemnity but rule out over-insurance, hence ki ≤ ε1, which also implies x2 ≤ x2.
To highlight the implications for the optimal amount of precautionary saving, consider
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first the case where no insurance is available, thus ki = 0. In the benchmark case
V b = c(y − ks) + 1
2
c(y − ε1 + ks) + 12c(y + ε1 + ks), (1.5)
where the first term in (1.5) denotes consumption utility in period 1 and the last two terms
are expected consumption utility in period 2. In the hybrid model
V h = c(y − ks) + 1
2
c(y − ε1 + ks) + 12c(y + ε1 + ks) + 14u(−2ε1) + 14u(2ε1). (1.6)
Again, the first three terms in (1.6) denote pure consumption utility in periods 1 and 2.
There is no gain-loss utility in period 1 since there is no uncertainty resolved. Gain-loss
utility in period 2 is captured by the last two terms. Since choosing the optimal ks in (1.5)
and (1.6) means solving identical first-order conditions we obtain the result that the decision
for precautionary saving is not affected by the reference-dependent part of utility V h(·).
If preferences are reference dependent instead of reference independent, the extent of risk
aversion will be higher17 as long as the slope of u(·) is steeper in losses than in corresponding
gains (u′(−τ) > u′(τ) ∀τ > 0) which is met for strictly concave as well as loss-averse S-shaped
u functions. But at the same time an identical amount of precautionary saving would be
optimal. This shows that seemingly sub-optimal levels of precautionary saving may well be
optimal if preferences are reference dependent. In contrast to classical models of EUT, this
result shows that predicted behavior under reference dependence is in line with the empirical
findings.
Only at first glance this results seems to be in contrast to a result of Ko˝szegi and Rabin
(2009). In their proposition 8 they show that a piecewise linear gain-loss utility contributes to
precautionary saving. However, their result rests on the assumption of concave consumption
utility entering gain-loss utility and thereby reintroducing classical EUT effects into the
gain-loss part. Indeed, with such a specification it can be shown that optimal precautionary
17For example, it can be easily verified that the risk premium of an individual with V h(·) is higher than
with V b(·).
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saving is higher under reference dependence compared to the benchmark case as long as the
slope of u(·) is steeper in losses than in corresponding gains (u′(−τ) > u′(τ) ∀τ > 0).18
However, since reference dependence increases risk aversion with this specification as well,
this does neither contradict our result nor the empirical pattern observed.19
We next analyze precautionary saving and insurance jointly. Our analysis encompasses
the case where insurance is costly. That is, it may have a positive loading factor λ. However,
in the following we restrict λ to the more realistic cases where it is below 1, hence 0 ≤ λ < 1.
Then, in the benchmark model
V b = c(y − ks − (1 + λ)ki) + 1
2
c(y − ε1 + ks + 2ki) + 12c(y + ε1 + ks),
∂V b/∂ks = −c′(y − ks − (1 + λ)ki) + 1
2
c′(y − ε1 + ks + 2ki) + 12c′(y + ε1 + ks)
= 0, (1.7)
∂V b/∂ki = −(1 + λ)c′(y − ks − (1 + λ)ki) + c′(y − ε1 + ks + 2ki) = 0. (1.8)
As shown in the appendix all second partial derivatives are strictly negative and the Hessian
is negative definite. We denote the solution of (1.7) and (1.8) by (kˆs, kˆi).
By combining (1.7) and (1.8) we get the following condition:
(1− λ)c′(y − ε1 + kˆs + 2kˆi) = (1 + λ)c′(y + ε1 + kˆs). (1.9)
Although (1.9) cannot be solved explicitly, due to the strict concavity of c(·) we receive that
kˆi < ε1 for λ > 0 and kˆ
i = ε1 for λ = 0.
Gollier (2003) simulated a life-cycle model for an infinite time horizon and found that
18At the optimal level of precautionary saving in the benchmark case ∂V h/∂ks > 0 since the additional
terms in the first-order condition of the hybrid model compared to the benchmark case are 14u
′[c(y+1+ks)−
c(y−1 +ks)][c′(y+1 +ks)−c′(y−1 +ks)]+ 14u′[c(y−1 +ks)−c(y+1 +ks)][c′(y−1 +ks)−c′(y+1 +ks)].
19Among the studies reviewed by Browning and Lusardi (1996) there are even numerous articles where
no precautionary saving was measured at all. Another recent example is Jappelli, Padula and Pistaferri
(2008). Lee and Sawada (2007, p196) stress that “while a growing number of theoretical studies point out
the importance of precautionary saving, the existing evidence suggests that precautionary saving motives
may not be empirically important.” Such empirical findings even point toward a reference-dependent model
with linear consumption utility in both the reference-dependent and the reference-independent part. This is
the model we analyzed in the previous section.
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demand for costly insurance completely vanishes with the opportunity of precautionary sav-
ings. He termed this result the ‘insurance puzzle’ because it is clearly at odds with empirical
observations. His explanation for this puzzle rests on market imperfections. In the following,
we show that it can also be explained by reference-dependent preferences, even if markets
are complete. This is because saving and insurance are weaker substitutes under reference
dependence than in the benchmark model. Consider our hybrid model where
V h = c(y − ks − (1 + λ)ki) + 1
2
c(y − ε1 + ks + 2ki) + 12c(y + ε1 + ks)
+1
4
u(−2ε1 + 2ki) + 14u(2ε1 − 2ki),
∂V h/∂ks = −c′(y − ks − (1 + λ)ki) + 1
2
c′(y − ε1 + ks + 2ki) + 12c′(y + ε1 + ks)
= 0, (1.10)
∂V h/∂ki = −(1 + λ)c′(y − ks − (1 + λ)ki) + c′(y − ε1 + ks + 2ki)
−1
2
u′(2ε1 − 2ki) + 12u′(−2ε1 + 2ki) = 0. (1.11)
Again, in the appendix it is shown that all elements of the Hessian are strictly negative and
that the Hessian is negative definite. This holds for u(·) being (weakly) concave, (piecewise)
linear, or (loss-averse) S-shaped. Combining (1.10) and (1.11) yields
(1− λ)c′(y − ε1 + ks + 2ki) = (1 + λ)c′(y + ε1 + ks)
−u′(2ε1 − 2ki) + u′(−2ε1 + 2ki). (1.12)
Using the assumptions that the slope of u(·) is steeper in losses than in corresponding gains,
ki ≤ ε1, and the strict concavity of c(·), we receive from (1.12) that in the optimum ki < ε1
for λ > 0 and ki = ε1 for λ = 0. In the following, we first analyze the case of positive loading
(λ > 0) and then discuss actuarially fair insurance (λ = 0).
For a comparison of the solutions of both models consider the optimality conditions (1.10)
and (1.11) at (kˆs, kˆi) which would be the solution if preferences were not reference dependent.
Indeed, (kˆs, kˆi) is one possible solution of (1.10) because condition (1.10) equals condition
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(1.7). Using u′(−τ) > u′(τ)∀τ > 0 and kˆi < ε1 we find that (kˆs, kˆi) cannot be a solution of
(1.11) since ∂V h(kˆs, kˆi)/∂ki > 0. Our goal is to show that the optimal demand for insurance
is higher and optimal saving is lower with reference-dependent preferences than without.20
We denote by (dks, dki) the amounts that the optimal solution of (1.10) and (1.11) deviates
from (kˆs, kˆi).
As mentioned above, condition (1.10) is met at (kˆs, kˆi). This implies that any change in
ks or ki has to be compensated by a change of the other variable. By totally differentiating










We show in the appendix that the term in brackets is positive. Therefore, in order to fulfill
condition (1.10) dks and dki need to have opposite signs as long as they are not both zero.
Our analysis of (1.11) showed that ∂V h(kˆs, kˆi)/∂ki > 0. Hence, in the hybrid model
∂V h/∂ki has to be lower in the optimum than at (kˆs, kˆi). Both an increase in ks or ki would
decrease ∂V h/∂ki, but (1.13) showed that their changes must have opposing signs. The












dki < 0. (1.14)
In order to show that only an increase in ki and a decrease in ks can accomplish this we















In the proof of proposition 5 we show that the term in brackets in (1.15), which is the
determinant of the Hessian matrix, is positive and that ∂2V h/(∂ks)2 < 0. Hence, it follows
that dki > 0 and in combination with (1.13) that dks < 0 in the optimum.
20There is no reason for a change in saving other than for precautionary motives since gain-loss utility
vanishes without uncertainty. All changes in saving are therefore changes in precautionary saving.
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Proposition 5 Individuals with preferences depending on reference points formed by expec-
tations have a higher demand for insurance and save less than individuals without reference-
dependent preferences.
Proposition 5 holds for all u functions with a slope that is steeper in losses than in
corresponding gains (u′(−τ) > u′(τ) ∀τ > 0) and with sensitivity that is diminishing faster
or equally in gains than in losses (u′′(τ) ≥ −u′′(−τ) ∀τ > 0). As mentioned before, these
conditions are met for u functions that are strictly concave or loss-averse S-shaped, including
the limiting case of u(·) being piecewise linear with loss aversion. Proposition 5 further shows
that reference dependence can be an alternative explanation for the insurance puzzle that
does not rest on market imperfections. We derived this result for costly insurance, i.e.
0 < λ < 1. For actuarially fair insurance (λ = 0) it can be easily shown that both models
yield the identical result of full insurance and the absence of a precautionary motive for
saving.21
Although this section focused on implications concerning the third and second order,
our results may have implications concerning higher orders as well. As an example, many
financial decisions, such as demand for insurance or risky assets, are taken in the face of
exogenous background risk. It is known that the fourth-order concept of temperance is
necessary for risk aversion to increase with increasing background risk and all commonly
used utility functions in EUT models exhibit this feature. If, by contrast, preferences are
reference dependent, our analysis of the previous section showed that despite higher risk
aversion, its sensitivity to background risk would be reduced under standard assumptions
on gain-loss utility. A formalization of these ideas will be the subject of future work.
1.5 Alternative Models
It is important to analyze whether our results for Ko˝szegi and Rabin’s (2007) model
of expectational references can in fact not also be derived by using alternative reference
21From λ = 0 it follows that kˆi = ε1 and kˆ
s = −ε1. Hence, V b = V h in the optimum.
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points. Only then, we may be able to conclude that it is their concept of expectational
references which is not only capable of resolving empirical puzzles concerning first and second
orders, but also concerning higher-order risk preferences. As alternative models we consider
disappointment models, models of regret, and reference-dependent models with exogenous
reference points like the status quo. All these alternative models can be captured by (1.1)
as well but are characterized by a different assumption concerning the reference point G.
Rather than using the full outcome distribution representing expectations as the reference
point, individuals may also assess choices relative to the mean of these expectations. This
is the assumption of disappointment models (Bell, 1985; Loomes and Sugden, 1986), where
outcomes above the mean are perceived as elation and outcomes below as disappointment.
So, in models of disappointment it is assumed that the reference point is the mean of the
chosen alternative’s distribution, thus G = E[F ]. Assuming such a reference point may seem
appropriate in situations where information or framing focuses on the mean outcome. For
instance, buyers of bonds may have clear expectations on their mean performance leading
to the mean as a natural source of reference for the evaluation of their actual performance.
With disappointment as well as with expectational references, the alternatives not chosen
do not have any impact on the final evaluation of a chosen option and thus every alternative’s
appeal can be described entirely by its own attributes. By contrast, in models of regret
sentiments (see Bell, 1982, 1983; and Loomes and Sugden, 1982) possible outcomes of the
chosen gamble are compared to possible outcomes of the gambles not chosen. This kind of
behavior is motivated in the literature by an ex-ante anticipation of ex-post utility that is
driven by regret (and rejoice) feelings. With the notion of regret employed in the following
analysis all combinations of outcomes are evaluated by a regret function and weighted by
their joint probabilities. This coincides with the initial models of Bell (1982, 1983) and
Loomes and Sugden (1982) in case the individual anticipates prior to her decision that she
will finally learn the true outcome that would have resulted had she decided differently than
she has. This qualification is a direct consequence of the emphasis these models put on
the resolution of foregone alternatives for the presence of regret feelings. In order for our
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representation (1.1) to be in line with these regret models an assumption needed is that
stochastic components of alternatives are realized independently.22 Since in models of regret
the alternative not chosen is the relevant reference distribution and since in the definitions
of higher orders only pairwise choices were applied, the relevant reference distribution under
regret is unambiguous in our context. If we denote the distribution of the alternative not
chosen by F ′, models of regret assume G = F ′.
Although the theoretical literature has advanced toward endogenous reference points like
regret, disappointment, and most recently, expectational references, first models of reference-
dependent preferences (see Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) started with exogenous reference
points and they still seem to be relevant for specific decision scenarios. For instance, in
surprise situations, where it was not anticipated that a decision has to be made, the status
quo may seem to be a relevant state of comparison. Also, in experiments subjects may
not anticipate what will happen in the experiment and are unlikely to endogenize the rules
of the game in the short time until they have to make their decisions. This is, however,
not a necessary experimental feature. If the reference point is meant to be endogenous, this
could be achieved by careful experimental design and a longer time horizon. With exogenous
reference points, G can be chosen arbitrarily but we will focus on the most relevant ones in
our analysis.
The following definition specifies how the reference point is formed in these alternative
models and therefore complements (1.1) and definition 1 for the analysis of this section.
Definition 3 If the reference point is determined (i) by disappointment, G = E[Bn] and
G′ = E[An]; (ii) by regret, G = An and G′ = Bn; and if the reference point is given (iii)
exogenously, then G = G′.
If the reference point is given exogenously (case (iii) in definition 3) and is stochastic rather
than deterministic, our analysis is formally very similar to classical models of background risk
22For this reason our results do not carry over to cases where the outcome of the chosen alternative
determines the counterfactual outcome (e.g. the toss of a coin). Nevertheless, despite our qualifications of
stochastic independence and full resolution of information we perceive the remaining field of applicability as
substantial. In particular, decisions made in a market environment are often characterized by independence
and full information disclosure (e.g. the decision to buy a particular financial asset or a treasury bond).
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(Ross, 1981; Kihlstrom, Romer and Williams, 1981). In these models, preferences toward risk
are analyzed in the presence of a given independent background risk. A stochastic, exogenous
reference point is analytically equivalent to a background risk since it enters additively into
the u function. This analogy does not carry over to endogenous reference points (definition 2
and cases (i) and (ii) in definition 3). Here, the actual choice influences the reference point.
Thus, the reference point entering u(·) is in these cases not independent of the choice taken.
Despite the fact that once the reference point is determined it is as if realized independently
of the outcome of the choice, the ex-ante distribution of the reference point depends on the
actual choice.
1.5.1 Disappointment
Just as in the case of expectational references, disappointment references are in principle
endogenous since they depend on the chosen alternative. However, in our analysis for n ≥ 2
the expectational mean of Bn is always identical to the expectational mean of An and it can
therefore also be considered as exogenous. For the same reason, the results of this section
also apply to models of regret in which the reference point is the expectational mean of
the foregone alternative. This is the usual assumption in regret models where the foregone
alternative is not realized or the individual does not receive feedback on its outcomes (see
Bell, 1983; or Kra¨hmer and Stone, 2008).23 In the following, we report results for risk
preferences when reference points are formed by the expectational mean. For the gambles
used in our analysis the mean is y for even orders and y− k
2
for odd orders, except order one.
For the first order the mean is identical to the full distribution since everything is certain and
there is no risk, hence B1 = E[B1] = y and A1 = E[A1] = y− k. We therefore receive for the
first order the exact same result as with expectational references, namely that individuals
with disappointment references have monotone preferences. Proposition 6 summarizes our
23Note that in these models it is assumed that U(F |G) = ∫ u(m(x)−∫ m(r)dG(r))dF (x). This is also the
assumption of the disappointment model of Loomes and Sugden (1986). However, with m(·) being linear,
which is assumed by Loomes and Sugden (1986) as well, this is equivalent to our formulation and that of
Bell (1985) where U(F |G) = ∫ u(m(x)−m(∫ r dG(r)))dF (x).
45
Part II: Theory Chapter 1: Higher-Order Risk Preferences
results with disappointment references for all orders.
Proposition 6 If preferences depend on reference points formed by the expectational mean,
individuals
(i) have monotone preferences, that is B1|E[B1]  A1|E[A1];
(ii) are risk-averse (risk-seeking, risk-neutral), that is B2|E[B2]  (≺,∼) A2|E[A2], if and
only if [0]|[0]  (≺,∼) [ε˜1]|[0];





+ ε˜1]|[0]  (≺,∼) [−k2 + ε˜1; k2 ]|[0];
(iv) are (for n ≥ 4) risk apportioning of order n (its opposite, neither nor), that is














Concerning orders higher than one, the mean is not equal to the full distribution and
therefore results generally differ between expectational and disappointment references
(cases (ii) – (iv) in proposition 6). However, for the second order (case (ii) in proposition 6)
we find that if an individual is classified as being risk-averse (risk-seeking, risk-neutral) with
disappointment references and a given u function, he will also be risk-averse (risk-seeking,
risk-neutral) with the same u function and expectational references. As with expectational
references an individual with disappointment references is therefore risk-averse if u(·) is
strictly concave or loss-averse S-shaped and risk-neutral if u(·) is (two-fold rotational) sym-
metric. Corollary 1 also applies to disappointment references.
So, concerning the first two orders expectational and disappointment references yield the
same behavior. This is one reason why it has been difficult to discriminate between these two
forms of expectations as the relevant reference point in the empirical literature. Neither of
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the empirical studies reviewed in section 1.2.2 has been able to distinguish them. Even recent
controlled laboratory experiments that directly test expectations as the reference point, like
for instance Abeler et al. (forthcoming), Gill and Prowse (forthcoming), or Ericson and
Fuster (2010), cannot differentiate between expectational and disappointment references.
However, with respect to the third order disappointment yields a different prediction
than expectational references (case (iii) in proposition 6).24
Corollary 3 If preferences depend on reference points formed by the expectational mean,
individuals with
(i) u′′′(·) > (<,=) 0 over the whole range are prudent (imprudent, neither nor);
(ii) loss-averse S-shaped u(·) are never prudent.
This result shows that by using the third order it may well be possible to discriminate be-
tween expectational and disappointment references. One advantage of the gamble definitions
used to define higher-order risk preferences is that they are easily implemented into choice
situations in experiments. Future experiments on expectations as the relevant reference
point could therefore use this result in order to be able to distinguish between expectational
and disappointment references. Moreover, this result further shows that the implications we
derived for expectational references, i.e. the effects on precautionary saving and insurance
demand, cannot be derived with disappointment references for all functional forms of u(·),
since they heavily relied on the general absence of third-order risk preferences.
There is again no difference in predicted behavior between these two reference points for
fourth-order risk preferences. More specifically, if an individual is temperate (intemperate,
neither nor) with disappointment references for a given u function, he will also be temperate
(intemperate, neither nor) with expectational references under this u function. In fact,
individuals with disappointment references are temperate, that is B4|E[B4] is preferred to
A4|E[A4] if and only if [ε˜1; ε˜2]|[0] is preferred to [0; ε˜1 + ε˜2]|[0]. This preference holds if
24Note that case (ii) in corollary 3 can be further specified: Individuals are imprudent if u(·) is loss-averse
S-shaped without the limiting case of piecewise linear, since then individuals like gambles in losses and dislike
gambles in gains. If u(·) is piecewise linear with loss aversion, individuals are neither prudent nor imprudent.
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u(·) globally satisfies u′′′′(·) < 0. But individuals are intemperate if u(·) is loss-averse S-
shaped. Moreover, individuals are neither temperate nor intemperate for u(·) being (two-fold
rotational) symmetric around the reference point. Again, corollary 2 not only holds with
expectational but also with disappointment references. So, as in the case of second-order
risk preferences, the same behavior is predicted for both reference points using common
assumptions on u(·).
Our higher-order results under disappointment (cases (ii) – (iv) in proposition 6) after our
reference-point transformation resemble those of Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006). They
further show that common assumptions on u(·) generate contrary predictions on third-order
effects compared to both standard EUT and expectational references, and on fourth-order
effects compared to EUT. However, just as with EUT and expectational references, they
predict risk aversion as well as monotone preferences. Furthermore, similar to our findings
for expectational references, the significance of higher-order derivatives no longer applies in
general. For strictly concave u functions we still need the third and fourth derivative in order
to characterize prudence and temperance respectively. But in cases of u(·) being loss-averse
S-shaped we only need the first two derivatives in order to describe the preference relations
of those higher orders.
In all models where some form of expectations shape the reference point, we can addition-
ally ask whether these expectations form rationally, because only choices followed through
can reasonably be expected in the first place. We provided conditions in section 1.3 that
have to be fulfilled for a choice to be a UPE under expectational references. This is only
relevant in decision scenarios where the CPE concept does not apply. If the CPE concept
can be applied, any choice is in fact an equilibrium. This also holds for disappointment
references. However, if CPE cannot be used, we call the disappointment counterpart of UPE
disappointment equilibria (DE). The DE that maximize ex-ante decision utility V (·) are the
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preferred disappointment equilibria (PDE). Then,
Bn|E[Bn] is a DE ⇔ Bn|E[Bn] % An|E[Bn] and
An|E[An] is a DE ⇔ An|E[An] % Bn|E[An].
Since E[Bn] = E[An] (for n ≥ 2), we can further say that if and only if Bn|E[Bn] is strictly
preferred to An|E[An], choosing Bn is the only DE and thus PDE. Similarly, if and only
if An|E[An] is strictly preferred to Bn|E[Bn], choosing An is the only DE and thus PDE.
This holds for all but the first order. For the first order DE conditions are identical to
the UPE conditions of expectational references since E[B1] = B1 and E[A1] = A1. Here,
B1|B1 = B1|E[B1] is the only UPE and DE and thus PPE and PDE.
1.5.2 Regret
As already discussed, reference points need not necessarily be formed by the expectation
of the choice made but can also be driven by regret feelings. Then, ex-ante expectations of
the foregone alternative functions as the reference point for the choice. A prevalent question
in the regret literature is how individuals evaluate choices when there are several alternatives
initially. This is not discussed in our context because the definition of higher orders applied
here is over binary alternatives only. In the following, we derive how regret references affect
higher-order risk attitudes.
Proposition 7 If preferences depend on reference points formed by regret, individuals have
monotone preferences, that is B1|A1  A1|B1.
While proposition 7 is a standard result which is satisfied by all other models as well, our
next result differs substantially from previous findings.
Proposition 8 If preferences depend on reference points formed by regret, individuals are
always risk-neutral, that is B2|A2 ∼ A2|B2. This holds for all formulations of u(·).
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This proposition applies to all u functions, since M(B2) = M(A2) and U(B2|A2) always
contains the same elements with identical probabilities as U(A2|B2). For instance, consider
again the simple case where ε˜1 = [−ε1; ε1]. If the individual chooses the gamble B2 over A2
she will receive y with certainty. Her foregone alternative would have given her y− ε1 in half
of the cases and y + ε1 in the other half of the cases. With regret references, choosing B2
over A2 exposes her to the regret of not receiving ε1 with probability 1/2. But it also gives
her with probability 1/2 the chance of rejoicing having not lost the same amount. Therefore,
choosing B2 would give her the utility of M([y])+U([−ε1; ε1]). By contrast, if the individual
chooses A2 over B2, with equal probability she will receive y − ε1 or y + ε1 and will always
compare it to the foregone certain alternative y. Thus, choosing A2 would give her the
utility M([y − ε1; y + ε1]) + U([−ε1; ε1]). Since U(B2|A2) = U(A2|B2) = 12u(−ε1) + 12u(ε1)
the individual is indifferent between B2 and A2 for all possible shapes of u(·).
Proposition 8 is a surprising result, so it may require some further explanation. One
assumption that leads to this result is that m(·) is linear. Empirical evidence for this as-
sumption in the context of regret can be found in Bleichrodt, Cillo and Diecidue (2010).
However, even if we allow m(·) to be concave or convex instead, it can be shown that second-
order risk attitudes with regret references are solely driven by the shape of m(·). As long as
u(·) and m(·) are strictly increasing, a strictly concave (convex, linear) m function implies
risk aversion (risk seeking, risk neutrality).25 This shows that regret references do in this
case only contribute to risk aversion because EUT effects are reintroduced into the gain-loss
function. Behavior under risk is still completely driven by the shape of pure consumption
utility. Since we are interested in the pure effect of regret references without confounding
effects of standard EUT preferences, proposition 8 still constitutes an important result. The
other assumption that leads to this result is that outcome and reference distributions are
stochastically independent. This is also the reason why some models of regret, in which
outcomes and foregone alternatives are compared state-wise, conclude that regret leads to
25B2|A2  (≺,∼) A2|B2 ⇔ u(δ2) − u(−δ2) > (<,=) u(δ1) − u(−δ1) where δ1 ≡ m(y + ε1) −m(y) and
δ2 ≡ m(y) −m(y − ε1). For all strictly increasing m functions δ1, δ2 > 0. Since δ2 > (<,=) δ1 ⇔ m′′(·) <
(>,=) 0, for strictly increasing u functions it holds that B2|A2  (≺,∼) A2|B2 ⇔ m′′(·) < (>,=) 0.
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risk-averse behavior (see e.g. Bleichrodt, Cillo and Diecidue, 2010).
Unlike second-order effects, third-order effects are not eliminated by regret references.
Proposition 9 If preferences depend on reference points formed by regret, individuals are
prudent (imprudent, neither nor), that is B3|A3  (≺,∼) A3|B3, if and only if
[−k; k + ε˜1 + ε˜′1]|[0]  (≺,∼) [k;−k + ε˜1 + ε˜′1]|[0].
Proposition 9 shows under which conditions individuals are prudent if their reference point
is determined by regret. Since M(B3) = M(A3) holds and in the comparison of B3|A3
vs. A3|B3 densities of similar elements can be reduced this choice is therefore equivalent to
[B3|A3〈A3|B3〉]|[0] = [−k; k+ ε˜1 + ε˜′1]|[0] vs. [k;−k+ ε˜1 + ε˜′1]|[0] = [A3|B3〈B3|A3〉]|[0]. Similar to
the definition of prudence by Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006), an individual in proposition
9 is prudent if she prefers to face risk in the higher wealth rather than in the lower wealth
state (given her reference point was zero).
Whether individuals with reference points formed by regret are in fact prudent or im-
prudent crucially depends on the functional form of u(·). If u′′′(·) > (<,=) 0 over the
whole range, individuals are prudent (imprudent, neither nor). However, if u(·) is loss-averse
S-shaped individuals are never prudent. Corollary 3 also applies to third-order risk pref-
erences under regret. Moreover, if an individual is classified as being prudent (imprudent,
neither nor) with disappointment references and a given u function, he will also be prudent
(imprudent, neither nor) with regret references under this u function.
Since the usual assumption in the regret literature is that u′′′(·) > 0, we again observe
a clear difference in predicted behavior between expectational and regret references con-
cerning third-order risk preferences.26 Moreover, since these two reference points yielded
already different predictions concerning second-order risk preferences, the implications for
precautionary saving and insurance demand could clearly not have been generated by regret
26Note that some authors (see e.g. Loomes and Sugden, 1982) use a function Q(m(α)−m(β)) ≡ m(α)−
m(β)+u(m(α)−m(β))−u(m(β)−m(α)) in order to state that the act is chosen where α obtains in a certain
state of the world and β would have obtained by a different choice (if and only if the weighted value of Q(·) is
positive). With this formulation, it is usually assumed that Q(·) is convex, which corresponds to u(·) being
decreasingly concave (see Bleichrodt, Cillo and Diecidue, 2010). This is equivalent to the assumption that
u′(·) > 0, u′′(·) < 0, u′′′(·) > 0.
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references.
Unlike for third-order effects, we again receive a result that is independent of the func-
tional form of u(·) for fourth-order effects.
Proposition 10 If preferences depend on reference points formed by regret, individuals are
never temperate or intemperate, that is B4|A4 ∼ A4|B4. This holds for all formulations of
u(·).
Proposition 10 shows that reference-dependent preferences with reference points determined
by regret can neither be temperate nor intemperate. Thus, there exists no preference to
aggregate or disaggregate ε˜1 and ε˜2, two stochastically independent, symmetric and zero-
mean random variables.
When looking at second- to fourth-order risk preferences, an interesting pattern can be
observed when our results for different endogenous reference points are compared. Regret
and expectational references do impose different risk attitudes for all these orders. However,
disappointment references impose risk preferences that can be considered as in between
expectational and regret references. For a given functional form of gain-loss utility, predicted
behavior of disappointment references is generically different compared to expectational but
not regret references with respect to the third order, and it is different compared to regret but
not expectational references concerning the second and fourth order. This pattern generalizes
to any arbitrary order n. By comparing case (iv) of proposition 6 to theorem 1 one can easily
see that if an individual is risk apportioning of order n with n
2
∈ N (its opposite, neither
nor) for a given u function under disappointment, she will also be risk apportioning of order
n (its opposite, neither nor) under this u function with expectational references. This holds,
however, only for even but not for odd orders. In contrast, a similar relationship between
disappointment and regret only holds for odd but not for even orders. Comparing case (iv)
of proposition 6 to theorem 2 shows that if an individual is risk apportioning of order n with
n
2
/∈ N (its opposite, neither nor) for a given u function under disappointment, she will also
be risk apportioning of order n (its opposite, neither nor) with this u function under regret.
Theorem 2 generalizes our results under regret for arbitrary order n.
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Theorem 2 If preferences depend on reference points formed by regret and n ≥ 4, individ-
uals are
(i) for odd orders (n
2
/∈ N) risk apportioning of order n (its opposite, neither nor), that is





















|[0] = [An|Bn〈Bn|An〉] |[0];
(ii) for even orders (n
2
∈ N) never risk apportioning of order n or its opposite, that is
Bn|An ∼ An|Bn. This holds for all formulations of u(·).
Considering n = 1 (proposition 7) we showed that under regret first-order effects are present.
The same result was obtained for expectational (proposition 1) as well as disappointment
references (case (i) in proposition 6). However, with these reference points the result was
solely driven by pure consumption utility. By contrast, under regret the gain-loss component
of utility contributes to this result as well, since choosing a high and comparing it to a low
outcome yields the sensation of rejoice, while choosing the low outcome and comparing it to
the high outcome yields a feeling of regret. With n = 2, choosing an uncertain outcome and
comparing it to a certain outcome with an equal mean can result in sensations of both rejoice
and regret. However, choosing a certain outcome and comparing it to the risky alternative
yields exactly the same feelings of rejoice and regret. Individuals with regret references
therefore do not care whether to take or avoid a risk. Risk enters gain-loss utility either via
the outcome or via the reference point. In general, questions of aggregating or disaggregating
risk(s) become irrelevant with regret preferences since they enter the evaluation through
either the avoided or the chosen alternative. This eliminates even-order risk preferences.
Nevertheless, location still matters and makes odd-order effects relevant.
As for theorem 1, a similar, more formal intuition also applies to theorem 2. Since for
even orders −Bn  (≺,∼) − An if and only if Bn  (≺,∼) An (due to the symmetry of ε˜i
and the absence of a reduction of k) and with regret references the magnitude of both these
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opposing effects is equal, an individual is now always indifferent between Bn|An and An|Bn
for even n. For odd orders note that −Bn  (≺,∼) − An if and only if Bn ≺ (,∼) An
(again due to the existence of a k reduction in addition to symmetric ε˜i). Thus, an individual
now prefers Bn|An to An|Bn if and only if she is risk apportioning of order n.
Comparing theorem 2 to 1 highlights the fact that reference points formed by regret
in a way induce opposite risk preferences as those formed by expectations. With regret,
preferences of even orders vanish while those of odd orders may well be present. By contrast,
with reference points formed by expectations preferences of odd orders are absent and those
of even orders are still present. One implication is that reference-dependent risk preferences
of any order are only affected by either expectations or regret. This suggests that both
forms of endogenous reference points rather supplement than collide with each other. Our
findings stress the advantage of jointly analyzing regret and expectational references in a
unified framework. Until now, both streams of the literature have been analyzed separately
despite the fact that they addressed similar questions.
1.5.3 Exogenous Reference Points
Unlike endogenous reference points like expectational, disappointment, or regret refer-
ences, exogenous reference points are usually of an ad hoc nature. This is because almost
every assumption on exogenous reference points can be supported by some reasoning. In the
following, we concentrate on the intuitively most appealing and most frequently discussed
reference points.
Assuming the status quo is not only very popular, but it is also easily assessed. Further-
more, it is undeniably exogenous at a given point in time. For these reasons the status quo
is advantageous if limited information is available on processes prior to the decision at hand.
Also, it does not require any assumption on how individuals form their beliefs over future
states. Only the minimum assumption of an individual’s awareness of her current state is
necessary. Independently of these considerations the status quo may be the natural reference
point when decisions come as a surprise. In our analysis wealth is normalized such that the
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status quo is 0.27
Although the status quo is often an obvious candidate for the reference point in experi-
ments, it seems highly sensitive to framing effects. In general, many framing situations are
possible and could support various exogenous reference points. If, for instance, an experi-
ment was actually conducted over the gambles we used in our definitions, the reference point
could be influenced in several ways. However, we focus firstly on situations where the framing
of the choice reduces complexity. These are scenarios in which the subject decides in which
situation she accepts an additional ‘harm’, i.e. −k or ε˜i (see Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger,
2006). As in the experiment of Deck and Schlesinger (2010), which tests for prudence and
temperance in the laboratory, a subject has to decide whether to take an unavoidable risk
in a high- or low-wealth state (prudence) or in a certain or uncertain state (temperance).
Formally, she has to add ε˜1 to one of the outcomes in the gamble [y; y − k] (prudence) or
[y; y + ε˜2] (temperance) and these gambles may then act as the subject’s reference point.
This is, however, only the case if the reference point adjusts sufficiently fast. An equally
complex framing to measure prudence, which has been used in the experiments of Deck
and Schlesinger (2010) and Ebert and Wiesen (2010), would be the task of assigning a sure
reduction of k to one of the outcomes in the gamble [y; y + ε˜1]. Again, this gamble may
then act as subjects’ reference point.28 Secondly, y is the single element that is present in all
possible states of the world. It may therefore act as a mental anchor and thus be a natural
point of comparison.
In Tables 1.1 to 1.3 we summarize our results for these reference scenarios. The first
column defines the assumed exogenous reference point. We computed Bn|· and An|· given
these reference points with n ∈ {2, 3, 4}. In the second column we state what the comparison
of these gambles reduces to, namely [Bn| · 〈An|·〉]|[0] vs. [An| · 〈Bn|·〉]|[0]. If and only if the
former gamble is preferred to the latter, Bn|·  An|·. In general, our findings for exogenous
27Other deterministic reference points could be generated by past outcomes (habit formation) or self-
selected goals (aspiration levels). We do not analyze these scenarios in our static framework.
28Note that it is not required to implement the higher-order gamble definitions in such compound ways.
In our experiment presented in chapter 4 all gambles were presented in a non-compound format which would
suggest using 0 as the reference point even if the adjustment happens fast.
55
Part II: Theory Chapter 1: Higher-Order Risk Preferences
Table 1.1: Second-order effects with exogenous references
reference equivalent to globally linear w/ globally symmetric S-shape (w/
point evaluating linear loss aversion standard S-shape loss aversion)
·|[0] [y]|[0] vs. [y + ε˜1]|[0] B2|· ∼ A2|· B2|· %1 A2|· B2|·  A2|· B2| · %≺
2
A2|· B2| · %≺
3
A2|·
·|[y] [0]|[0] vs. [ε˜1]|[0] B2|· ∼ A2|· B2|·  A2|· B2|·  A2|· B2|· ∼ A2|· B2|·  A2|·
Notes:
1) B2|·  A2|· if −ε1 < y < ε1; B2|· ∼ A2|· if ε1 ≤ y or y ≤ −ε1; thus determined over the full range.
2) B2|·  A2|· if 0 < y; B2|· ∼ A2|· if y = 0; B2|· ≺ A2|· if y < 0; thus determined over the full range.
3) B2|·  A2|· if ε1 ≤ y; B2|· ≺ A2|· if y ≤ −ε1; generally ambiguous if −ε1 < y < ε1.
reference points depend on the functional form of the evaluation function u(·). As in the
previous sections, we again distinguish between common assumptions about u(·) and present
their corresponding results in columns three to seven.
Table 1.2: Third-order effects with exogenous references
reference equivalent to globally linear w/ globally symmetric S-shape (w/
point evaluating linear loss aversion standard S-shape loss aversion)
·|[0] [y−k; y+ ε˜1]|[0] vs.




A3|· B3|·  A3|· B3| · %≺
2
A3|· B3| · %≺
2
A3|·
·|[y] [−k; ε˜1]|[0] vs.
[0;−k + ε˜1]|[0] B3|· ∼ A3|· B3|· ≺ A3|· B3|·  A3|· B3|· ≺ A3|· B3|· ≺ A3|·
·|[y; y + ε˜1] [−k; 2ε˜1]|[0] vs.[0;−k + 2ε˜1]|[0] B3|· ∼ A3|· B3|· ≺ A3|· B3|·  A3|· B3|· ≺ A3|· B3|· ≺ A3|·
·|[y; y − k] [−k; k + ε˜1]|[0] vs.
[k;−k + ε˜1]|[0] B3|· ∼ A3|· B3|· -
3 A3|· B3|·  A3|· B3|· ≺ A3|· B3|· ≺ A3|·
Notes:
1) B3|· ∼ A3|· if y ≤ −ε1, or ε1 + k ≤ y; B3|· ≺ A3|· if y = 0; generally ambiguous if −ε1 < y < ε1 + k ∧ y 6= 0, but B3|·  A3|·
if k < y < ε1, B3|· ∼ A3|· if ε1 < y < k − ε1, and B3|· ≺ A3|· if k − ε1 < y < 0.
2) B3|·  (∼,≺) A3|· if either y ≤ −ε1 or ε1+k ≤ y, and additionally u′′′(·) > (=, <) 0; generally ambiguous if −ε1 < y < ε1+k,
or the sign of u′′′(·) is not constant over the full range.
3) B3|· ∼ A3|· if ε1 ≤ k; B3|· ≺ A3|· if k < ε1; thus determined over the full range.
In column three u(·) is globally linear. In the fourth column we consider piecewise linear
gain-loss utility with a unique kink at 0 inducing loss aversion. In the fifth column we analyze
a standard u function that has derivatives that alternate in sign with u′(·) being positive.
Column six considers a function that exhibits identical diminishing sensitivity for losses and
gains. In column seven we report results for S-shaped u functions that are asymmetric, either
due to loss aversion or faster diminishing sensitivity in gains than in losses, or both. This
functional form is the traditional assumption made in prospect theory. All results in Tables
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1.1 to 1.3 are formally derived for two-outcome ε˜i, hence ε˜i = [−εi, εi].
Table 1.3: Fourth-order effects with exogenous references
reference equivalent to globally linear w/ globally symmetric S-shape (w/
point evaluating linear loss aversion standard S-shape loss aversion)
·|[0] [y+ε˜1; y+ε˜2]|[0] vs.




A4|· B4|·  A4|· B4| · %≺
2
A4|· B4| · %≺
2
A4|·
·|[y] [ε˜1; ε˜2]|[0] vs.
[0; ε˜1 + ε˜2]|[0] B4|· ∼ A4|· B4|· ≺ A4|· B4|·  A4|· B4|· ∼ A4|· B4|· ≺ A4|·
·|[y; y + ε˜2] [2ε˜2; ε˜1]|[0] vs.
[0; 2ε˜2 + ε˜1]|[0]
B4|· ∼ A4|· B4|· ≺ A4|· B4|·  A4|· B4|· ∼ A4|· B4|· ≺ A4|·
Notes:
1) B4|· ∼ A4|· if ε1 +ε2 ≤ y, y = 0, or y ≤ −ε1−ε2; B4|·  A4|· if −ε1−ε2 < y ≤ −max{ε1, ε2}, or max{ε1, ε2} < y < ε1 +ε2;
generally ambiguous if −max{ε1, ε2} < y < max{ε1, ε2}.
2) B4|·  (∼,≺) A4|· if either y ≤ −ε1 − ε2 or ε1 + ε2 ≤ y, and additionally u′′′′(·) < (=, >) 0; generally ambiguous if
−ε1 − ε2 < y < ε1 + ε2, or the sign of u′′′′(·) is not constant over the full range.
As can be seen from Tables 1.1 to 1.3 results are rather ambiguous in case the reference
point is the status quo. This is due to the fact that individuals can end up making gains
or losses depending on the specific parameter combinations of y, k, ε1, and ε2. In the other
reference scenarios initial wealth y cancels out since it is part of both the reference point
and the gambles evaluated. Results for these reference scenarios are therefore more straight-
forward.29 Generally, they vary widely with the functional form considered. Nevertheless, a
few tendencies seem prevalent. While not stated explicitly, exogenous reference points also
yield monotone preferences. As already extensively discussed in the existing literature, we
further find that loss aversion induces risk aversion. But, more surprisingly, loss aversion
also induces imprudence and intemperance in many cases. Assuming a S-shaped u function
does only generate risk aversion in the asymmetric case (column seven). Such a requirement
is not needed for the third order. Here, an S-shaped u function always induces imprudence
in cases where y is an element of the reference point. These results clearly show that ex-
ogenous reference points do not yield the same predictions on third-order risk preferences
as expectational references. Again, the implications of expectational references we derived
for precautionary saving and insurance demand would therefore not obtain with exogenous
29Note that in case of a fixed, real-numbered reference point, as in the first two rows of Tables 1.1 to
1.3, our reference-dependent model reduces to a general EUT model if the functional form of u(·) does not
depend on the reference point (see Wakker, 2005).
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reference points.
1.6 Conclusion
Models of reference-dependent preferences have been proposed to resolve empirical puz-
zles concerning second-order risk preferences. There has been no attempt to consider higher
orders, like the third-order effect of prudence or the fourth-order effect of temperance, in
these models in order to see whether they can resolve empirical puzzles concerning higher
orders as well. This chapter is a first attempt in this direction. We first analyzed higher-order
risk preferences in Ko˝szegi and Rabin’s (2006, 2007) model of expectation-based reference
dependence. Risk preferences of odd orders (except order one) were generally found to be
absent while even-order risk attitudes still exist in their model. These results show that
higher-order risk preferences under reference dependence follow a completely different pat-
tern than in classical EUT models as they do not depend on the previous order. For example,
if a certain order delivers indifference in EUT, the next higher order has to deliver indiffer-
ence as well. This is not the case under reference dependence. Therefore, our results have
strong implications in situations where characteristics of one order are used to derive state-
ments on a succeeding order. We considered precautionary saving and optimal demand for
insurance as illustrating examples for the implications of our results. In a simple model we
showed that seemingly sub-optimal amounts of precautionary saving under EUT may well
be optimal under reference dependence. Also, the importance of insurance is less mitigated
by buffer-stock saving with such preferences. These implications were formally derived in
a two-period model. In order to verify whether the observed empirical patterns also match
the optimal behavior of individuals under reference dependence quantitatively, a dynamic
analysis would be necessary. However, this would additionally require a dynamic model of
belief formation concerning own behavior in all future periods. Such a task is left for future
research.
In a second step, we further showed that alternative behavioral models cannot resolve
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these empirical puzzles as they predict different patterns of risk attitudes toward higher
orders. In this robustness analysis we considered other endogenous as well as exogenous
reference points. While exogenous reference points often seem to be of an ad-hoc nature,
endogenous reference points generally account for the fact that individuals anticipate how
their behavior will have a feedback on their preferences. With reference points being en-
dogenously formed by the alternative choice, as in models of regret, risk preferences toward
even orders are absent while those of odd orders are present. With reference points being en-
dogenously formed by the mean of expectations, as in models of disappointment, results can
be considered as in between expectational and regret references. Note that all these models
predict monotone preferences. However, only concerning higher even orders expectation-
based reference dependence and disappointment models yield the same predicted behavior
and only with respect to higher odd orders models of regret and disappointment yield the
same behavior. Regret models and expectation-based reference dependence never induce the
same behavior as they yield opposite patterns of higher-order risk attitudes.
Together with our results on exogenous reference points, which generally differ from
expectation-based reference dependence, our robustness analysis clearly showed that higher-
order risk preferences under expectation-based reference dependence follow a different pat-
tern than under alternative assumptions on the reference point. Alternative behavioral mod-
els can therefore in general not resolve the same empirical puzzles that can be resolved with
expectation-based reference dependence. Besides this observation, comparing our results
on endogenous reference points offers further interesting insights. On the one hand, they
emphasize a new way, for instance via third-order risk preferences, to discriminate between
expectation-based reference dependence and models of disappointment in laboratory exper-
iments. This has not been possible in the past and the gamble definitions of Eeckhoudt and
Schlesinger (2006) we used in our analysis are especially advantageous in this respect. On
the other hand, they show that models of regret and expectation-based reference dependence
cannot influence risk preferences of a certain order simultaneously. Thus, risk preferences of
a particular order can only be influenced by either expectational or regret references. The
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notion that expectations and regret influence human decision making under uncertainty in
distinctively different ways is also suggested by neurological research. For instance, Camille
et al. (2004) and Coricelli et al. (2005) find that counterfactual thinking on the alternative
choice is activated in a different brain region than counterfactual thinking on one’s choice
taken.
Although we analyzed the implications of our results for two specific examples only, i.e.
precautionary saving and insurance demand, they may well be of significance in other areas
as well where higher orders have shown to play an important role. For instance, they could
lead to further insights for asset demand under background risk or for precautionary labor
supply. They might even influence normative criteria like the precautionary principle that
is frequently used in international treaties and environmental regulation. Future research
should therefore analyze further applications where our results on reference-dependent risk
preferences of higher orders may be helpful to yield better predictions than those of classical
EUT models.
1.7 Appendix: Proofs
Proof. [Proposition 1] Since U(B1|B1) = u(m(y) − m(y)) = u(0) and U(A1|A1) =
u(m(y − k) −m(y − k)) = u(0), it follows that U(B1|B1) = U(A1|A1). Then, V (B1|B1) =
M(B1) + U(B1|B1) = m(y) + u(0) and V (A1|A1) = M(A1) + U(A1|A1) = m(y − k) + u(0).
Since m(·) is strictly increasing and k > 0, it follows that V (B1|B1) > V (A1|A1) and thus
B1|B1  A1|A1.
Lemma 1 M(Bn) = M(An) holds for all n ≥ 2. It therefore holds for all n ≥ 2 that
Bn|C  (≺,∼) An|C ⇔ V (Bn|C) > (<,=) V (An|C)⇔ U(Bn|C) > (<,=) U(An|C)
where C is any arbitrary gamble.
Proof. [Lemma 1] From E[ε˜1] = 0, the linearity ofm(·), and the definitions ofB2, A2, B3, A3,
it follows that M(B2) = M(A2) and M(B3) = M(A3). Using these results, E[ε˜i] = 0 ∀i,
and the linearity of m(·), it follows from the definitions of Bn and An that M(Bn) = M(An)
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also holds for n ≥ 4. Thus, for all n ≥ 2 and C being any arbitrary gamble it holds that
Bn|C  (≺,∼) An|C ⇔ V (Bn|C) > (<,=) V (An|C)⇔ U(Bn|C) > (<,=) U(An|C).
Proof. [Proposition 2] From lemma 1 it follows that B2|B2  (≺,∼) A2|A2 ⇔
U(B2|B2) > (<,=) U(A2|A2). Evaluating B2|B2 by U(·) means getting B2 = y and also
expecting B2 = y. Therefore,
U(B2|B2) = u(m(y)−m(y)) = u(0).












where the last equality holds because of the symmetry of all ε˜i and the linearity of m(·). From
E[ε˜1] = 0, E[ε˜′1] = 0 and the stochastic independence of ε˜1 and ε˜′1 it follows that E[ε˜1+ε˜′1] = 0.
From E[ε˜1 + ε˜′1] = 0 and the linearity of m(·) it follows that M([ε˜1 + ε˜′1]) = M([0]). Thus,
we can state that
V (B2|B2) > (<,=) V (A2|A2)⇔ V ([0]|[0]) > (<,=) V ([ε˜1 + ε˜′1]|[0]),
and therefore
B2|B2  (≺,∼) A2|A2 ⇔ [0]|[0]  (≺,∼) [ε˜1 + ε˜′1]|[0].
Alternatively, we can also state that both gambles reduce to
[B2|B2〈A2|A2〉] |[0] = [0]|[0] and [A2|A2〈B2|B2〉] |[0] = [ε˜1 + ε˜′1]|[0]
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when compared with each other.





u(m(y − k)−m(y − k)) + 1
4
u(m(y − k)−m(y + ε˜′1))
+1
4
















where the last equality holds because of the symmetry of all ε˜i and the linearity of m(·).







u(m(y)−m(y − k + ε˜′1))
+1
4











u(k + ε˜′1) +
1
4





where the last equality holds because of the symmetry of all ε˜i. Since ε˜1 and ε˜
′
1 are identically
distributed we can conclude that U(B3|B3) = U(A3|A3) regardless of the shape of u(·).
Lemma 1 showed that M(B3) = M(A3). From M(B3) = M(A3) and U(B3|B3) = U(A3|A3)
it follows that V (B3|B3) = V (A3|A3) and thus B3|B3 ∼ A3|A3. Alternatively, we can also
state that both gambles reduce to
[B3|B3〈A3|A3〉] |[0] = [C]|[0] and [A3|A3〈B3|B3〉] |[0] = [C]|[0] (1.16)
when compared with each other, where C denotes any arbitrary gamble.
Proof. [Proposition 4] Follows directly from theorem 1.
Proof. [Theorem 1] To prove both part (i) and part (ii) of theorem 1 (where we use lemma
1, ε˜i being symmetric with E[ε˜i] = 0 ∀i, and the linearity of m(·)) it helps to show first that
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To show this, note that [Bn|Bn〈An|An〉]|[0] and [An|An〈Bn|Bn〉]|[0] can be expressed as gambles
containing only Bn and An.
Bn|Bn = [Bn −Bn] |[0] and An|An = [An − An] |[0]
⇒ [Bn|Bn〈An|An〉]|[0] = [Bn −Bn] |[0] and [An|An〈Bn|Bn〉]|[0] = [An − An] |[0],
and therefore
[Bn−2|Bn−2〈An−2|An−2〉]|[0] = [Bn−2 −Bn−2] |[0] (1.19)
and [An−2|An−2〈Bn−2|Bn−2〉]|[0] = [An−2 − An−2] |[0]. (1.20)
However, [Bn|Bn〈An|An〉]|[0] and [An|An〈Bn|Bn〉]|[0] can also be expressed as gambles containing
only Bn−2 and An−2 since Bn = [An−2;Bn−2 + ε˜int(n
2





An−2 − An−2;An−2 −Bn−2 + ε˜′int(n
2
)
;Bn−2 − An−2 + ε˜int(n
2
);











Bn−2 −Bn−2;Bn−2 − An−2 + ε˜′int(n
2
)
;An−2 −Bn−2 + ε˜int(n
2
);
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because two of the elements cancel out when the two gambles are compared with each other.
Finally, inserting (1.19) and (1.20) into (1.21) and (1.22) delivers (1.17) and (1.18). Part (i) of







In order to prove part (ii) of theorem 1 (n
2
/∈ N) we again use (1.17) and (1.18). Suppose
n = 5, then
[B5|B5〈A5|A5〉]|[0] = [A3|A3〈B3|B3〉;B3|B3〈A3|A3〉+ ε˜2 + ε˜′2] |[0] (1.23)
and [A5|A5〈B5|B5〉]|[0] = [B3|B3〈A3|A3〉;A3|A3〈B3|B3〉+ ε˜2 + ε˜′2] |[0]. (1.24)
By inserting (1.16) into (1.23) and (1.24) and canceling ε˜2 and ε˜
′
2 in both gambles we then
get
[B5|B5〈A5|A5〉]|[0] = [C]|[0] and [A5|A5〈B5|B5〉]|[0] = [C]|[0]. (1.25)
⇒ B5|B5 ∼ A5|A5.
Since (1.25), by the same logic it must also hold that [B7|B7〈A7|A7〉]|[0] = [C]|[0] and
[A7|A7〈B7|B7〉]|[0] = [C]|[0]. Continuing this reasoning yields
[Bn|Bn〈An|An〉]|[0] = [C]|[0] and [An|An〈Bn|Bn〉]|[0] = [C]|[0]
⇒ Bn|Bn ∼ An|An
for n
2
/∈ N and C being any arbitrary gamble.
Proof. [Proposition 5] First, we show that the second-order conditions are met for the
optimal values in the benchmark model. The second partial derivatives of V b(·) are
∂2V b
(∂ki)2
= (1 + λ)2c′′(y − ks − (1 + λ)ki) + 2c′′(y − ε1 + ks + 2ki) < 0,
∂2V b
(∂ks)2
= c′′(y − ks − (1 + λ)ki) + 1
2
c′′(y − ε1 + ks + 2ki) + 12c′′(y + ε1 + ks) < 0,
∂2V b
∂ks∂ki
= (1 + λ)c′′(y − ks − (1 + λ)ki) + c′′(y − ε1 + ks + 2ki) < 0.
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c′′(y − ε1 + ks + 2ki)c′′(y − ks − (1 + λ)ki)
+1
2
c′′(y + ε1 + ks)
[
(1 + λ)2c′′(y − ks − (1 + λ)ki) + 2c′′(y − ε1 + ks + 2ki)
]
> 0.
Now, we show that the second-order conditions are met for the values solving the first-order
conditions in the hybrid model. Then conditions (1.13) and (1.15) in fact have to hold in
the optimum. The second partial derivatives of V h(·) are
∂2V h
(∂ki)2
= (1 + λ)2c′′(y − ks − (1 + λ)ki) + 2c′′(y − ε1 + ks + 2ki)
+u′′(2ε− 2ki) + u′′(−2ε+ 2ki) < 0, (1.26)
∂2V h
(∂ks)2
= c′′(y − ks − (1 + λ)ki) + 1
2




= (1 + λ)c′′(y − ks − (1 + λ)ki) + c′′(y − ε1 + ks + 2ki) < 0, (1.28)
where we used the assumption of u′′(τ) ≤ −u′′(−τ) ∀τ > 0 to derive (1.26). The determinant






c′′(y − ε1 + ks + 2ki)c′′(y − ks − (1 + λ)ki)
+1
2
c′′(y + ε1 + ks)
[






u′′(2ε− 2ki) + u′′(−2ε+ 2ki)] > 0, (1.29)
where we again used the assumption u′′(τ) ≤ −u′′(−τ) ∀τ > 0 as well as (1.27). We can
now conclude from (1.15) that dki > 0 has to hold if we use (1.27) and (1.29). Using this
result it follows from (1.13), (1.27), and (1.28) that dks < 0 which completes the proof.
Proof. [Proposition 6] Parts (i)-(iv) of proposition 6 will be proved subsequently. Part
(i) follows directly from the proof of proposition 1 since B1 = E[B1] and A1 = E[A1].
For proving part (ii), first note that from lemma 1 it follows that B2|E[B2]  (≺,∼)
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A2|E[A2]⇔ U(B2|E[B2]) > (<,=) U(A2|E[A2]). Evaluating B2|E[B2] by U(·) means getting
B2 = y and expecting E[B2] = y. Thus,
U(B2|E[B2]) = u(m(y)−m(y)) = u(0).
Evaluating A2|E[A2] by U(·) means getting A2 = y + ε˜1 and expecting E[A2] = y since










u(m(y + ε˜1)−m(y))dF (ε˜1) =
∫
u(ε˜1)dF (ε˜1),
where the last equality holds because of the linearity of m(·). From E[ε˜1] = 0 and m(·) being
linear it follows that M([ε˜1]) = M([0]). We can therefore state that
V (B2|E[B2]) > (<,=) V (A2|E[A2])⇔ V ([0]|[0]) > (<,=) V ([ε˜1]|[0]),
and hence
B2|E[B2]  (≺,∼) A2|E[A2]⇔ [0]|[0]  (≺,∼) [ε˜1]|[0].









(y − k) + 1
2









(y − k) + 1
2





























where the second equality holds because E[ε˜′1] = 0 and the last equality holds since m(·) is
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where again the second equality holds because E[ε˜′1] = 0 and the last equality holds since
m(·) is linear. Lemma 1 showed that M(B3) = M(A3). From E[ε˜1] = 0 and the linearity of




+ ε˜1]) = M([−k2 + ε˜1; k2 ]), and we can therefore state that
V (B3|E[B3]) > (<,=) V (A3|E[A3])⇔ V ([−k2 ; k2 + ε˜1]|[0]) > (<,=) V ([−k2 + ε˜1; k2 ]|[0]),
and hence
B3|E[B3]  (≺,∼) A3|E[A3]⇔ [−k2 ; k2 + ε˜1]|[0]  (≺,∼) [−k2 + ε˜1; k2 ]|[0].
In order to prove part (iv) note that from the definitions of Bn and An it follows that
E[Bn] = E[An] = y if n2 ∈ N∧n ≥ 2 and that E[Bn] = E[An] = y−k2 if n2 /∈ N∧n ≥ 3. Consider
first the case where n
2
∈ N∧n ≥ 4. Then, Bn|E[Bn] = [Bn−y] and An|E[An] = [An−y] holds
for all n ≥ 2 with n
2
∈ N. Since Bn = [An−2;Bn−2 + ε˜int(n
2
)] and An = [Bn−2;An−2 + ε˜int(n
2
)]
we get for any arbitrary n ≥ 4 with n
2
∈ N that
Bn|E[Bn] = [An−2 − y;Bn−2 − y + ε˜int(n
2
)]|[0]
= [An−2|E[An−2];Bn−2|E[Bn−2] + ε˜int(n
2
)]|[0],
and An|E[An] = [Bn−2 − y;An−2 − y + ε˜int(n
2
)]|[0]
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Now consider the other case where n
2
/∈ N ∧ n ≥ 5. Then, Bn|E[Bn] = [Bn − (y − k2 )] and
An|E[An] = [An− (y− k2 )] holds for all n ≥ 3 with n2 /∈ N. Since Bn = [An−2;Bn−2 + ε˜int(n2 )]
and An = [Bn−2;An−2 + ε˜int(n
2
)] we get for any arbitrary n ≥ 5 with n2 /∈ N that
Bn|E[Bn] = [An−2 − (y − k2 );Bn−2 − (y − k2 ) + ε˜int(n2 )]|[0]
= [An−2|E[An−2];Bn−2|E[Bn−2] + ε˜int(n
2
)]|[0],
and An|E[An] = [Bn−2 − (y − k2 );An−2 − (y − k2 ) + ε˜int(n2 )]|[0]
= [Bn−2|E[Bn−2];An−2|E[An−2] + ε˜int(n
2
)]|[0].
Lemma 1 showed that M(Bn) = M(An) ∀n ≥ 2. From the fact that E[ε˜i] = 0 always





)]), and we can therefore state that
V (Bn|E[Bn]) > (<,=) V (An|E[An])
⇔ V ([An−2|E[An−2];Bn−2|E[Bn−2] + ε˜int(n
2
)]|[0])




Bn|E[Bn]  (≺,∼) An|E[An]
⇔ [An−2|E[An−2];Bn−2|E[Bn−2] + ε˜int(n
2
)]|[0]
 (≺,∼) [Bn−2|E[Bn−2];An−2|E[An−2] + ε˜int(n
2
)]|[0].
Proof. [Proposition 7] Since U(B1|A1) = u(m(y) − m(y − k)) = u(k) and U(A1|B1) =
u(m(y − k)−m(y)) = u(−k) (because of the linearity of m(·)), it follows that V (B1|A1) =
M(B1) +U(B1|A1) = m(y) +u(k) and V (A1|A1) = M(A1) +U(A1|B1) = m(y−k) +u(−k).
Since m(·) and u(·) are strictly increasing and k > 0 it follows that V (B1|A1) > V (A1|B1)
and therefore B1|A1  A1|B1.
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Proof. [Proposition 8] Evaluating B2|A2 by U(·) delivers
U(B2|A2) =
∫





Evaluating A2|B2 by U(·) delivers
U(A2|B2) =
∫
u(m(y + ε˜1)−m(y))dF (ε˜1) =
∫
u(ε˜1)dF (ε˜1).
The last equalities in both cases hold due to the symmetry of all ε˜i and the linearity of
m(·). Since ε˜1 and ε˜′1 are identically distributed we can conclude that U(B2|A2) = U(A2|B2)
regardless of the shape of u(·). Using M(B2) = M(A2) from lemma 1 and U(B2|A2) =
U(A2|B2), it follows that V (B2|A2) = V (A2|B2) and thus B2|A2 ∼ A2|B2. Alternatively, we
can also state that both gambles reduce to
[B2|A2〈A2|B2〉] |[0] = [C]|[0] and [A2|B2〈B2|A2〉] |[0] = [C]|[0] (1.30)
when compared with each other, where C denotes any arbitrary gamble.
Proof. [Proposition 9] From lemma 1 we know that B3|A3  (≺,∼) A3|B3 ⇔





u(m(y − k)−m(y)) + 1
4
u(m(y − k)−m(y − k + ε˜′1))
+1
4
























where the last equality holds because of the symmetry of all ε˜i and the linearity of m(·).
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where again the last equality holds because of the symmetry of all ε˜i and the linearity of
m(·). Comparing U(B3|A3) to U(A3|B3) yields























From E[ε˜1] = 0 and E[ε˜′1] = 0 it follows that E[k + ε˜1 + ε˜′1] = k and E[−k + ε˜1 + ε˜′1] = −k.
With m(·) being linear it follows that M([−k; k + ε˜1 + ε˜′1]) = M([k;−k + ε˜1 + ε˜′1]). Thus,
we can state that
V (B3|A3) > (<,=) V (A3|B3)⇔ V ([−k; k + ε˜1 + ε˜′1]|[0]) > (<,=) V ([k;−k + ε˜1 + ε˜′1]|[0]),
and thus
B3|A3  (≺,∼) A3|B3 ⇔ [−k; k + ε˜1 + ε˜′1]|[0]  (≺,∼) [k;−k + ε˜1 + ε˜′1]|[0].
Alternatively, we can also state that both gambles reduce to
[B3|A3〈A3|B3〉] |[0] = [−k; k + ε˜1 + ε˜′1]|[0] and [A3|B3〈B3|A3〉] |[0] = [k;−k + ε˜1 + ε˜′1]|[0]
when compared with each other.
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Proof. [Proposition 10] Follows directly from theorem 2.
Proof. [Theorem 2] In the following proof of theorem 2 we again first show that a gener-
alization of the first part holds and then that this generalization implies both parts of the
theorem (where we use lemma 1, ε˜i being symmetric with E[ε˜i] = 0 ∀i, and the linearity of

























To show this, note that [Bn|An〈An|Bn〉] |[0] and [An|Bn〈Bn|An〉] |[0] can be expressed as gambles
containing only Bn and An.
Bn|An = [Bn − An] |[0] and An|Bn = [An −Bn] |[0]
⇒ [Bn|An〈An|Bn〉] |[0] = [Bn − An] |[0] and [An|Bn〈Bn|An〉] |[0] = [An −Bn] |[0],
and therefore
[Bn−2|An−2〈An−2|Bn−2〉] |[0] = [Bn−2 − An−2] |[0] (1.33)
and [An−2|Bn−2〈Bn−2|An−2〉] |[0] = [An−2 −Bn−2] |[0]. (1.34)
But [Bn|An〈An|Bn〉] |[0] and [An|Bn〈Bn|An〉] |[0] can also be expressed as gambles containing
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only Bn−2 and An−2 as Bn = [An−2;Bn−2 + ε˜int(n
2





An−2 −Bn−2;An−2 − An−2 + ε˜′int(n
2
)
;Bn−2 −Bn−2 + ε˜int(n
2
);











Bn−2 − An−2;Bn−2 −Bn−2 + ε˜′int(n
2
)
;An−2 − An−2 + ε˜int(n
2
);









⇒ [Bn|An〈An|Bn〉] |[0] =
[









and [An|Bn〈Bn|An〉] |[0] =
[
















are valued equally and therefore two of the elements cancel out when
the two gambles are compared. Finally, inserting (1.33) and (1.34) into (1.35) and (1.36)
delivers (1.31) and (1.32). Part (i) of theorem 2 follows directly from (1.31) and (1.32) when







To prove part (ii) of theorem 2 (n
2
























By inserting (1.30) into (1.37) and (1.38) and canceling ε˜2 and ε˜
′
2 in both gambles we then
get
[B4|A4〈A4|B4〉]|[0] = [C]|[0] and [A4|B4〈B4|A4〉]|[0] = [C]|[0]. (1.39)
⇒ B4|A4 ∼ A4|B4.
Since (1.39), by the same logic it must also hold that [B6|A6〈A6|B6〉]|[0] = [C]|[0] and
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[A6|B6〈B6|A6〉]|[0] = [C]|[0]. Continuing this reasoning yields
[Bn|An〈An|Bn〉]|[0] = [C]|[0] and [An|Bn〈Bn|An〉]|[0] = [C]|[0]
⇒ Bn|An ∼ An|Bn
for n
2





In this chapter I will introduce a model of multi-attribute reference-dependent anticipa-
tory utility. It is developed along similar notions as the model of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009).
Also, the deviations of the two models can be expressed in terms of easily identifiable struc-
tural assumptions. Therefore, I will give a thorough comparison of these two alternative
models as I proceed in the analysis. The crucial difference of the two models is how an-
ticipatory utility is generated if the pure consumption utility function depends on several
arguments.
The notion that the anticipation of future events can generate feelings in the presence
that in turn constitute experience utility has been first expressed in a formal model by
Loewenstein (1987). He models deterministic streams of consumption and the resulting
amounts of direct and anticipatory utility. However, Caplin and Leahy (2001) emphasized
that the influence of anticipation may be especially pronounced in settings of uncertainty. We
can think of the anxiety a patient faces before receiving a medical diagnosis or the suspense a
gambler experiences before learning whether his wager pays off. Although in both situations
the envisioned events might not have a high probability, they can nevertheless have a huge
influence on the utility experienced by the individuals. Both models of Loewenstein (1987)
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and Caplin and Leahy (2001) have in common that the absolute level of anticipated future
direct consumption utility is the basis of anticipatory utility.
While utility from anticipation may appear like a reasonable concept at first glance, it
raises additional issues when considering the specifics of modeling. The assumption that the
expected absolute value of the consumption of a later period equals anticipatory utility yields
fairly strong implications in some settings. Contrary to such a model we can imagine for
instance that the effects of anticipation can wear out very quickly as the individual adjusts
to the new mind-set of future events. Similarly, especially those anticipations create strong
feelings of excitement that were subject to recent change in the expectation of the future.
An alternative choice of modeling utility from anticipations would be that changes in
expectations are carriers of utility. Consider the following example introduced by Matthey
(2008). Assume that an individual gets a note from his employer that because of a change in
the pay scale he will receive a raise in his monthly wage, starting in three months. Further
assume that this comes as an unexpected surprise to him. A few days later he learns that the
notification was an unintended mistake and the change in the pay scale was not implemented.
Even if the individual did not exercise any real options in the last days due to the erroneous
belief of a future pay raise we could imagine that the overall effect on experienced utility is
non-zero. In classical models of expected utility (EUT) and non-EUT where utility solely
depends on physical consequences there cannot be any effect on utility. If we would include
the absolute value of the anticipated future level of consumption, as in Caplin and Leahy
(2001), we would receive the prediction that the individual is better off, because for a few
days he was elated by the outlook on a better future. According to such a theory, the utility
from expectation after he learned that there will be no pay-raise is the same as in a situation
where he never thought there would be a raise. However, we may intuitively think that the
individual is worse off in the situation where he erred. The reason is that we think he suffers
from disappointment after he learns that he overestimated his future wealth. Although we
might acknowledge that at the point of time receiving the good news he might have been
delighted, we are tempted to think that the latter disappointment may prevail.
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The model by Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009) captures such situations and many similar ones.
The precise model might seem very complex at the outset but nevertheless it delivers clear-
cut predictions in many important scenarios.
One example is that the model generates specific preferences for information, even if this
information does not aid in making real options. According to the model, individuals prefer
to acquire information clustered rather than in small pieces, they prefer to receive information
sooner rather than later and they dislike false information even if it represents good news
and is eventually corrected. Experimental evidence of such informational preferences can be
found in Gneezy and Potters (1997), Bellemare et al. (2005) and Haigh and List (2005).
A second example of a prediction of the model of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009) is that indi-
viduals receive substantial utility from an increase in wealth. Wealth does not only increase
consumption when it is used to purchase consumption goods, as in traditional models. It
also immediately increases the anticipation of such a higher level of future consumption.
This increase in the expected consumption constitutes an additional source of utility.
The model of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009) also has the advantage that many existing models
of established carriers of utility can be incorporated and are special cases of the more general
model. A specific parameter choice also allows to reduce the model to the more simple one by
Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006)1 where only final outcomes are compared with recent expectations.
An early draft of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006) that contains extensive additional discussions on
separability of utility that are important to some aspects of the present analysis is Ko˝szegi
and Rabin (2004). In subsequent versions of the working paper and in the final article,
those considerations were omitted. In risk-less situations the model of Ko˝szegi and Rabin
(2009) reduces to classical consumption utility with all properties of the standard model of
consumption in such situations.
These former models with endogenous reference points assume that reference-dependent
utility only originates from the comparison of final outcomes with recent expectations. The
1A variant of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006) that is slightly less closely related to Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009)
is Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2007). It does not treat the multi-attribute utility case and assumes risk-less utility
to be defined over wealth instead of consumption.
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model of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009) instead allows additionally for utility stemming from
changes in the expectations on future consumption. An article treating similar questions
as Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009) but in a less formal way is Matthey (2008). Matthey (2008)
does not consider multi-attribute utility and is therefore less relevant to the central points of
my analysis. Another restriction of generality is that Matthey (2008) considers only binary
choices over outcome distributions of a single future period.
The model of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009) allows for arbitrary many dimensions of pure
consumption utility in riskless situations. These dimensions are also the relevant dimensions
across which changes in beliefs are assessed and valued. The extension of the model to multi-
attribute utility is important since the stated aim of the model of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009) is
to incorporate classical models of risky choice. However, with the chosen formal specification
the pure consumption utility has to be additive separable in all dimensions in the model of
Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009). This restricts the model to multi-attribute applications were the
dimensions of utility are valued independently of each other.
I propose an alternative formal model along the same intuitions of Ko˝szegi and Rabin
(2009). However, my model is specified in a way that allows the multiple attributes of the
pure consumption utility to have any functional form. The model accomplishes this because
the level at which a comparison is evaluated and at which feelings of gain or loss are generated
is the overall level of pure consumption utility. In the original model by Ko˝szegi and Rabin
(2009) this is applied instead at the level of the pure consumption utility inflicted by the
amount of consumption of a single dimension.
Therefore, the scope of applicability is broader than that of the previous model. The
analysis of reference-dependent anticipatory utility can also be applied to situations in which
intuition or empirical evidence suggests that dimensions of consumption contribute in a non-
additive way. Since all situations that can be analyzed by the model of Ko˝szegi and Rabin
(2009) can also be analyzed in my model, the latter covers an unambiguously larger range
of situations.
I show that in case of single-dimensioned consumption both models are behaviorally
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identical. Since in the article of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009) all formally stated results and
propositions were derived for the case of single-dimensionality, all results of Ko˝szegi and
Rabin (2009) apply in my model as well.
The cases were both models are applicable are characterized by additively separable pure
consumption utility. However, I show that if pure consumption utility is additively separable
the two models do not necessarily coincide in their predictions. Thus, my model does not
represent a mere generalization of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009) but rather an alternative model
with a broader domain of applicability.
To show that the differences between the proposed model and the model of Ko˝szegi
and Rabin (2009) that occur with additively separable pure consumption utility do not
constitute an obscure technicality, I discuss two practically relevant cases were predictions
differ. These two examples could also be used as a device to discriminate between the two
models since they show in which instances the two models yield different but empirically
testable predictions.
The first example shows that two distinctive dimensions of consumption are in a certain
way more substitutable in my model compared to the model of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009).
In my model, simultaneous changes in expectations on different dimensions of consumption
that would not result in an overall effect on pure consumption utility do not have an effect
on reference-dependent anticipatory utility. In contrast, in the model by Ko˝szegi and Rabin
(2009) in such a situation the individual would still dislike these simultaneous changes since
the feeling of gain in one dimension of utility does not outweigh the feeling of loss in the
other dimension.
The second example shows that my model is sensitive to a wider range of changes in
beliefs. An update in beliefs over the correlation of risks affecting different dimensions
of pure consumption utility generates a change in utility in my model. In the model of
Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009) such a change in the beliefs has no effect since only the marginal
distributions of the beliefs are considered.
The outline of the chapter is as follows. In section 2.2 I outline the basic features that
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both models have in common. In section 2.3 I state the additional assumptions that define
the model of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009). Section 2.4 formally defines my alternative model.
Those three sections define the two compared models up to the functional form of what I will
call disaggregate gain-loss utility. Since this functional form is again common to both models
I will discuss it in section 2.5. Since the main motivation to formulate an alternative model
is to allow for a non-restrictive specification of multi-attribute pure consumption utility I
discuss this matter in section 2.6. I formally show that all differences between the two
models disappear if consumption has only a single dimension in section 2.7. In section 2.8 I
show that for multi-attribute utility the two models yield diverging predictions even if pure
consumption utility is additively separable. Section 2.9 concludes. The appendix of section
2.10 discusses why I did not choose two alternative adjustments of the Ko˝szegi and Rabin
(2009) model that would have also allowed pure consumption utility to be multi-attributed.
All lengthy proofs of propositions and lemmas are relegated to the appendix of section 2.11.
Continuing Example
For the sake of illustration I will discuss at the end of many sections what the outlined
theoretical concepts imply in a simple continuing example. This example assumes that
both the consumption of material goods and the current state of health contribute to pure
consumption utility. This has been one of the classical settings where the analysis of multi-
attribute utility has led to valuable insights. Although the example can hint at some potential
applications, it is not meant to demonstrate all aspects of the models.
2.2 Common Features of All Models
In this section I discuss the features that all considered models share. In particular I will
show how decision utility depends on what I will call aggregate gain-loss utility. The specific
structure of this aggregate gain-loss utility will distinguish the different models.
The period in which a decision has to be made is denoted by s. The utility function
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according to which the decision is made is U s. I will call U s decision utility henceforth. It
is assumed that decisions under uncertainty are taken such that the expectation of U s is
maximized. The time horizon taken into account when making the decision is T . Decision
utility is based on the experience utility in present and future periods. Experience utility






Experience utility ut consists of both direct utility from consumption in period t and
utility from an update of expectations,
ut = m(ct) +
T∑
τ=t
γt,τN (Ft,τ | Ft−1,τ ) . (2.2)









Direct consumption utility over this vector of consumption levels is m(·) and satisfies




]2 ∀ k, t. (2.4)
Changes in expectations that concern consumption levels of periods far away may have
weaker influences on utility than those concerning periods less far away. This notion is
captured by the weights γt,τ . Those weights have the properties
0 ≤ γ0,τ ≤ γ1,τ ≤ · · · ≤ γτ,τ ≡ 1 ∀ τ. (2.5)
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N (Ft,τ | Ft−1,τ ) is the aggregate gain-loss utility that comes into effect in period t and
originates in the beliefs concerning period τ . Ft,τ is the belief held in period t over the
consumption vector in period τ , cτ . Here I define beliefs as general as possible. It consists
of an conception of the joint distribution function of all K dimensions of utility in a given
period τ . I denote beliefs over the joint distribution over the bivariate distribution of two
dimensions k and l as Fk,lt,τ . This could be extended to more than two dimensions. The
beliefs over the distribution of all K variables then would be F1,...,Kt,τ ≡ Ft,τ . The precise
way in which those beliefs influence aggregate gain-loss utility differs among the considered
models and will be discussed in the next two sections.








γt,τN (Ft,τ | Ft−1,τ )
}
. (2.6)
Additionally, all models discussed in this chapter also have the later defined assumptions
(A0) to (A4) in common. These five assumptions concern the functional form of the dis-
aggregate gain-loss utility function µ(·). Since this function will enter aggregate gain-loss
utility differently for the considered models I will discuss these additional common features
in section 2.5 after I formally introduced both models.
Continuing Example
Suppose K = 4. Define c1 as the level of health the decision maker enjoys. To discuss
a more tangible example, think of health as the ability to use his legs. The levels of c2,
c3 and c4 denote the consumption levels of material goods and services. While the utility
derived from good 3 is independent of health, the appeal of both good 2 and good 4 vary
with different health levels. Good 2 is especially valuable if the level of health is good,
such as going to a skiing vacation. In contrast, good 4 is especially valuable if the level
of health is low, such as a wheelchair. Define consumption levels such that ckt ≥ 0 ∀ k, t.






t ) + ln (c
3
t ). Then ∂m/∂c
k





for all k and t and
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therefore condition (2.4) is met. The cross-derivatives are negative between good 1 and 4 and
between 2 and 4. The cross-derivative between good 1 and 2 is positive. All cross-derivatives
involving good 3 are zero. The precise terms of all second order derivatives can be extracted
from Table 2.1. The table should be consulted as follows. The nominator of every second-














































·/∂c1t ·/∂c2t ·/∂c3t ·/∂c4t
order derivative is always ∂2m. The denominator of the second-order derivative depicted in
a certain cell is always the product of the terms at the margins to the right of the cell and
below the cell. For instance, the only entry in the first row, namely −1/[c1t c2t + c4t ]2, is the
second-order derivative ∂2m/[∂c4t ]
2.
2.3 Original Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009) Model
In this section I discuss the properties of the model by Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009) that
distinguish it from my model and from the two adjusted models discussed in the appendix in
section 2.10. Together with the definitions of the previous section the present section delivers
a complete description of the formal structure of the model of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009).
The only exception is that a theory on the formation of beliefs is absent. While Ko˝szegi and
Rabin (2006, 2007, 2009) successively develop such a theory, I do not incorporate it here
because of two reasons. First, the theory on belief formation does not influence the discussed
differences in the considered models in any way. Second, the discussed differences also apply
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if any other theory on the formation of beliefs would be used.
Equations (2.1) to (2.5) hold, thus also equation (2.6) holds. Features of the model of



















]2 ∀ t, k (2.8)
Ft,τ =
(F1t,τ , . . . ,FKt,τ) (2.9)




(Fkt,τ ∣∣ Fkt−1,τ) (2.10)
Nk













From equations (2.7) and (2.8) it follows that equation (2.4) holds. The assumption that
pure consumption utility is additively separable in all arguments will be one of the main
differences of the original model of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009) and my alternative model.
It is not a straightforward task to generalize this pure consumption utility function for
more general functional forms. The reason is that pure consumption utility enters not only
directly into the experience utility of every period but also additionally via the aggregate
gain-loss utility function. It is the specification of this aggregate gain-loss utility function
that requires pure consumption utility to be additively separable in the original model of
Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009).
Equations (2.10) and (2.11) jointly define the aggregate gain-loss utility function in the
model of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009). Equation (2.10) states that aggregate gain-loss utility is
also separable across the K dimensions of the consumption vector. Equation (2.11) defines
aggregate gain-loss utility for an arbitrary dimension k. It depends on changes in the beliefs
concerning this dimension.
Fkt,τ is the belief held in period t over the consumption level of good k in period τ , that
is ckτ . In the model of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009), the condition Ft,τ = (F1t,τ , . . . ,FKt,τ ) holds.
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While the definition of Ft,τ in the preceding section contained the beliefs over the joint
probabilities of consumption levels of all dimensions, the element Fkt,τ merely contains the
beliefs over the marginal distribution of the consumption level of dimension k. Therefore,
equation (2.9) constitutes a restriction on what information contained in the beliefs is of
relevance in the model.
As expressed in (2.11), the disaggregate gain-loss utility function µ(·) evaluates the dif-
ferences in pure consumption utility of a consumption level that can be expected according
to two beliefs at a certain percentile. The functional form of µ(·) will be discussed in detail
in section 2.5. Here, I will now investigate the precise composition of the argument of µ(·).
This is of some importance since it constitutes one of the key differences of the model of
Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009) and my alternative model proposed in the succeeding section.
cF(p) is consumption in percentile p given belief F . If F (z)|F denotes the cumulative
distribution function of the real-valued variable z given belief F , then cFkt,τ (p) is the value
of ckτ that is defined by F (c
k
τ )|Fkt,τ ≥ p and F (c)|Fkt,τ < p ∀ c < ckτ . Figure 2.1 illustrates
the composition of the argument of the gain-loss utility function µ(·). In each panel two
examples of cumulative distribution functions over ckτ are sketched out, one according to the
beliefs held in period t− 1 and one according to the beliefs held in period t.
In panel A of figure 2.1 the change in beliefs is a deterministic positive shift in ckτ , that is,
ckτ increases by a constant amount at each p ∈ ]0 ; 1[ . Therefore, at each percentile the change
of beliefs is perceived as a gain. Note, however, that the amount of the gain is not constant
for all percentiles p because at each percentile p the consumption level ckτ is evaluated by
the function mk(·) and the difference is taken over these levels of pure consumption utility.
For illustration consider the percentile p = p˜. At this percentile the argument of µ(·) is
m`− m´ > 0, since m` = mk(cFkt,τ (p˜)) and m´ = mk(cFkt−1,τ (p˜)).
In panel B of figure 2.1 the change in beliefs has a more complex pattern. For some
percentiles the change results in a sensation of gain. For example, at the percentile p = p˜ the
change in beliefs delivers again a gain of m` − m´. However, at other percentiles the change
in beliefs now induces sentiments of loss. An instance for the latter case is percentile p = pˇ.
84






























Figure 2.1: The argument of the gain-loss function µ(·)
At this lower percentile the argument of µ(·) is m¨ − m˙ < 0, since m¨ = mk(cFkt,τ (pˇ)) and
m˙ = mk(cFkt−1,τ (pˇ)).
I will denote decision utility according to the original model of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009)
by U¯ s. By incorporating the assumptions (2.7) to (2.11) into (2.6), the model of Ko˝szegi
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2.4 An Alternative Model
This section introduces my alternative model. It shares the features discussed in section
2.2 with the original model by Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009). Thus, equations (2.1) to (2.5)
hold, and subsequently also equation (2.6) holds.
I will now state the features of my model that are not common to the other models of
the previous section and of appendix 2.10.






]2 ∀ t, k (2.13)








Equation (2.13) states that any function satisfying condition (2.4) can be employed to
describe pure consumption utility in my model. This is in contrast to the restriction to
additively separable functions expressed in (2.7) and (2.8) in the model of Ko˝szegi and
Rabin (2009). In section 2.6 I will argue that this feature allows my model to be applied in
a significantly broader range of situations.
Equation (2.14) defines how aggregate gain-loss utility is comprised in my model. In
contrast to equations (2.10) and (2.11) it does not rely on a separation of aggregate gain-loss
utility across the dimensions of the consumption vector. Instead, it relies on differences in
the pure consumption utility determined by all K dimensions jointly. These differences in
pure consumption utility according to two beliefs are also evaluated at a certain percentile
by the disaggregate gain-loss utility function µ(·). For a discussion of the functional form of
µ(·) I again refer to section 2.5. I will now illustrate the precise composition of the argument
of µ(·) in my model.
By mF(p) I denote pure consumption utility in percentile p given belief F . For notational
convenience, I define mt = m(ct). I can now formally state that mFt,τ (p) is the value of mτ
that is defined by F (mτ )|Ft,τ ≥ p and F (m|Ft,τ ) < p ∀ m < mτ .
Note also, that I made no restriction on the beliefs Ft,τ that enter into my model. All
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features of the K-dimensional joint cumulative distribution function over the consumption
levels could have an influence on pure consumption utility. Thus, all these influences could
play a role in the formation of gain-loss utility in my model.
To give an impression on what information is neglected if one simply defines beliefs as
the vector of marginal distributions Ft,τ = (F1t,τ , . . . ,FKt,τ ) as in Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009),
consider an example where K = 2, ckτ ∈ {ckτ , c¯kτ} ∀ τ, k and ckτ 6= c¯kτ ∀ τ, k. In Table 2.2
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the joint probabilities are spelled out inside the box. The set of those joint probabilities
contains all information on the bivariate distribution of c1τ and c
2
τ . This general formulation
of beliefs now captures all appreciation and information concerning possible values of these
joint probabilities held in period t. To the right of and below the box I stated the marginal
probabilities concerning a single dimension of utility. Assuming that Ft,τ = (F1t,τ ,F2t,τ ) rules
out all influences of beliefs over the joint distribution of consumption levels of different
dimensions that are not captured in the marginal distributions.
I will denote decision utility according to my proposed model by Uˆ s. By incorporating
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2.5 Functional Form of Gain-Loss Utility
In sections 2.3 and 2.4 we saw that in both the original model of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009)
and in my alternative model aggregate gain-loss utility depends on a function representing
disaggregate gain-loss utility µ(·). However, not only is the way this gain-loss utility function
µ(·) is integrated in the aggregated gain-loss utility function N(Ft,τ |Ft−1,τ ) different between
the two models. Also, the construction of the argument of µ(·) was shown to be different.
Despite these differences, the functional form of µ(·) across all models is identical and
is therefore discussed separately in this section. The functional form of µ(·) will not be
parameterized. Instead, it will be defined more broadly by the common set of assumptions
(A0) - (A4),
(A0) µ(x) is continuous ∀ x, µ(x) is two times differentiable ∀ x 6= 0, and µ(0) = 0
(A1) µ(x) is strictly increasing
(A2) µ(y) + µ(−y) < µ(x) + µ(−x) ∀ y > x ≥ 0




µ′(|x|) ≡ λ > 1.
The literature on the functional form of the gain-loss is too vast to allow for an exhaustive
discussion here. However, almost all concepts originate in the classical prospect theory of
Kahneman and Tversky (1979). Bowman, Minehart and Rabin (1999) first introduced the
precise formal definitions (A0) to (A4) as I use them here. They were subsequently used by
Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006, 2007, 2009) and many others.
Let us discuss assumptions (A0) to (A4) in isolation first. Assumption (A0) states conti-
nuity since a function with gaps would easily yield counterfactual predictions. The assump-
tion of (two-times) differentiability (∀ x 6= 0) is a technicality allowing the application of
calculus within domains. The assumption that µ(0) = 0 ensures that in a situation of no
changes, no gain-loss utility occurs.
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Assumption (A1) ensures that a larger gain is perceived as more favorable than a smaller
gain, a smaller loss is preferred to a larger loss, and to experience a gain is better than a
loss.
Assumption (A2) ensures loss aversion in the large. Thus, an individual always strictly
dislikes an increase in a loss more than it likes the increase in a gain if the initial gain equals
the initial loss and the considered magnitudes of the changes are equal.
Assumption (A3) ensures that diminishing sensitivity (weakly) holds. Thus, if a gain is
increased, the marginal utility stemming from this improvement decreases with the initial
value of the gain or stays constant. Similarly, if an initial loss is increased the marginal
disutility stemming from this deterioration decreases with the initial value of the loss or
stays constant.
Assumption (A4) ensures that loss aversion in the small holds. This condition formally
states that the function µ(·) has a concave kink at x = 0. On this property, Ko¨bberling and
Wakker (2005) provide the most concise discussion.
Although assumptions (A0) to (A4) constitute the baseline model, in order to derive
some results, additionally one or several stronger assumption will have to be made.
(A2’) −µ′′(−x) ≥ µ′′(x) ∀ x > 0






Assumption (A2’) is a stronger version of assumption (A2) while assumptions (A3’) and
assumption (A3◦) are stronger versions of assumption (A3).
To clarify the roles of these stronger assumption in relation to each other and in relation
to the original assumptions (A0) to (A4), we can state the following relationships
µ(·) with (A0), (A1), (A2), (A3’), (A4) ⇒ µ(·) with (A0), (A1), (A2), (A3◦), (A4).
µ(·) with (A0), (A1), (A2), (A3◦), (A4) ⇒ µ(·) with (A0), (A1), (A2), (A3), (A4).
µ(·) with (A0), (A1), (A2’), (A3), (A4) ⇒ µ(·) with (A0), (A1), (A2), (A3), (A4).
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Assuming (A0), (A1), (A2), (A3’), (A4) defines the special case where µ(·) is a piecewise
linear function. Assumption (A3’) was already introduced by Bowman, Minehart and Rabin
(1999) as a special case and used by Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006) and Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009)
to derive some of their central results.
Let us now discuss some joint implications of assumptions (A0) to (A4). The exemption
of differentiability at point x = 0 in assumption (A0) is necessary to allow for loss aversion
in the small as expressed in assumption (A4) to occur.
Assumptions (A2) and (A3) jointly require that gain-loss disutility in losses does not
diminish too fast in relation to the diminishing of gain-loss utility in gains. A sufficient but
not necessary condition is that disutility diminishes less fast in losses than utility diminishes
in equally strong gains. Another sufficient but not necessary condition is that the slope of
µ(·) in the domain of losses becomes never smaller than the amount of loss aversion in the
small as expressed as λ in assumption (A4).
In figure 2.2 I sketch µ˜(·) with µ˜ = µ˜+ for x ≥ 0 and µ˜ = µ˜− for x < 0 as one possible
function that meets all assumptions (A0) to (A4). The line µ¯+ is the tangent to µ˜+ at x = 0.
The line µ¯− is the tangent to µ˜− as x approaches 0 from below. The function µ¯(·) (with
µ¯ = µ¯+ for x ≥ 0 and µ¯ = µ¯− for x < 0) itself is another possibility of meeting assumptions
(A0) to (A4). In contrast to µ˜(·), the function µ¯(·) additionally meets assumption (A3’).
Finally, I will derive two lemmas concerning implications of the functional form of µ(·)
that will be of help when discussing the differences in the predictions of the two models.
Consider a variable ω with the K outcomes ω1, . . . , ωK . Call ω non-degenerate if there




∣∣ ωk = x} = #{ωk∣∣ ωk = −x} ∀ x ∈ R, where #{·} denotes the cardinality of a set.
Then I can state the following two lemmas.
Lemma 2 If µ(·) satisfies (A0), (A1), (A2), (A3), (A4) and ω is non-degenerate and sym-
















Proof. [Lemma 2] Is provided in the appendix of section 2.11
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Figure 2.2: Functional form of the gain-loss function µ(·)






















Proof. [Lemma 3] Is provided in the appendix of section 2.11
The sum of outcomes of a variable that is distributed symmetrically around zero is
always zero. Therefore the lemmas illustrate that we have to either (lightly) restrict µ(·) or
the risky situation to ensure the sum over the gain-loss utilities of ωk is smaller than the
gain-loss utility of the sum over ωk.
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2.6 Generality of Pure Consumption Utility
In this section I will consider how sever the restriction to additively separable pure con-
sumption is that the model of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009) requires. First, I discuss what
exactly should be considered as a separate dimension of consumption. Second, I will investi-
gate under which conditions an additively separable utility function can represent preferences
over these consumption vectors.
In a very early draft of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006), namely in Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2004),
the authors discuss the matter of separability at some length and devote an entire section
on the matter of how a dimension of consumption should be defined. In subsequent versions
of the working paper and in the final articles of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006) and Ko˝szegi and
Rabin (2009) a discussion of the separability of consumption utility and the definition of
dimensions is almost completely absent.
Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2004) argue that their categories of consumption should be best
understood as hedonic dimensions. Examples of such hedonic dimensions could be basic
nutrition, security, entertainment or shelter. A single traded good or service can potentially
contribute to several of these dimensions. Also, different goods can satisfy the same need
and the joint contributions of these goods to a single hedonic dimension can be viewed as
a single level of consumption. In Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2004) the dimensions of consumption
are precisely defined by the fact that trade-offs within such a dimension are not subject to
sentiments of gain or loss.
On the one hand, we could adopt this definition. Then, my model could be thought of
as the analysis of reference-dependent anticipatory utility within these hedonic dimensions
and the original model of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009) could be perceived as the analysis
of reference-dependent anticipatory utility across these hedonic dimensions. This could be
appropriate if we would primarily be interested in composing a theoretically formulated
psychological model.
However, most often economists are not interested in fitting psychological models as an
end in itself. In contrast, we propose models in order to predict or describe observable
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behavior of economic agents in response to exogenous parameters. If we focus on private
households, the classical example is to investigate how the demand functions of such a
household depend on prices. Hedonic dimensions of utility themselves rarely have observable
prices, there is no explicit price of security for instance. In contrast, traded goods and services
have explicitly stated prices. I therefore perceive the models to be of higher value to the
analysis of economic phenomena if we understand consumption in the traditional way as
the usage or exhaustion of tradable commodities instead of hedonistic attributes. Although
not hinted at by Ko˝szegi or Rabin anywhere, similar considerations might have led to the
omission of the discussion on the definition of dimensions of consumptions in later versions
of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2004).
If we accept that our theories deal with consumption levels of tradeable commodities,
we are left with the question under which conditions several of these commodities can be
aggregated into a single index. The classical composite commodity theorem of Hicks (1936)
states that only if a group of prices moves in parallel, the corresponding group of commodities
can be treated as a single good. If we accept that several dimensions of consumption exist
with prices that do not move in parallel, we have to investigate under which conditions an
additively separable utility function is a valid representation of preferences.
One approach would be to discuss applications that are compatible with additively sepa-
rable preferences and instances where no additively separable representation can be applied.
An example of the latter would be that, if we restrict pure consumption utility to be addi-
tively separable, none of the goods can be complementary to any other good. Additionally,
no single good can be an inferior good (see e.g. Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980, pp138-139).
In contrast, I give a necessary and sufficient condition for the validity of an additively








, M ′ > 0
⇔ m is completely separable in {c1t , . . . , ckt , . . . , cKt } (2.16)
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with M(·) denoting an arbitrary increasing function. The utility function m is completely
separable in a set if the preference relations within every subset is independent of the values
of all remaining attributes not in the subset.2 See also Blackorby, Primont and Russell (1998,
p72), and Keeney and Raiffa (1993, pp111-116), for a discussion on this result. The latter
text substitutes the term of separability with the term of preferential independence. A set
of attributes is preferentially independent of other attributes if the conditional preferences
in the set do not depend on the value of the other attributes.
Whether preferences are completely separable in the arguments of the utility function
finally constitutes an empirical question. On a critique of additive separable utility func-
tions based on empirical findings, see Deaton (1974). He concludes that “the assumption of
additive preferences is almost certain to be invalid in practice and the use of demand models
based on such an assumption will lead to severe distortion of measurement. So that if the
price to be paid for the theoretical consistency of demand models is the necessity of assum-
ing additive preferences, then the price is too high.” (Deaton, 1974, p346, emphasis in the
original).
Continuing Example
To analyze a situation as outlined above in the original Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009) model











t , then m(ct) = ln (c
5
t ) + ln (c
3
t ). We would have to construct a price
index of the composite good c5t , not an easy task to do. The only relative price change that
can be analyzed is that between c3t and the aggregated price index of c
5
t .
Let us for the following sections assume that we can make observations on this compound
concept of consumption. Let us also redefine the utility contributing goods related to health
as good 1 and the utility contributing goods not related to health as good 2. Then, m(ct) =
ln (c1t ) + ln (c
2
t ).
2The original proof of Gorman (1968) allows for a generalization where every ckt may represent a group
of goods.
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Although both c1t and c
2
t can take on the value of each non-negative real number, I will
in the following consider situations where both arguments are either 1 or Euler’s number e.
If both are 1, the pure consumption utility is 0, m(c1t = 1, c
2
t = 1) = 0. If both are e pure
consumption utility equals 2, m(c1t = e, c
2
t = e) = 2. If only one of the arguments is 1 and
the other is e pure consumption utility is 1, m(c1t = 1, c
2
t = e) = m(c
1
t = e, c
2
t = 1) = 1.
2.7 Equality of Models for Single-Attribute Utility
In this section I show that my model is identical to the model of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009)
if the consumption vector contains only a single dimension. This is important because all
formal propositions in Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009) were derived for K = 1. Thus, all these
results are valid in my model as well.
If I define
c ≡ (cs, . . . , cT )
γ ≡ (γ0,T−s, . . . , γT−s−1,T−s)
F ≡ (Fs−1,s, . . . ,Fs−1,T ,Fs,s+1, . . . ,Fs,T , . . . , . . . ,FT−1,T )
I can state the following proposition.
Proposition 11 For K = 1 my model is equivalent to the one of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009),
thus U¯ s(c,F ; γ,m(·), µ(·)) = Uˆ s(c,F ; γ,m(·), µ(·)) ∀ s, c,F , γ,m(·), µ(·).
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m(·) = m1(·) (2.20)
Ft,τ = F1t,τ
mFt,τ (p) = m
1(cF1t,τ (p)) (2.21)
where the last equality holds because at each t the function m(·) is increasing in the only
argument ct, as expressed in condition (2.4). Inserting (2.19), (2.20) and (2.21) into (2.18)
delivers the same expression as (2.17).
Equation (2.21) is probably the only condition that requires more elaboration. I already
established that for K = 1, m(·) = m1(·) and Ft,τ = F1t,τ hold. Therefore, m1(cF1t,τ (p)) =
m(cFt,τ (p)).
Figure 2.3 illustrates the identity of mFt,τ (p) and m(cFt,τ (p)). In the northeastern quad-
rant the cumulative distribution function of cτ according to a belief Ft,τ is sketched. Every
consumption level cτ is mapped onto the pure consumption utility function mτ = m(cτ ) in
the southeastern quadrant. The cumulative distribution function of mτ according to the be-
lief Ft,τ is depicted in the southwestern quadrant. For an illustration consider the percentile
p = p˜. Whether we take the value of cτ at the percentile p˜ according to the belief Ft,τ and
evaluate it by the pure consumption utility function m(·) or we directly evaluate mτ at the
percentile p˜ always delivers the same amount of pure consumption utility.
2.8 Inequality of Models for Multi-Attribute Utility
If pure consumption utility depends on several arguments the two compared models will
differ in their predictions of choice under risk. This difference persists if pure consumption
utility is additively separable in all arguments. The root of this difference is that gain-loss
utility is computed at a different level of aggregation. Whereas in the model of Ko˝szegi and
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Figure 2.3: Equality of mFt,τ (p) and m(cFt,τ (p)) with K = 1
Rabin (2009) it is computed at the level of pure consumption utility of a single dimension in
my model it is computed at the level of overall pure consumption utility of all dimensions.
To formally demonstrate the difference with additively separable pure consumption utility
a single example would suffice. However, I provide two examples in the following subsections
that show that the difference is not a mere technicality but extends to practically relevant
situations. At the end of each subsection I continue my example from previous sections.
2.8.1 Substitutability of Changes
In a certain sense in my model the dimensions of consumption are more substitutable
than in the model of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009). If a change in the beliefs occurs, individuals
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assess whether this change would lead to a different probability distribution over the overall
pure consumption utility. If it does not, there result no feelings of gain or loss in my model.
However, in the model of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009) individuals do not integrate the different
dimensions of utility when anticipating the effect of changes. They compare the probability
distribution of each dimension of utility separately and enjoy gains or suffer losses along each
of these dimensions.
To clarify the difference between the two models I define an event that leads to an
update of beliefs in the following way. It leaves the beliefs on overall pure consumption
utility unaffected. At the same time it changes the beliefs concerning at least one dimension
of utility. If both statements hold simultaneously there have to exist changes in at least
two dimensions. Then I show that this event has no effect on aggregate gain-loss utility in
my model. Subsequently I show that this event has an unambiguously negative effect on
aggregate gain-loss utility in the Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009) model.







and µ(·) satisfies (A3 ◦). For a fixed combi-
nation of t and τ consider beliefs Ft,τ and Ft−1,τ such that mFt,τ (p) = mFt−1,τ (p) ∀ p and
∃ k, p : cFkt,τ (p) 6= cFkt−1,τ (p). Then N(Ft,τ |Ft−1,τ ) = 0 in my model but N(Ft,τ |Ft−1,τ ) < 0 in
the model of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009).
Proof. [Proposition 12] Is provided in the appendix of section 2.11
The outlined difference in predictions could also be employed in an experiment to dis-
tinguish between my own model and the Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009) model. For example,
one could determine which trade-offs between monetary compensation and effort leaves an
individual indifferent in a riskless environment. In such a riskless environment, both models
yield identical prediction and decision utility equals pure consumption utility. Then one
could test whether in risky environments changes in beliefs over the two dimensions that did
not have an effect on pure consumption utility do generate a change in decision utility.
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Continuing Example
To illustrate proposition 12 consider the situation where in period t−1 the decision maker
beliefs that in the future period τ he will be in good health (c1τ = e) with certainty. However,
he also thinks that with certainty he will be poor (c2τ = 1). Between period t− 1 and period
t the decision maker is knocked over by a drunken car driver. This has two effects. First,
the decision maker knows with certainty that in period τ he will not be able to use his legs
normally and thus c1τ = 1. Second, the decision maker receives a financial compensation
for non-pecuniary damage from the car driver that allows him to consume c2τ = e instead
of c2τ = 1. The pure consumption utility in period τ , that is m (cτ ) will not be changed by
the accident and equals 1. The assumption that the financial payment does not make the
decision maker worse off in terms of pure consumption utility might seem stylized. However,
this case could be a reasonable approximation to reality if the legislation has the intention
to fully compensate the victim and is very effective in doing so. The outlined event does
not have any effect on anticipatory utility in my model since only changes in the anticipated
pure consumption utility can generate this. In contrast, it results in an aggregate gain-loss
utility of µ(1) + µ(−1) < 0 in the model of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009).3
2.8.2 Changes in Beliefs on Correlation
The discussion of the previous subsection might give the misleading impression that the
model of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009) predicts gain-loss utility to arise in unambiguously more
situations than in my model. However, we will see that there also exists a class of situations
where gain-loss utility can only occur in my model.
To identify this class of situations I define an update of beliefs with the following proper-
ties. It does not change any marginal distribution of the single dimensions of consumption.
However, the update in beliefs does change the joint probability distribution of at least one
3Note that the assumption that deteriorations in health can be fully compensated by other consumption
in terms of decision utility is not unique to my model. Only the level at which this compensation is reached
differs between the two models. In my model the level is equal to the compensation in riskless situations
whereas in the model of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009) it has to be higher.
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pair of dimensions of consumption. Then I show that this update in beliefs can never gener-
ate any gain-loss utility in the model of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009). In contrast, it generally
generates gain-loss utility in my model.
Thus, my model does generate the prediction that the correlation of risks that affect
different dimensions of consumption matters for the determination of gain-loss utility. If the
individual would for instance learn that losses in two dimensions of consumption are more
likely to appear jointly than he thought before, this dismal association can trigger negative
feelings of loss in him. In contrast, according to the model of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009) he
would not be scared by the insight that two bad news tend to come together.
Proposition 13 Assume m(ct) =
K∑
k=1
mk(ckt ). For a fixed combination of t and τ con-
sider beliefs Ft,τ and Ft−1,τ such that Fkt,τ = Fkt−1,τ ∀ k and ∃ k, l : Fk,lt,τ 6= Fk,lt−1,τ . Then,
N(Ft,τ |Ft−1,τ ) = 0 in the model of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009). In general, N(Ft,τ |Ft−1,τ ) 6= 0
in my model.
Proof. [Proposition 13] Is provided in the appendix of section 2.11
Again, this result could be used to distinguish between the two models experimentally.
It could be implemented that the subjects receive information on the correlation of future
risks. If the subjects would show not to be indifferent to these news they would hint at a
closer resemblance with my model.
Continuing Example
To illustrate proposition 13 consider the following situation. The decision maker thinks
in period t − 1 and in period t that with the probability of 1/2 he will be healthy in τ . If
he is healthy, consumption of good 1 is e, otherwise it is 1. He also thinks in both periods
that he will be able to afford the higher level of consumption of good 2 with probability of
1/2. The higher level of good 2 is e, the lower level is 1. The only difference between the
two periods is that in period t− 1 the decision maker thinks that the levels of the two goods
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are independently distributed. Think of it as his naive inference from statistical data that
states that half of comparable persons are rich and half are healthy.
Between period t− 1 and t he learns of a number of cases where comparable individuals
have suffered from a joint deterioration in both dimensions. This could be in the form of
stories on self-induced car accidents. In such accidents the drivers lose the ability to normally
use their legs in τ and the damage to the car additionally decreases their consumption in τ .
Again, to make the example very clear cut, I assume that the individual naively infers that
the injured and poor individuals are always the same and vice versa. Thus, in period t he
beliefs that the two dimensions of consumption are perfectly and positively correlated.
In the model of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009) the decision maker will suffer no gain-loss util-
ity. The reason is that only the beliefs on marginal probability distributions of dimensions of
consumption are relevant for gain-loss utility and those marginal distributions are unaffected
by the update in beliefs. In my model the perceived higher probability of suffering both a
low level of health and of material consumption (probability of 1/2 instead of 1/4) induces
feelings of loss that outweigh the elation of a higher probability of enjoying both good health
and riches (also with a probability of 1/2 instead of 1/4). Formally, in my model the update
in beliefs results in aggregate gain-loss utility of 1
4
[µ(1) + µ(−1)] < 0.
Although I assumed for illustrational purposes an extreme response to news it is impor-
tant to point out that also very reasonable and rational individuals update their beliefs as
they receive additional information on the correlation of events. The feelings of such indi-
viduals that is generated by updates on correlations may be less extreme but nevertheless
could change behavior in crucial ways.
2.9 Conclusion
In this chapter I proposed a theoretical model of reference-dependent anticipatory utility
that has a broader range of applicability in case of multi-attribute utility than previous
models. I provided a thorough comparison to the similar model of Ko˝szegi and Rabin
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(2009). I showed that the difference in predictions of behavior exists only in the multi-
attribute utility case. I showed that the difference in the multi-attribute utility case persist
even if pure consumption utility is additively separable. I outlined two classes of situations
where those differences matter.
Although the ambition is to improve the model of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009) in the respect
of wider applicability there is no doubt that my work constitutes only a small step forward
compared to the huge improvement the model of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009) achieved in
comparison to its predecessors. In this respect I perceive my model to stand in the tradition
of studies such as Fishburn (1984), Miyamoto and Wakker (1996), Zank (2001), Bleichrodt
and Miyamoto (2003), and Bleichrodt, Schmidt and Zank (2009) which extend other non-
EUT models to the multi-attribute case. The latter three studies concern multi-attribute
versions of prospect theory. The level at which gain-loss utility is generated can also be
employed to categorize these models. While Miyamoto and Wakker (1996) and Zank (2001)
assume gain-loss utility to depend on the level of integrated consumption utility, Bleichrodt,
Schmidt and Zank (2009) assume that at each dimension of consumption gain-loss utility
is generated. In this respect the distinction between these models resembles the distinction
between my model and the one of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009). The question of substitutability
of changes in different dimensions of consumption arises in those models in a very similar
way than we discussed in section 2.8.1 for the two models under consideration. However,
the additional issues related to the beliefs in the correlation of dimensions as discussed in
section 2.8.2 are novel to anticipatory utility. This is because in the previous non-EUT
models changes of expectations did not have any effect.
Possible applications of my model encompass all economically interesting situations where
the multi-dimensionality of consumption is known to be important and where the anticipation
of events can generate profound impacts on the feelings of individuals. The domain of health
comes into mind. It has been argued that health is not integrated with other consumption in
a linear way. Also, the anxiety because of potential deterioration in health become extremely
important to explain patient behavior. We could, for instance, apply the outlined model to
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analyze the attitude of patients to medical test that might reveal that the patient is prone to
certain illnesses. Especially, the potential event of a false positive test result could explain
the reluctance of patients to take such tests. Another application in health economics would
be to analyze what benefit insurance can have if it cannot improve health but only raise
wealth in the event of an illness. Here, the differences of my model to the one of Ko˝szegi
and Rabin (2009) could also lead to diverging predictions.
2.10 Appendix: Alternative Models
In this section I investigate if there exists an adjustment of the model of Ko˝szegi and
Rabin (2009) that allows pure consumption utility m(·) to be non-additive but at the same
time generates gain-loss utility in each dimension k separably. This is only possible if the
percentile-wise comparison in each dimension is not conducted over the pure consumption
utilities, but instead over the absolute levels of consumption.
In both adjusted models considered in this section the common assumptions of section
2.2 are met. Formally, equations (2.1) to (2.5) hold, thus also equation (2.6) holds.
The features not common to the two models in the main text are






]2 ∀ t, k (2.22)
N(Ft,τ |Ft−1,τ ) =
K∑
k=1
Nk(Fkt,τ |Fkt−1,τ ) (2.23)
Equation (2.22) distinguishes the adjusted models from the original model of Ko˝szegi and
Rabin (2009), where additionally condition (2.7) has to hold. Equation (2.23) distinguishes
the adjusted models from my model.
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In addition to the assumptions above, one of the following conditions holds





cFkt,τ (p)− cFkt−1,τ (p)
)
dp (2.24)





cFkt,τ (p)− cFkt−1,τ (p)
)
dp (2.25)
cF(p) again denotes consumption in percentile p given belief F , and both µ(·) and µk(·)
satisfying assumptions (A0) to (A4) (in the latter case, for all k).






















The drawback of specification (2.24) is that it is not invariant to the scaling of consump-
tion levels. If we would have only a single dimension of utility, hence K = 1, we could define
µ(·) as holding for a specific scale of its argument. But since we consider multi-attribute
consumption vectors this is no longer possible. Different attributes might not be expressible
in the same units to begin with. Even if they are, it seems highly doubtful that a com-
mon scale-specific gain-loss utility function µ(·) would be a reasonable assumption. Both a
splendid bottle of wine and a package of shampoo can be expressed in milliliter or gallons.
However, it seems far fetched that a loss of the same quantity would result in equal feelings
of loss.
This discussion also demonstrates why in both models discussed in the main text disag-
gregate gain-loss utility is based on the differences in pure consumption utilities. The pure
consumption utility operates as an equalizer of all dimensions of consumption. It translates
the attribute-specific units into a single measure that can be interpreted across dimensions.
Using specification (2.25), the adjusted Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009) model can be written
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The drawback of specification (2.25) is that one has to define K different gain-loss func-
tions µ1(·), . . . , µK(·). These additional degrees of freedom run counter to the stated objective
to find a common theory for many phenomena.4 It introduces K − 1 additional degrees of
freedom into the model. One consequence would be that no elicitation of gain-loss utility
over one dimension of utility can be used to generate predictions on behavior concerning
gain-loss utility of a different dimension. It diminishes the accomplishment of Ko˝szegi and
Rabin (2006) and subsequent models to reduce arbitrary and non-verifiable assumptions.
2.11 Appendix: Proofs
Proof. [Lemma 2] Firstly, I show that the equality in the lemma holds
















4On this goal see Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006, p1136-1137):“[. . . ] our general approach has an attractive
methodological feature: [. . . ] it moves us closer to a universally applicable, zero-degrees-of-freedom way to
translate any existing reference-independent model into the corresponding reference-dependent one.”
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)− µ (−ωk)] .
Now I show that this term is negative as long as there exists at least one k for which ωk > 0
using (A2) : µ(y) + µ(−y) < µ(x) + µ(−x) ∀ y > x ≥ 0
⇒ µ(y) + µ(−y) < 2µ(0) ∀ y > 0
using (A0)⇒ µ(y) + µ(−y) < 0 ∀ y > 0










The last step of the proof is to show that there exists always a k for which ωk > 0
By assumption: ω is non-degenerate
⇔ ∃ k : ωk 6= 0
using that ω is symmetrically distributed around 0⇒ ∃ k : ωk > 0.
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I can also derive
by assumption (A3◦): lim
x→−∞
µ′ (x) > lim
x→0
µ′ (|x|)
using (A0) & (A2)⇒ µ′ (x) > µ′ (y) ∀ x < 0 < y
⇔ µ′ (ωk) < µ′ (ωl) ∀ ωl < 0 < ωk.
Using this result and assumption (A1), I can state that














































































Proof. [Proposition 12] I first show that in my model the change in beliefs results in no
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gain-loss utility.
By assumption: mFt,τ (p) = mFt−1,τ (p) ∀ p
⇔ mFt,τ (p)−mFt−1,τ (p) = 0 ∀ p








using (2.14)⇒ N (Ft,τ |Ft−1,τ ) = 0
I now show that in the model of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009) there results a negative gain-
loss utility. For this purpose consider the variable ω(p) whose K outcomes are defined by
ωk(p) = mk(cFkt,τ (p))−mk(cFkt−1,τ (p)) for k = 1, . . . , K. Then,














= 0 ∀ p,
therefore the sum over ωk(p) is zero for all p. Also,
by assumption: ∃ k, p : cFkt,τ (p) 6= cFkt−1,τ (p)
using (2.7)⇒ ∃ k, p : mk(cFkt,τ (p)) 6= mk(cFkt−1,τ (p))
⇔ ∃ k, p : mk(cFkt,τ (p))−mk(cFkt−1,τ (p)) 6= 0,
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(Fkt,τ |Fkt−1,τ) < 0
using (2.10)⇒ N (Ft,τ |Ft−1,τ ) < 0.
Proof. [Proposition 13] I first show that in the model of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009) the
change in beliefs results in no gain-loss utility.
By assumption: Fkt,τ = Fkt−1,τ ∀ k
⇔ cFkt,τ (p) = cFkt−1,τ (p) ∀ k, p
using (2.8)⇒ mk(cFkt,τ (p)) = mk(cFkt−1,τ (p)) ∀ k, p












dp = 0 ∀ k
using (2.11)⇒ Nk (Fkt,τ |Fkt−1,τ) = 0 ∀ k
using (2.10)⇒ N (Ft,τ |Ft−1,τ ) = 0
I now show that in my model generally N(Ft,τ |Ft−1,τ ) 6= 0 holds. To show that the strict
inequality in the proposition can hold, it suffices to give a single example. Suppose that
K = 2, m (c1τ , c
2
τ ) = ln (c
1
τ ) + ln (c
2




τ ∈ {1, e}, where e denotes Euler’s number. For
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the considered t, τ , the beliefs over the joint distribution of c1τ and c
2
τ are as follows
Ft−1,τ = F1,2t−1,τ : Pr (c1τ = 1, c2τ = e) = Pr (c1τ = e, c2τ = 1) = 1/2
Ft,τ = F1,2t,τ : Pr (c1τ = 1, c2τ = 1) = Pr (c1τ = e, c2τ = e) = 1/2
The marginal probabilities do not change, therefore Fkt−1,τ = Fkt,τ for k = 1, 2. My model
relies only on the beliefs over the full pure consumption utility. Thus, these beliefs can
equivalently be stated as
Ft−1,τ : Pr (m (c1τ , c2τ ) = 1) = 1
Ft,τ : Pr (m (c1τ , c2τ ) = 0) = Pr (m (c1τ , c2τ ) = 2) = 1/2
Then I can state that in my example
N(Ft,τ |Ft−1,τ ) = 12 [µ(−1) + µ(1)]
This expression is strictly negative according to assumption (A2).
I now show that the inequality in the proposition holds only generally and there exist
exemptions. In those exemptions no gain-loss utility results in my model. One exemption is




τ ) = ln (c
1
τ ) + ln (c
2
τ ) + ln (c
3







{1, e}. For the considered t and τ , the beliefs over the joint distribution of c1τ , c2τ and c3τ can
be represented as follows
Ft−1,τ = F1,2,3t−1,τ : Pr (c1τ = 1, c2τ = 1, c3τ = 1) = Pr (c1τ = 1, c2τ = 1, c3τ = e)
= Pr (c1τ = e, c
2
τ = e, c
3
τ = 1) = Pr (c
1
τ = e, c
2
τ = e, c
3
τ = e) = 1/4
Ft,τ = F1,2,3t,τ : Pr (c1τ = 1, c2τ = 1, c3τ = 1) = Pr (c1τ = e, c2τ = 1, c3τ = 1)
= Pr (c1τ = 1, c
2
τ = e, c
3
τ = e) = Pr (c
1
τ = e, c
2
τ = e, c
3
τ = e) = 1/4
Again, the marginal probabilities do not change, and therefore Fkt−1,τ = Fkt,τ for k = 1, 2, 3.
However, Fk,lt−1,τ 6= Fk,lt,τ holds for both (k, l) = (1, 2) and (k, l) = (2, 3). Thus, the conditions
in the proposition are met in this example.
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As again my model relies only on the beliefs over pure consumption utility I can state
the full set of beliefs equivalently as
Ft−1,τ ,Ft,τ : Pr (m (c1τ , c2τ , c3τ ) = 0) = Pr (m (c1τ , c2τ , c3τ ) = 1)










τ ) = 3) = 1/4
The beliefs over the pure consumption utility did not change between period t − 1 and t.







Intensity of Risk Aversion∗
3.1 Introduction
In order to measure individuals’ risk attitudes, the multiple price-list method of Holt and
Laury (2002) has become the industry standard in experimental economics. Major advan-
tages that led to the popularity of the Holt and Laury (HL) tables include its transparency
to subjects (easy to explain and implement), its incentivized elicitation, and that it can be
easily attached to other experiments where risk aversion may have an influence. Neverthe-
less, the HL method has also its drawbacks. The major disadvantage is that it requires a
specific utility framework such as expected utility theory (EUT) in order to classify subjects
as more or less risk-averse.1 If individuals’ risk preferences are heterogeneous in the way
that some act according to EUT while others rather act according to non-EUT, it becomes
problematic to use the HL tables in order to classify subjects’ risk attitudes. The reason is
that the HL method is not based on a general notion of increasing risk which is satisfied by
EUT and non-EUT models.
To account for this disadvantage, we propose a modification of the HL tables. This
new method is based on the well-known increasing risk definitions of Rothschild and Stiglitz
∗This chapter is based on joint work with Johannes Maier. Both authors contributed equally to this
work.
1Holt and Laury (2002) use specific parametric forms of EUT in order to classify subjects.
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(1970). These definitions are solely in terms of attributes of the distribution function and are
therefore independent of a utility framework. Moreover, they have been used to characterize
risk aversion in both EUT and non-EUT models (e.g. Machina, 1982; or Chew, Karni and
Safra, 1987). By just imposing ‘duality’ asserting that less risk-averse individuals accept
riskier gambles (see Diamond and Stiglitz, 1974), our method enables us to classify subjects
as more or less risk-averse without assuming a specific utility framework. It is therefore appli-
cable with heterogeneous risk preferences. Furthermore, our approach is more robust toward
probability weighting, since it uses variations in outcomes (i.e. mean preserving spreads) and
holds probabilities of outcomes constant at 50 %.
In a laboratory experiment we directly compare the HL method and our method using
low and high stakes. We find that both methods yield the same classification of individu-
als concerning the direction of risk attitudes (i.e. risk-averse, risk-neutral, or risk-seeking).
However, we also find that both methods yield diverging results concerning the intensity of
risk attitude. The classification of individuals as being more or less risk-averse than others
is quite different between both methods. Moreover, we find that our method yields higher
levels of risk aversion intensity that are much closer to what is observed in the field. These
estimates of risk aversion intensity are robust toward multiplying the stakes by five only
when our method is used. For the HL method we can confirm the result of Holt and Laury
(2002) that increasing the stakes increases risk aversion. It is also shown that these results
are robust toward possible confounds like certain switching preferences or order effects.
The chapter is structured as follows. In section 3.2 we review the HL tables and note
further advantages and disadvantages. We then propose a new method that shares the
advantages but not the disadvantages of the HL tables in section 3.3. The experiment used
to directly compare both methods is explained in section 3.4. The results of our experiment
as well as their robustness are discussed in section 3.5 and the conclusion can be found in
section 3.6. In the appendix of section 3.7 we generalize our new method so that it can be
used for different purposes of measuring the intensity of risk attitude.
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3.2 The Holt and Laury Method
Measuring the intensity of risk preferences is very important for theoretical predictions.
Also, in experiments individuals’ decisions are often (partly) driven by their risk preferences.
In order to control for that, the multiple price-list method of Holt and Laury (2002) is
commonly used in experiments nowadays. Table 3.1 presents the original HL design.
Table 3.1: The Holt and Laury method
Option A Option B RRA if row was
Row Outcome A1 Outcome A2 Outcome B1 Outcome B2 last choice of A EV [A]− V ar[A]−
No. = $2.00 = $1.60 = $3.85 = $0.10 and below all B EV [B] V ar[B]
1 Prob. 1/10 Prob. 9/10 Prob. 1/10 Prob. 9/10 [−1.71 ; −0.95] 1.17 -1.25
2 Prob. 2/10 Prob. 8/10 Prob. 2/10 Prob. 8/10 [−0.95 ; −0.49] 0.83 -2.22
3 Prob. 3/10 Prob. 7/10 Prob. 3/10 Prob. 7/10 [−0.49 ; −0.14] 0.50 -2.92
4 Prob. 4/10 Prob. 6/10 Prob. 4/10 Prob. 6/10 [−0.14 ; 0.15] 0.16 -3.34
5 Prob. 5/10 Prob. 5/10 Prob. 5/10 Prob. 5/10 [0.15 ; 0.41] -0.18 -3.84
6 Prob. 6/10 Prob. 4/10 Prob. 6/10 Prob. 4/10 [0.41 ; 0.68] -0.51 -3.34
7 Prob. 7/10 Prob. 3/10 Prob. 7/10 Prob. 3/10 [0.68 ; 0.97] -0.85 -2.92
8 Prob. 8/10 Prob. 2/10 Prob. 8/10 Prob. 2/10 [0.97 ; 1.37] -1.18 -2.22
9 Prob. 9/10 Prob. 1/10 Prob. 9/10 Prob. 1/10 [1.37 ; ∞) -1.52 -1.25
10 Prob. 10/10 Prob. 0/10 Prob. 10/10 Prob. 0/10 non-monotone -1.85 0.00
An individual makes a decision between option A and option B in each of the ten rows.
Option A as well as option B can have two different outcomes (A1 or A2 and B1 or B2)
with varying probabilities over the ten rows. The expected outcome of option A is higher
for the first four rows and lower for the last six rows (as indicated by the second-to-last
column in Table 3.1). So, a risk-neutral subject should choose option A in row 1 to 4 and
then switch over and choose option B in row 5 to 10. However, as option B has a higher
variance (indicated by the last column in Table 3.1), there is a trade-off when to switch to
option B. Clearly, by row 10 everybody should have switched to option B as it yields the
higher outcome with certainty. An individual who switches to option B between row 6 and
row 10 is classified as being risk-averse and the more risk-averse individual will switch later
as she needs a higher expected value to choose the more variable option. Someone who
switches earlier to option B (between row 1 and row 4) is classified as risk-seeking by similar
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arguments. In column 6 of Table 3.1 we report the risk preference intensity measured by
the amount of relative risk aversion (RRA) that is induced from the switching behavior if
we assume the class of constant relative risk-averse (CRRA) utility functions.2
The advantages of the HL method are due to its design. It is very easy to explain to
subjects since they only have to choose between option A and option B in each row.3 It is
incentivized and usually one of the ten rows is randomly selected and paid out for real. And
because it is so easy to implement, the HL table can be attached to other experiments where
risk aversion may play a role.
Nevertheless, the HL method also has its disadvantages. One disadvantage is that there
is no flexibility in adjusting the ranges of RRA without affecting the round-numbered prob-
abilities. So, for instance, if one would want to decrease the ranges of the RRA intervals in
row 4 to 6 in order to better classify most subjects’ risk attitudes (according to Holt and
Laury (2002) 75 % of the subjects fall into this category), one would have to give up the
round-numbered probabilities in Table 3.1. One way to circumvent this problem is proposed
by Andersen et al. (2006) using a complex more-stage procedure and thereby loosing the
advantages of the simple HL design mentioned above.
The use of variations in probabilities (whereas outcomes are held constant) makes the
HL tables sensitive to probability weighting. For instance, by using the standard parametric
Prospect Theory assumptions (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) on the probability weighting
function, we obtain the result that a subject with a linear utility function should choose A
only for the first three and not for the first four rows. Such an individual would be classified
as risk-seeking in HL. Of course, this makes it difficult to draw conclusions about the shape
of the utility function.
The major disadvantage of the HL tables is, however, that they are not based on a general
notion of increasing risk. They need a specific utility framework, namely EUT, in order to
2Note that the bound in rows 3 and 4 of r = −0.15 as reported in the original article of Holt and Laury
(2002) is in fact according to our calculation r = −0.14. Also, if the subject chooses always option B, his
relative risk aversion is r ∈ (−∞;−1.71].
3A variant of the design is to induce a single switching point, i.e. to ask for the row where the subjects
would want to switch from A to B.
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classify subjects as more or less risk-averse.4 However, evidence rather suggests that risk
preferences are heterogeneous and subjects follow different models of risky choice.5 It is then
not only problematic to impose EUT in order to classify subjects, but also to assume the
very same choice model over all subjects. Hence, a more general measure of risk aversion
intensity is needed that allows for a classification across different underlying models. In
the next section, we therefore propose a modification of the HL method that is based on a
general ‘behavioral’ notion of risk aversion, namely an aversion to mean preserving spreads.
3.3 A Model-Independent Method
In this section we propose a new method that shares the advantages of the HL table but
not its disadvantages as mentioned above. Table 3.2 presents our new approach.
Table 3.2: Our elicitation method
Option A Option B RRA if row was RRA if row was
Row Prob. 1/2 Prob. 1/2 Prob. 1/2 Prob. 1/2 first choice of A last choice of A
No. Outcome A1 Outcome A2 Outcome B1 Outcome B2 and above all B and below all B
1 0.05 4.95 2.65 2.75 [−0.51 ; −0.13]
2 1.10 3.90 2.65 2.75 (−∞ ; −0.51]
3 2.40 2.60 2.65 2.75 non-monotone
4 2.40 2.60 2.00 3.40 [2.27 ; ∞)
5 2.40 2.60 1.90 3.50 [1.70 ; 2.27]
6 2.40 2.60 1.75 3.65 [1.18 ; 1.70]
7 2.40 2.60 1.60 3.80 [0.86 ; 1.18]
8 2.40 2.60 1.45 3.95 [0.65 ; 0.86]
9 2.40 2.60 1.05 4.35 [0.36 ; 0.65]
10 2.40 2.60 0.20 5.20 [0.13 ; 0.36]
Again, subjects choose in each row between option A and option B. As in the HL table,
option A as well as option B has two possible outcomes. However, instead of varying the
4In order to discriminate between intensities of risk aversion, HL use EUT and the specific class of
CRRA functions. Using the HL method and assuming for instance Tversky and Kahneman’s (1992) Prospect
Theory would require a ‘trade-off’ between the curvatures of the utility function and the probability weighting
function since both simultaneously influence the level of risk aversion. However, even if such a ‘trade-off’
could be made, there is no way to compare subjects in case they follow different models of risky choice.
5The evidence that many individuals behave according to non-EUT models is vast. For instance, a recent
study by Harrison, Humphrey and Verschoor (2010) finds a 50/50 share of EUT and Prospect Theory.
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probabilities and keeping the outcomes constant over all rows as in the HL table, we rather
vary the outcomes and keep the probabilities constant (i.e. all probabilities are equal, namely
50 %). First note that an individual with monotone preferences will always prefer option B
over option A in row 3 of Table 3.2 (this is similar to row 10 in Table 3.1) as here option B
first-order stochastically dominates (or more specifically, state-wise dominates) option A.
We now compare options in row 4 to those in row 3. While option A is identical to the
one in row 3, option B in row 4 is a mean preserving spread of the one in row 3. We can
therefore say that option B becomes more risky in the sense of the very general increasing
risk definition of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970), while option A stays the same. In row 5
option A is again unaltered whereas option B is a further mean preserving spread of the one
in row 4 and thus a further increase in risk. This continues until row 10. By just imposing
‘duality’ stating that less risk-averse individuals should take riskier gambles, we can say that
someone (call her j) who preferred option B in the first four rows and option A in the last
six rows is more risk-averse than someone (call her i) who preferred option B in the first five
rows and option A in the last five rows. Such a statement can be made without referring to
any particular utility framework. The property of ‘duality’ is based on the concept of mean
utility preserving spreads first proposed by Diamond and Stiglitz (1974).6 To see how, note
that there exists a hypothetical gamble that is a mean preserving spread of option B in row
4, a mean preserving contraction of B in row 5, and leaves j just indifferent between A and
B. This hypothetical gamble then is a mean utility preserving spread of A for j. At this
point i still prefers B, so her hypothetical gamble representing a mean preserving spread of B
in row 5, a mean preserving contraction of B in row 6, and leaving i just indifferent between
A and B is a mean preserving spread of j’s hypothetical gamble. It follows that j is more
risk-averse than i. To illustrate how our table relates to the one of Holt and Laury (2002),
we state in the last two columns of Table 3.2 how our method would elicit measures of RRA
if we would also assume CRRA.
6Diamond and Stiglitz (1974) study this concept solely within EUT. By referring to simple compensated
spreads, Machina (1982) and Chew, Karni, and Safra (1987) used it to analyze risk aversion in non-EUT
models.
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Risk seeking is identified through switches of choices in the first two rows of Table 3.2.
Consider again the options in row 3, but now compare them to those in row 2. Now the
‘less attractive’ option A is altered by a mean preserving spread when going from row 3 to
row 2, while option B stays the same. Only a very risk-seeking individual would like this
spread so much that she would now prefer option A in row 2. In row 1 option A is a further
mean preserving spread. Now, also less extreme risk seekers, who in row 2 were still choosing
option B, are lured by the further increase in risk toward choosing option A in row 1. An
individual who is risk-neutral, or is very close to being risk-neutral, will always choose option
B in Table 3.2 since its expected value is higher than the one of option A in all rows.
Both options in Table 3.2, option A and option B, are always risky. This avoids the ‘cer-
tainty effect’, a well-known problem of any elicitation method using certainty equivalents.7
The concept of riskiness we use in our table follows the established theoretical literature.
“Clearly riskiness is related to dispersion, so a good riskiness measure should be monotonic
with respect to second-order stochastic dominance. Less well understood, perhaps, is that
riskiness should also relate to location and thus be monotonic with respect to first-order
stochastic dominance, in particular, that a gamble that is sure to yield more than another
should be considered less risky. Both stochastic dominance criteria are uncontroversial [. . . ]”
(Aumann and Serrano, 2008, p811)
In Table 3.2 we use both criteria. Option B first-order stochastically dominates option
A in row 3 and can therefore be considered less risky. Going downward from row 3 option A
stays unaltered whereas option B gets worse in terms of second-order stochastic dominance.
Going upward from row 3 option A gets worse in terms of second-order stochastic dominance
whereas option B stays the same. Individuals who switch from option B to A after row 3
are risk-averse (the earlier the more risk-averse). And individuals who switch from option A
to option B before row 3 are risk-seeking (the later the more risk-seeking).8
7“The certainty effect introduces systematic errors into any method based on certainty equivalents.”
(McCord and de Neufville, 1986, p57). It describes the widely observed phenomenon that certain alternatives
are perceived in a fundamentally different way than risky alternatives, even if the risk is negligible.
8Note that mean preserving contractions of option A (option B) could be applied in addition to the mean
preserving spreads of option B (option A) when going downward (upward) from row 3. This variant of the
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Although the two concepts we use for our elicitation method, mean preserving spreads and
mean utility preserving spreads, were originally analyzed within EUT, it has become common
in other models as well to understand risk aversion in terms of this more behavioral definition,
namely as an aversion to mean preserving spreads. Subsequently, it is this definition that
is used when risk aversion is analyzed in non-EUT models (see e.g. Machina, 1982; Chew,
Karni and Safra, 1987; or Schmidt and Zank, 2008). And as Machina (2008, p80) notes,
most non-EUT models “are capable of exhibiting first-order stochastic dominance preference,
[and] risk aversion [. . . ].” This shows that our method can classify subjects as more or less
risk-averse across various models of risky choice.
Using variations of outcomes (i.e. mean preserving spreads) not only makes it easy for
subjects to compute expected values but also allows us quite some flexibility in designing
the range of the intervals to elicit estimates of relative risk aversion if we adopt the CRRA
framework of Holt and Laury (2002). In principle, this could also be achieved in the HL ta-
ble, but only at the price of stating odd probabilities. By contrast, in our table probabilities
stay always at 50 % and only outcomes vary. We believe that subjects are more experi-
enced in dealing with odd outcomes (such as price tags) than with odd probabilities.9 More
importantly, constant probabilities of 1/2 are much less sensitive to probability weighting.
Already Quiggin (1982) uses 1/2 as plausible fixed point in his theory. “The claim that the
probabilities of 50-50 bets will not be subjectively distorted seems reasonable, and [. . . ] has
proved a satisfactory basis for practical work [. . . ].” (Quiggin, 1982, p328). This becomes
important when decisions taken in the table are interpreted solely in terms of the curvature
of a utility function.
design could be useful if one wanted to induce similar changes in both options over all rows of our table.
However, since it may come at the cost of increased complexity for the subjects, we chose not to do so.
9In the appendix in section 3.7 we provide a more general treatment of our method. This shows how our
method can be easily modified to meet different requirements on the elicitation ranges.
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3.4 The Experiment
The experiment was computer-based and was conducted in November 2009 at the ex-
perimental laboratory MELESSA of the University of Munich. It used the experimental
software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and the organizational software Orsee (Greiner, 2004).
232 subjects (graduate students were excluded) participated in 10 sessions and earned 11
euros (including 4 euros show-up fee) on average (with a maximum (minimum) of 30 (4.10)
euros) for a duration of approximately one hour.
In the beginning of the experiment subjects received written instructions that were read
privately by them. At the end of these instructions they had to answer test questions that
showed whether everything was understood. There was no time limit for the instructions
and subjects had the opportunity to ask questions in private. The experiment started on
the computer screen only after everybody answered the test questions correctly and there
were no further questions.
The further procedure of the experiment was the following. Each subject made decisions
in four tables.10 Again, they could take as much time as they wanted in order to make their
decisions. After all subjects had made their decisions, an experimental instructor came to
each subject to let them randomly determine their payoff from the tables.11 Before they saw
what their payoff from the experiment was they could again see how they actually decided
in the randomly determined relevant table. At the end of the experiment all subjects further
answered a questionnaire about their socio-economic characteristics. As soon as everybody
had answered the questionnaire they were payed in private (not by the experimenter) and
could leave.
As mentioned above, each subject made decisions in four tables. Two of the tables were
low-stakes tables and two of them were high-stakes tables, where all low-stake outcomes were
10Eight treatments varied which tables in which order a subject received. The treatments are further
explained below.
11Each subject had to role four dice. First, a four-sided die determined which of the four tables was
payoff-relevant. Second, a ten-sided die determined which row in the payoff-relevant table was selected. And
lastly, two ten-sided dice determined whether the amount A1 or A2 (if A was chosen in the relevant table
and row) or whether the amount B1 or B2 (if B was chosen in the relevant table and row) was payed out to
them (in addition to the show-up fee of 4 euros).
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Table 3.3: Our adjusted elicitation method
Option A Option B RRA if row was RRA if row was
Row Prob. 1/2 Prob. 1/2 Prob. 1/2 Prob. 1/2 first choice of A last choice of A
No. Outcome A1 Outcome A2 Outcome B1 Outcome B2 and above all B and below all B
1 0.03 4.89 2.62 2.72 [−0.49 ; −0.14]
2 1.01 3.91 2.62 2.72 [−0.96 ; −0.49]
3 1.40 3.52 2.62 2.72 [−1.70 ; −0.96]
4 1.65 3.27 2.62 2.72 (−∞ ; −1.70]
5 2.36 2.56 2.62 2.72 non-monotone
6 2.36 2.56 1.77 3.57 [1.37 ; ∞)
7 2.36 2.56 1.61 3.73 [0.97 ; 1.37]
8 2.36 2.56 1.42 3.92 [0.68 ; 0.97]
9 2.36 2.56 1.09 4.25 [0.41 ; 0.68]
10 2.36 2.56 0.26 5.08 [0.15 ; 0.41]
multiplied by five. In total, we used eight different tables. One of them was the original HL
table (HLol) as outlined in section 3.2 (Table 3.1) and another was the original HL table but
with all outcomes multiplied by five (HLoh). In order to being able to directly compare the
HL method and our method, we adjusted our tables to the exact same ranges of RRA that
were used by Holt and Laury (2002). A third table therefore used our method but adjusted
to the original low-stake outcomes of the HL table (MRal) as outlined in Table 3.3. And
a fourth table used our method adjusted to the high-stake version of the original HL table
(MRah), where all outcomes in Table 3.3 are multiplied by five.
Subjects further received our table (Table 3.2) from section 3.3 (MRol). In designing this
table we employed criteria mentioned by Holt and Laury (2002). There is an approximately
symmetric range of RRA around 0, 0.5, 1, and 2. Based on the experimental results of Holt
and Laury (2002), our table has only two risk seeking ranges and therefore more ranges
for reasonable degrees of risk aversion. There was also a high-stakes version of this table
where all outcomes are multiplied by five (MRoh). Again, in order to directly compare both
methods, we also adjusted the HL tables to the exact same ranges of RRA that were used
in our tables. Table 3.4 shows the adjusted HL table for low stakes (HLal). Again, the
high-stakes version of Table 3.4 (HLah) multiplied all outcomes by five.
Each of all eight different tables was received by 116 subjects and all 232 subjects were
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Table 3.4: The adjusted Holt and Laury method
Option A Option B RRA if row was
Row Outcome A1 Outcome A2 Outcome B1 Outcome B2 last choice of A
No. = $2.00 = $1.60 = $3.85 = $0.10 and below all B
1 Prob. 29/100 Prob. 71/100 Prob. 29/100 Prob. 71/100 [−0.53 ; −0.14]
2 Prob. 40/100 Prob. 60/100 Prob. 40/100 Prob. 60/100 [−0.14 ; 0.12]
3 Prob. 49/100 Prob. 51/100 Prob. 49/100 Prob. 51/100 [0.12 ; 0.36]
4 Prob. 58/100 Prob. 42/100 Prob. 58/100 Prob. 42/100 [0.36 ; 0.65]
5 Prob. 69/100 Prob. 31/100 Prob. 69/100 Prob. 31/100 [0.65 ; 0.85]
6 Prob. 76/100 Prob. 24/100 Prob. 76/100 Prob. 24/100 [0.85 ; 1.19]
7 Prob. 86/100 Prob. 14/100 Prob. 86/100 Prob. 14/100 [1.19 ; 1.70]
8 Prob. 95/100 Prob. 5/100 Prob. 95/100 Prob. 5/100 [1.70 ; 2.37]
9 Prob. 99/100 Prob. 1/100 Prob. 99/100 Prob. 1/100 [2.37 ; ∞)
10 Prob. 100/100 Prob. 0/100 Prob. 100/100 Prob. 0/100 non-monotone
in either of eight different treatments. The treatments were designed to control for order
effects, not only whether subjects answered low- or high-stakes tables first, but also whether
HL tables or our tables (adjusted and original) were answered first. The eight treatments
ensured that every subject had the same ex-ante expected income.12
In the comparison of the HL method and our method we will ask several questions.
Firstly, whether both methods yield the same classification of individuals concerning both
the direction and the intensity of risk attitude. Secondly, whether both methods yield
similar levels of risk aversion intensity. Thirdly, what the effect is of increasing the stakes
(i.e. multiplying all outcomes by five) on these RRA estimates. And lastly, how robust our
results are.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Directions of Risk Attitudes
Before analyzing the intensities of risk attitudes, we can ask how many of the subjects
that can be classified are risk-averse, risk-neutral, and risk-seeking. Under low stakes, we
12The eight treatments were: 1. HLol, MRal, HLoh, MRah; 2. MRol, HLal, MRoh, HLah; 3. MRal,
HLol, MRah, HLoh; 4. HLal, MRol, HLah, MRoh; 5. HLoh, MRah, HLol, MRal; 6. MRoh, HLah, MRol,
HLal; 7. MRah, HLoh, MRal, HLol; 8. HLah, MRoh, HLal, MRol.
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find that 79 % are risk-averse, 11 % are risk-neutral, and 10 % are risk-seeking in the HL
tables. The respective numbers for our tables are 81 %, 9 %, and 10 %. Under high stakes,
88 % are risk-averse, 7 % are risk-neutral, and 5 % are risk-seeking in the HL tables whereas
the respective numbers are 88 %, 6 %, and 6 % in our tables. This suggests that both
methods yield identical classifications of subjects concerning the direction of risk attitude.
This finding is confirmed when we look at within subject classifications. Among the
subjects that can be classified, we find that 84 % have the same direction of risk attitude
across both methods under low stakes, where 76 % are risk-averse, 4 % are risk-neutral, and
4 % are risk-seeking in both methods. Under high stakes, 90 % have the same direction
of risk attitude in both methods with 84 % being risk-averse, 4 % risk-neutral, and 2 %
risk-seeking.
For each relevant comparison of both methods (i.e. HLol vs. MRal, HLoh vs. MRah, HLal
vs. MRol, and HLah vs. MRoh) we perform sign tests in order to see whether the HL tables
yield a different classification on the direction of risk attitude than our tables. We find that
none of the comparisons is significant.13 We can now state our first result.
Result 1 The HL method and our method do not yield a different classification of individuals
concerning the direction of risk attitude (risk-averse, risk-neutral, or risk-seeking).
3.5.2 Intensities of Risk Attitudes
While Result 1 shows that both methods yield the same classification concerning the
direction of risk attitude, another question is whether both methods also yield the same
classification concerning the intensity of risk attitude. Are individuals similarly classified as
more or less risk-averse across both methods? This is an important question as it answers
whether the methodological problem of using the HL method (due to the required assumption
of EUT) is indeed an empirically relevant one. If both methods yielded the same classification
13The results (p-values, number of observations N) of two-sided Sign tests are: HLol vs. MRal (p = 1.0000,
N = 76), HLoh vs. MRah (p = 1.0000, N = 71), HLal vs. MRol (p = 0.1094, N = 66), and HLah vs. MRoh
(p = 1.0000, N = 71).
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of subjects concerning the intensity of risk attitude, results of experimental studies that
used the HL method (and thereby assumed EUT) in order to classify subjects as more or
less risk-averse would not be flawed. If, however, subjects are differently classified as more
or less risk-averse in both methods, the methodological problem of assuming EUT for the
classification in the HL method is in fact empirically relevant.
In order to answer this question we take the following approach. We first take a subject in
a HL table and determine whether she is classified as more, less, or equally risk-averse than
any other subject. We then take the same subject in our table and determine as well whether
she is classified as more, less, or equally risk-averse than each of the other subjects. When
we now compare this subjects pairwise comparisons (to all other subjects) in both tables,
we can identify for this subject whether she is classified the same or differently (against each
of the other subjects) across both tables. Thus, we know against how many of the other
subjects this subject changes her risk aversion ranking across both tables. Since we perform
this task not only for one specific but for all subjects, we can identify against how many
of the other subjects a subject changes her ranking across methods on average. When we
compare the HL tables to our tables we find that on average subjects change their ranking to
49 % of the other subjects.14 So, the average subject has a different ranking toward almost
half of the other subjects across methods.15
Result 2 The HL method and our method yield a different classification of individuals con-
cerning the intensity of risk aversion relative to other individuals.
14The comparisons we make yield the following results. The average subject changes her ranking (of being
more, less, or equally risk-averse) to 54 %, 52 %, 47 %, and 42 % of the other subjects in the respective
comparisons of HLol vs. MRal, HLoh vs. MRah, HLal vs. MRol, and HLah vs. MRoh.
15Note that subjects also change their ranking to other subjects across stakes (but within methods).
However, we can test whether subjects change their ranking across methods more than across stakes. Holding
the stakes effect constant, we find that subjects increase their ranking changes to other subjects on average
by 36 % when the method in addition to the stakes changes. When performing two-sided Wilcoxon signed-
rank tests we find that subjects change their ranking significantly more across methods than across stakes
(HLol vs. HLoh against HLol vs. MRah (z = −5.262, p = 0.0000, N = 68), HLal vs. HLah against HLal vs.
MRoh (z = −6.366, p = 0.0000, N = 67), MRol vs. MRoh against MRol vs. HLah (z = −2.431, p = 0.0151,
N = 63), and MRal vs. MRah against MRal vs. HLoh (z = −3.169, p = 0.0015, N = 57)). Results do
not change when using two-sided Mann Whitney U tests instead (HLol vs. HLoh against HLol vs. MRah
(p = 0.0000, N = 170), HLal vs. HLah against HLal vs. MRoh (p = 0.0000, N = 157), MRol vs. MRoh
against MRol vs. HLah (p = 0.0273, N = 135), and MRal vs. MRah against MRal vs. HLoh (p = 0.0000,
N = 133)).
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Results 1 and 2 are of great interest for other experimental studies that use the HL method
to control for risk aversion in observed behavior but which are not specifically interested in
the absolute level of risk aversion intensity. However, there are other studies where the
absolute level of risk aversion is important in order to derive quantitative predictions of a
theoretical model. In the following we therefore investigate what the levels of risk aversion
intensity are in both methods and how robust these RRA estimates are toward increasing
the stakes.
Figure 3.1: Cumulative distributions of RRA for all tables
Concerning the level of the intensity of risk attitude we again find systematic differences
between both methods. Figure 3.1 shows the cumulative distributions of RRA for all eight
different elicitation tables.16 The cumulative distributions of relative risk aversion of all four
HL tables lie above those of our four tables. While almost none of the subjects lies in the
highest RRA range in the HL tables, many subjects fall into the highest RRA range when
our method is used.17 The medians of RRA using the HL method are all below the medians
when our method is used. In the HL tables the medians lie in RRA ranges below one (HLol:
16We used uniform distributions within the RRA ranges.
17Note that as the highest range goes to infinity, the cumulative distribution functions do not end at
100 for the displayed values of RRA. Similarly, as the lowest range goes to minus infinity, the cumulative
distribution functions do not start at 0 for the reported RRA values. This is also the reason why we cannot
investigate the means of RRA but only the medians.
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[0.41; 0.68]; HLal: [0.65; 0.85]; HLoh: [0.68; 0.97]; HLah: [0.65; 0.85]) but they lie in RRA
ranges above one with our tables (MRol: [1.70; 2.27]; MRal: [1.37;∞); MRoh: [1.18; 1.70];
and MRah: [0.97; 1.37]). While Figure 3.1 shows the overall picture, Figures 3.2 and 3.3
show the specific distributions that need to be compared in analyzing our data.18
Figure 3.2: Cumulative distributions of RRA: Comparing methods
Figure 3.2 compares the HL method and our method. For low and high stakes we can
compare the original to the adjusted tables since the adjustment was such that the ranges
of RRA were identical in both tables. In all four panels the HL method yields clearly lower
measures of RRA. This is the case no matter whether the adjustment took place for the HL
method (Panels 2C and 2D) or for our method (Panels 2A and 2B) or whether we look at
low (Panels 2A and 2C) or high stakes (Panels 2B and 2D).
Figure 3.3 shows the effect of increasing the stakes in both methods. Since the cumulative
18In Figures 3.2 and 3.3 we omitted naming the axis, but since all distribution lines are taken from Figure
3.1 and just considered in isolation, the notation of Figures 3.2 and 3.3 is of course the same as in Figure
3.1.
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Figure 3.3: Cumulative distributions of RRA: Comparing stakes
distributions of the high-stakes HL tables lie below those of the low-stakes HL tables (Panels
3A and 3C), increasing the stakes seems to increase relative risk aversion. This is in contrast
to our method where increasing the stakes does not cause risk aversion to increase. The
cumulative distributions of our high-stakes tables rather cross those of our low-stakes tables
(Panels 3B and 3D). This picture seems not to be affected by the fact whether we compare
original (Panels 3A and 3B) or adjusted tables (Panels 3C and 3D).
Since each subject made decisions in four tables, we also test these differences using
matched pairs. Table 3.5 relates the original HL tables to our adjusted tables, such that
RRA ranges are identical and can be directly compared. And Table 3.6 relates the adjusted
HL tables to our original tables such that all comparisons have identical RRA intervals.
Reported are the number of observations (N), the z-values, and the p-values of two-sided
Wilcoxon signed-rank tests.19 In both tables, Table 3.5 and Table 3.6, in each cell it is tested
19Our results do not change when using two-sided Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests instead. The p-values are
all p = 0.000 for the comparisons of Figure 3.2 (with N = 186, 179, 172, 168 respectively for Panels 2A, 2B,
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if the elicitation method to the left yields different measures of RRA than the elicitation
method above. Consider an example from Table 3.5. If HLol is compared to MRal, then
a z-value of z = −4.922 indicates that the left table (HLol) yields lower measures of RRA
than the right table (MRal).











HLol -5.081 -4.922 -4.815
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000











HLal -4.957 -3.756 -4.654
0.0000 0.0002 0.0000
Comparing first the HL method and our method, we observe significantly higher measures
of RRA when our method is used (HLol vs. MRal and HLoh vs. MRah in Table 3.5; and
HLal vs. MRol and HLah vs. MRoh in Table 3.6). This holds at the 1 %-level for all four
comparisons of Figure 3.2. We can therefore state the following result.
2C, 2D). Thus, compared to the HL method our method yields significantly higher measures of RRA. For
the comparisons of Figure 3.3, we get p = 0.798 (N = 151) and p = 0.227 (N = 155) for Panels 3B and
3D, respectively. And we get p = 0.002 (N = 210) and p = 0.167 (N = 189) for the respective Panels 3A
and 3B. Hence, while measures of RRA are not significantly different between low and high stakes when our
method is used, this is not the case with the HL method. Here, increasing the stakes significantly increases
measures of RRA in the original (two-sided at 1 %-level) as well as in the adjusted (one-sided at 10 %-level)
HL tables.
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Result 3 Our method yields a higher intensity of risk aversion than the HL method.
Looking at the effect of increasing the stakes, we see that there is a significantly positive
effect on the RRA measure in the HL tables (HLol vs. HLoh in Table 3.5; and HLal vs. HLah
in Table 3.6). In contrast, there is no such effect observed when our method is used (MRal
vs. MRah in Table 3.5; and MRol vs. MRoh in Table 3.6). So, for the comparisons of Figure
3.3, we see that increasing the stakes by a factor of five increases risk aversion significantly
at the 1 %-level only when the HL method is used. With our method, there is no significant
effect of increasing stakes.20
Result 4 While increasing the stakes by a factor of five increases the intensity of risk aver-
sion with the HL method, increasing the stakes has no effect on the intensity of risk aversion
with our method.
Results 3 and 4 show that our method not only yields higher risk aversion estimates than
the HL method, but also that our estimates are robust toward multiplying all outcomes by
five (thereby indicating CRRA). This is not the case for the HL estimates. Here, we find
increasing relative risk aversion (IRRA). Our findings for the HL method are completely in
line with the findings of Holt and Laury (2002). Nevertheless, the results for our method
are much closer to what is observed in the empirical literature. Several empirical studies
indicate a measure of RRA roughly between 1 and 2 (e.g. Tobin and Dolde, 1971; Friend
and Blume, 1975; Kydland and Prescott, 1982; Hildreth and Knowles, 1982; Szpiro, 1986;
Chetty, 2006; or Bombardini and Trebbi, 2010) and Mehra (2003, p59) notes that “most
studies indicate a value for α that is close to 2.”21 An experimental study by Levy (1994)
rejects the existence of IRRA. Other empirical studies (e.g. by Szpiro, 1986; Friend and
Blume, 1975; Brunnermeier and Nagel, 2008; or Calvet and Sodini, 2010) find supportive
evidence for CRRA. Fehr-Duda et al. (2010) show in their experimental study that IRRA is
entirely driven by transformations of the probability weighting function as stakes increase.
20As can be seen from Tables 3.5 and 3.6, even the sign of the z-value is positive (adjusted tables) and
negative (original tables).
21Here, α is the measure of RRA.
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In contrast to the HL method, our method is invariant to probability weighting. Hence, this
may be the reason why there is a stakes effect only with the HL method.
Another possible explanation for the results of Holt and Laury (2002) and ours is that
subjects need higher incentives when they have to exert more cognitive effort. In the HL
tables, subjects need to exert more cognitive effort than in our tables since the varying
probabilities are difficult to handle. By contrast, in our tables all probabilities are one
half and 50/50 odds seem easy to work with. When subjects have too little incentives to
exert the cognitive effort that is required to reveal their true level of risk aversion, it seems
reasonable that they anchor their decision on the 50/50 choice (i.e. row 5 in the original
HL tables).22 Our results and the results of Holt and Laury (2002) suggest that increasing
the stakes increases risk aversion with the HL method. So, as incentives increase subjects
are more willing to exert such effort and thereby show their true level of risk aversion.23
This might be the reason that Holt and Laury (2002) do not observe such a stake effect with
hypothetical payoffs. With our method, subjects do not need much cognitive effort to handle
50/50 chances. Already our low-stakes tables give sufficient incentives to show subjects’ true
level of risk aversion. Increasing the stakes has therefore no effect on risk aversion with
our method. It is interesting to note that increasing the stakes by a factor of five seemed
not to be sufficient to show subjects’ true level of risk aversion in the HL tables since risk
aversion was still lower than in our tables. This is, however, consistent with the findings of
Holt and Laury (2002) who increased stakes by factors of 20, 50 and 90. They showed that
risk aversion increased with these higher stakes and that the RRA of one third of subjects
was in the highest RRA range when stakes are increased by a factor of 90. Harrison at al.
(2005) use a design similar to Holt and Laury (2002) but control for order effects. They
find that stakes effects are only significant between a factor of 20 and 50 (or 90), but not
between 50 and 90. Of course, if incentives increase even further beyond a factor of 50,
only few subjects need such high incentives to exert their required cognitive effort and we
22Note that this is also the modal switching point under low stakes in Holt and Laury (2002).
23Note that in Holt and Laury (2002) there are also less inconsistent subjects under high stakes and more
inconsistencies under comparable hypothetical payoffs.
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should expect that the increase in risk aversion is not significant anymore. Although this
cognitive effort explanation may explain the results of our experiment, we did not design
the experiment to test this explanation. Further research should therefore investigate this
potential explanation more closely in order to answer the question what the true level of risk
aversion is.
3.5.3 Robustness
One may be concerned that the differences in the RRA estimates between the HL method
and our method may be due to a preference for switching in the same row across tables. For
instance, if a subject always switches after row 5 (from A to B in the HL tables and from
B to A in our tables) we would measure a higher RRA in our tables. When comparing the
HL tables to our tables, there are always the same number of rows where identical switching
behavior would induce a higher RRA with our method as there are where identical switching
leads to a higher RRA with the HL method.24 Nevertheless, if a majority of subjects switched
in exactly those rows where we would measure a higher RRA for our tables, Result 3 may
simply be explained by a preference for identical switching behavior.
For all four comparisons of Figure 3.2, we find that only a minority of subjects switches
in the same row in both tables. The respective numbers are 19.7 %, 9.9 %, 10.6 %, and 12.7
% for Panels 2A, 2B, 2C, and 2D.25 Nevertheless, of those subjects that switch in the same
row a majority switches in those rows that induce a higher RRA with our method. For the
respective Panels 2A, 2B, 2C, and 2D 80 %, 85.7 %, 71.4 %, and 55.6 % of the ‘same row
switchers’ switch in rows where our tables yield a higher RRA, and only 13.3 %, 0 %, 28.6
24When comparing original HL tables to our adjusted tables (HLol vs. MRal and HLoh vs. MRah),
switching after row 1, 5, and 6 yields a higher RRA in our tables, switching after row 3, 4, 8, and 9 yields a
higher RRA in the HL tables, and switching after row 2 and 7 yields the same RRA in both tables. Never
switching (choosing always B in both tables) also leads to a higher RRA in our tables. When comparing
our original to the adjusted HL tables (HLal vs. MRol and HLah vs. MRoh), switching after row 3, 4, and 5
yields a higher RRA in our tables, switching after row 2, 7, 8, and 9 yields a higher RRA in the HL tables,
and switching after row 1 and 6 leads to the same RRA in both tables. Again, never switching and choosing
always B yields a higher RRA in our tables.
25Note that all subjects answered not only two but four tables. And there are only two subjects that
switch in the same row in all four tables.
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%, and 11.1 % switch in rows where the HL tables yield a higher RRA. It may therefore be
possible that a preference for identical switching behavior drives Result 3.
However, we can test whether Result 3 still holds for those subjects that switch in different
rows. If we exclude the ‘same row switchers’, we can test whether Result 3 is driven by a
preference for switching in the same row across both types of tables. For the comparisons of
Figure 3.2, we again perform two-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank tests where we exclude ‘same
row switchers’.26 For all comparisons we observe that differences are still significant. For
the comparison of HLol vs. MRal (Panel 2A) we get z = −4.540, p = 0.0000, N = 61. For
the comparison of HLoh vs. MRah (Panel 2B) we get z = −1.787, p = 0.0740, N = 64. The
comparison of HLal vs. MRol (Panel 2C) yields z = −3.908, p = 0.0001, N = 59, and the
comparison of HLah vs. MRoh (Panel 2D) yields z = −3.982, p = 0.0001, N = 62. Thus, the
differences of Panels 2A, 2C, and 2D are still significant at the 1 %-level, and the difference
of Panel 2B is still significant at the 10 %-level. We can now state the following result.
Result 5 Result 3 is not due to a preference for switching in the same row across both
methods.
Since we had eight different treatments in our experiment, we can also test whether the
order in which the tables were presented to the subjects had an effect on the elicited intensity
of risk aversion. This could be the case if subjects are primed to think about all tables in
terms of the first table they completed. To control for such order effects, we first test for
each of the comparisons of Figure 3.2 whether it made a difference if a specific table was
completed before or after its corresponding ‘other-type’ table. As an example, consider the
HLol table. Here, we test whether the RRA distribution of HLol in treatment 1 and 5 (where
it is completed before MRal) is different to the RRA distribution of Hlol in treatment 3 and
7 (where it is completed after MRal). For each of the eight different tables we perform a two-
sided Kolmogorov-Smirnov test on the equality of RRA distributions and find no significant
26When performing two-sided Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests instead, we observe similar results. All compar-
isons of Figure 3.2 stay significant at the 1 %-level (p = 0.000, N = 122 for Panel 2A; p = 0.008, N = 128
for Panel 2B; p = 0.000, N = 118 for Panel 2C; and p = 0.000, N = 124 for Panel 2D).
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difference in either table.27
To control for order effects in the comparisons of Figure 3.3, we also test for each table
whether it made a difference if it was completed before or after its corresponding ‘other-
stake’ table. Consider again as an example the HLol table. Here, we test whether the RRA
distribution of HLol in treatment 1 and 3 (where it is completed before HLoh) is different
to the RRA distribution of HLol in treatment 5 and 7 (where it is completed after HLoh).
Again, none of the two-sided Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests shows a significant difference.28 We
are now able to summarize these results on order effects. The order effects that are captured
by Result 6 test whether high-stakes tables are completed before or after corresponding low-
stakes tables (and vice versa) as well as whether original (HL and MR) tables are completed
before or after corresponding adjusted (MR and HL) tables (and vice versa).
Result 6 The order in which tables were completed by subjects does not influence the elicited
intensities of risk aversion.
The analysis of sections 3.5.1 and 3.5.2 excluded subjects that switched multiple times
from one option to another, or chose the first-order dominated option, and thus were incon-
sistent in completing a table. Over all eight different tables, we find that on average 24 %
of subjects are inconsistent which is in line with other studies.29 However, Holt and Laury
27The results of the two-sided Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests are: HLol (p = 0.199, N = 107), HLal (p =
0.822, N = 94), HLoh (p = 1.000, N = 103), HLah (p = 0.949, N = 95), MRol (p = 0.424, N = 78), MRal
(p = 0.896, N = 79), MRoh (p = 0.545, N = 73), and MRah (p = 0.763, N = 76).
28The results of the two-sided Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests are: HLol (p = 0.188, N = 107), HLal (p =
0.949, N = 94), HLoh (p = 0.990, N = 103), HLah (p = 0.940, N = 95), MRol (p = 0.796, N = 78), MRal
(p = 0.979, N = 79), MRoh (p = 0.775, N = 73), and MRah (p = 0.957, N = 76).
29Of those 24 %, 18 % switched multiple times and 6 % chose the first-order dominated option. Bruner,
McKee and Santore (2008), for instance, find 30 % inconsistent subjects where 25 % are multiple switchers and
5 % have non-increasing utility. As noted by Andersen et al. (2006, p386) “it is quite possible that [multiple]
switching behavior is the result of the subject being indifferent between the options. The implication here is
that one simply use a “fatter” interval to represent this subject in the data analysis, defined by the first row
that the subject switched at and the last row that the subject switched at.” When allowing for indifference,
Andersen et al. (2006) find that multiple switching is only 5.8 % and 24.3 % choose the indifference option.
When imposing a single switching point, choosing indifference increases to 30 %, which again indicates that
multiple switching behavior is caused by ‘thicker’ indifference curves. In contrast, Bruner (2007) suggests an
instructional variation emphasizing that only one decision will determine earnings (and further emphasizing
incentive compatibility of the payment rule) and finds multiple switching reduced, from 25.8 % to 6.7 % and
from 13.3 % to 2.3 % in two different elicitation formats. This would rather suggest that multiple switching
is caused by errors.
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(2002) treated those inconsistent subjects differently than we did. They simply counted how
often subjects chose each option (even if the option was not only chosen in subsequent rows)
and assumed the inconsistency away. If we treat our inconsistent subjects in the same way,
we can test whether the inconsistent subjects show a different pattern of risk aversion than
the consistent subjects. When performing Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests, we do not find any
significant difference in the distributions of consistent and inconsistent subjects.30
3.6 Conclusion
The multiple price-list method of HL has become the standard way to measure the inten-
sity of individuals’ risk attitudes in experiments. Several other methods which also involve
choices between lotteries have been proposed to accomplish a similar task. Binswanger
(1980, 1981) asks subjects to choose between pairs of different 50/50 gambles, where higher
expected values come at the cost of higher standard deviations. Eckel and Grossman (2008)
use a gamble design similar to Binswanger (1980, 1981) but subjects choose one out of five
different 50/50 gambles. Hey and Orme (1994) ask a battery of 100 choices with more com-
plex probabilities. None of these approaches uses mean preserving spreads among different
choice situations in a way similar to our approach. Since it is exactly this feature that allows
us to classify subjects as more or less risk-averse independently of a specific model, other
elicitation methods need to impose the same utility structure on all individuals in order to
classify them. None of the methods is model-independent in that it can rank individuals as
more or less risk-averse when they have heterogeneous risk preferences, such as EUT and
non-EUT. This seems especially problematic in light of existing evidence.
After modifying the HL method and thereby proposing a new model-independent multiple
price-list method to elicit the intensity of individuals’ risk attitudes, we further compared
our proposed method to the HL method in a lab experiment. Our results for the HL method
30The results of the two-sided Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests are: HLol (p = 0.916, N = 116), HLal (p =
0.390, N = 113), HLoh (p = 0.328, N = 116), and HLah (p = 0.180, N = 116). Subjects were only excluded
in case they never chose option B (3 subjects in HLal), since then even reshuffling their choices cannot make
them consistent.
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replicate the findings of Holt and Laury (2002). Furthermore, concerning the direction of risk
attitude (i.e. risk-averse, risk-neutral, or risk-seeking) we find that individuals are classified
the same across both methods.
However, with our method we found systematic differences concerning the intensity of
risk attitude. The classification of individuals as being more or less risk-averse than other
individuals is quite different across methods. This is important for experimental studies
that use the HL method (and thereby assume EUT for the classification) in order to control
for risk aversion in observed behavior. Concerning the level of individuals’ intensity of risk
aversion we found that our method yields higher measures of risk aversion that are much
closer to what is observed in the field. Furthermore, while increasing the stakes increases
risk aversion with the HL method, our method is robust toward such stakes effects. We also
offered a cognitive effort explanation of our results that needs to be tested in future research.
This may help to answer the important question of what subjects’ true level of risk aversion
is after all.
3.7 The General Model-Independent Method
Define row i as consisting of two alternatives Ai and Bi. Each alternative consists of two
possible outcomes, A1i and A2i of alternative Ai and B1i and B2i of alternative Bi. Given
row i is the row played (if only one row of the table is randomly selected to be played), each
outcome of each alternative is realized with probability 1/2. Choose a row i = m and define
A1m ≡ a,A2m ≡ b, B1m ≡ c, B2m ≡ d, where a, b, c, d ∈ R. Without loss of generality,
choose a and b such that a < b, and c and d such that c < d.31 Our method of elicitation
requires that a ≤ c, b ≤ d, and at least one relation holds strictly. It follows that
Am ≺FSD Bm. (3.1)
31We chose to make these inequalities strict in order to avoid ‘certainty effect’ issues.
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(3.1) means that Bm first-order stochastically dominates (FSD) Am.
32 Every individual with
strictly increasing utility prefers Bm over Am.
Then define values of row m + 1 as follows: A1m+1 ≡ a,A2m+1 ≡ b, B1m+1 ≡ c −
k1, B2m+1 ≡ d + k1. Further define values of row m + 2 in the following way: A1m+2 ≡
a,A2m+2 ≡ b, B1m+2 ≡ c − k1 − k2, B2m+2 ≡ d + k1 + k2. Continue these mean preserving
spreads (MPS’s) of option B until the last row is reached. Generally, for nˇ > 0 we can define
A1m+nˇ ≡ a,A2m+nˇ ≡ b, B1m+nˇ ≡ c − k1 − k2 − . . . − knˇ, B2m+nˇ ≡ d + k1 + k2 + . . . + knˇ,
where k1, k2, . . . ∈ R+.
In a similar way, we can define values of row m− 1 as follows: A1m−1 ≡ a− k1, A2m−1 ≡
b + k1, B1m−1 ≡ c, B2m−1 ≡ d. Now define values of row m − 2 as follows: A1m−2 ≡
a − k1 − k2, A2m−2 ≡ b + k1 + k2, B1m−2 ≡ c, B2m−2 ≡ d. Again, these MPS’s of option
A can be continued until the first row is reached. Generally, for nˆ > 0 define A1m−nˆ ≡
a − k1 − k2 − . . . − knˆ, A2m−nˆ ≡ b + k1 + k2 + . . . + knˆ, B1m−nˆ ≡ c, B2m−nˆ ≡ d, where
k1, k2, . . . ∈ R+.
With these definitions it follows that for all i the expected values are E[Ai] = a+b2 and
E[Bi] = c+d2 . Table 3.7 illustrates our generalized elicitation method.
Table 3.7: Our generalized elicitation method
Row Option Ai Option Bi
No. Prob. 1/2 Prob. 1/2 Prob. 1/2 Prob. 1/2
i Outcome A1i Outcome A2i Outcome B1i Outcome B2i
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
m− nˆ a− k1 − k2 − . . .− knˆ b+ k1 + k2 + . . .+ knˆ c d
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
m− 2 a− k1 − k2 b+ k1 + k2 c d
m− 1 a− k1 b+ k1 c d
m a b c d
m+ 1 a b c− k1 d+ k1
m+ 2 a b c− k1 − k2 d+ k1 + k2
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
m+ nˇ a b c− k1 − k2 − . . .− knˇ d+ k1 + k2 + . . .+ knˇ
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
32In order to make this more salient, we even used state-wise dominance as a special case of FSD in the
experiment.
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From k1, k2, . . . > 0 and k
1, k2, . . . > 0 it follows that for all i ≥ m we can state B1i >
B1i+1 and B2i < B2i+1. Also, for all i ≤ m it holds that A1i > A1i−1 and A2i < A2i−1.
Let us first consider all rows with i ≥ m. Since all A1i and A2i are identical, it follows
that
Am = Am+1 = . . . = Am+nˇ
⇒ Am ∼ Am+1 ∼ . . . ∼ Am+nˇ. (3.2)
Since B1m+nˇ = B1m+nˇ−1 − knˇ and B2m+nˇ = B2m+nˇ−1 + knˇ it follows that Bm+nˇ is a MPS
of Bm+nˇ−1.33 We use the standard (behavioral) definition of risk aversion and say that an
individual is risk-averse if she dislikes increases in risk, i.e. if she dislikes MPS’s. We thus
employ the increasing risk definitions of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970). For every risk-averse
individual
Bm ≺MPS Bm+1 ≺MPS . . . ≺MPS Bm+nˇ
⇒ Bm  Bm+1  . . .  Bm+nˇ. (3.3)
Combining (3.1), (3.2), and (3.3) we can derive that the choice between Am+nˇ and Bm+nˇ for
every nˇ > 0 is a trade-off between the advantage of the FSD-improvement from Bm over Am
(= Am+nˇ) and the disadvantage of the increase(s) in risk (MPS(’s)) when going from Bm to
Bm+nˇ.
34
Suppose an individual chooses Am+nˇ over Bm+nˇ, but chooses Bm+nˇ−1 over Am+nˇ−1. Then,
the MPS’s from row m until row m+ nˇ− 1 were not enough to distract him from the FSD-
33In going from Bm+nˇ−1 to Bm+nˇ, general MPS’s could be applied. However, since we defined each option
as having two possible outcomes only (where each occurs with probability 1/2) a MPS can only be attained
by adding and subtracting kn. In giving up that all outcomes of the table are equally likely, one would not
only require that subjects understand situations other than certainty and equally likely, but one would also
introduce complications such as probability weighting.
34Note that one could also use mean preserving contractions (i.e. decreases in risk) when going from Am
to Am+nˇ, either instead or in addition to the MPS’s that are used when going from Bm to Bm+nˇ. This
would be useful if one wanted to induce similar changes between the two alternatives over the rows of the
table.
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improvement of Bm over Am. In contrast, the MPS’s from row m until row m+nˇ were enough
to outweigh the FSD-improvement of Bm over Am. So, we can define an ’intermediate’
hypothetical option B¯m+nˇ with B¯1m+nˇ = B1m+nˇ−1 − κknˇ and B¯2m+nˇ = B2m+nˇ−1 + κknˇ.
The κ ∈ [0; 1] is chosen such that Am+nˇ ∼ B¯m+nˇ. Put differently, κ is the fraction of knˇ that
would make the individual indifferent between Am+nˇ and Bm+nˇ if κknˇ instead of knˇ would
have been used. For this individual B¯m+nˇ is then a mean utility preserving spread of Am+nˇ
in the sense of Diamond and Stiglitz (1974).
Now, suppose there is another individual who is less risk-averse. This individual would
then still strictly prefer B¯m+nˇ over Am+nˇ. It follows, that this individual would choose at
least as many times B over A as the more risk-averse individual.35 The smaller the ki’s, the
finer are the differences in risk aversion that can be observed. Any observed differences in
behavior must be due to (sufficiently strong) differences in risk aversion.
In order to distinguish risk-seeking individuals, consider all rows with i ≤ m. Since all
B1i and B2i are identical, it follows that
Bm = Bm−1 = . . . = Bm−nˆ
⇒ Bm ∼ Bm−1 ∼ . . . ∼ Bm−nˆ. (3.4)
Since A1m−nˆ = A1m−nˆ+1− knˆ and A2m−nˆ = A2m−nˆ+1 + knˆ it follows that Am−nˆ is a MPS of
Am−nˆ+1. Of course, every risk-seeking individual likes MPS’s and thus
Am ≺MPS Am+1 ≺MPS . . . ≺MPS Am−nˆ
⇒ Am ≺ Am−1 ≺ . . . ≺ Am−nˆ. (3.5)
Combining (3.1), (3.4) and (3.5) we can derive that the choice between Am−nˆ and Bm−nˆ
for every nˆ > 0 is a trade-off between the advantage of the FSD-improvement from Bm
(= Bm−nˆ) over Am and the advantage of the increase(s) in risk when going from Am to
35Strictly speaking, an individual who chooses as many times B over A as another individual could still
be slightly more or slightly less risk-averse. In this case her κ would be lower or higher, respectively.
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Am−nˆ. By similar arguments as before, it follows that a less risk-seeking individual would
choose at least as many times B over A as the more risk-seeking individual.
As in the HL tables, for risk-averse as well as for risk-seeking individuals it is optimal
to switch options only once. Risk-averse individuals switch from B to A after row m (the
earlier the more risk-averse) and risk-seeking individuals switch from A to B before row m
(the earlier the less risk-seeking).36 For risk-neutral individuals it is optimal to choose option
B throughout since it offers the higher expected payoff.
36Of course, if one wanted to induce switching from A to B for most (i.e. risk-averse) subjects as in the





In this chapter I present an experimental test of higher-order risk preferences. We evaluate
the subjects level of consistency with the concepts of risk aversion (second-order preferences),
prudence (third-order preferences, sometimes also called downside risk aversion), and tem-
perance (fourth-order preferences, sometimes also called outer risk aversion). Many theories
predict a substantial difference in risk preferences concerning gains and losses. Therefore, a
focus of our experimental design was to inflict real monetary losses on subjects.
While second-order risk preferences have been extensively studied in the experimental
literature, the experimental evidence on higher orders remains relatively scarce. Some at-
tempts have been made to measure behavior associated with higher-order risk preferences.
Ballinger, Palumbo and Wilcox (2003) showed in an experiment simulating life-cycle con-
sumption and saving that individuals make precautionary savings, but to a much lesser
extend than predicted by theory. Harrison, List and Towe (2007) found in a field experiment
that the risk aversion of coin traders is significantly higher when they faced an additional
background risk. This supports the notion that temperance is present.
Very recently, there has emerged also some direct experimental evidence on higher-
∗This chapter is based on joint work with Johannes Maier. Both authors contributed equally to this
work.
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order preferences. Based on the model-independent gamble definitions of Eeckhoudt and
Schlesinger (2006), Deck and Schlesinger (2010) tested whether subjects apportion risks con-
sistent with prudence and temperance. They found evidence for prudence but also against
temperance (i.e. intemperance). From this, they conclude that common specifications of ex-
pected utility theory (EUT), such as CRRA and CARA functions, are not reconcilable with
the combination of prudence and intemperance. However, popular specifications of cumula-
tive prospect theory (of Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) are consistent with both prudence
and intemperance. Hence, they interpret their findings as support of cumulative prospect
theory (CPT). A similarly designed experiment is Ebert and Wiesen (2010). However, it is
confined to third-order risk preferences. They find supportive evidence for prudence.
Compared to EUT, one crucial difference of reference-dependent models, such as prospect
theory, is the distinct evaluation of gains and losses. In experiments, it is usually difficult
to impose losses on subjects. Most experiments endow subjects with enough money right
before they impose ‘losses’ on them. Since subjects in these experiments cannot make real
losses, it is hard to believe that they behave as if they would. The problem of house money
effects in economic experiments of risky choice is well-established since Thaler and Johnson
(1990). The house money effect describes the behavior of subjects to treat all money earned
in the experiment as money to play with. Consequently, they are willing to take risks they
normally would not accept. This problem arises in any design where subjects are endowed
with a participation fee or previous earnings and can subsequently only lose this amount of
money. Bosch-Dome`nech and Silvestre (2006) instead introduced a design where subjects
have to attend two dates of the experiment. This design enables them to impose real losses
on the second date. However, they only consider risk aversion. To our knowledge, no
experiment has been conducted so far that tests higher-order risk preferences in the domain
of real monetary losses.
In our experiment, we investigate second- to fourth-order risk preferences over gains
and losses. Subjects attended two dates of the experiment. The purpose of the first date
was to let subjects earn enough money which they possibly could lose at the second date,
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several weeks later. At the second date subjects made 84 binary choices that are also based
on the gamble definitions of Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006). However, while Deck and
Schlesinger (2010) and Ebert and Wiesen (2010) asked subjects where they wanted to add
‘harms’, we rather presented the gambles in final outcomes. We chose this design, as it is well
established in the literature1 that in experiments subjects have major difficulties in solving
compound lotteries.
Results on risk aversion and on prudence closely resemble the results of previous experi-
ments. However, our results on temperance contrast sharply with those of the only previously
conducted experiment by Deck and Schlesinger (2010). Since we elicit temperance using 28
choices by each subject2 we are confident that our results are robust. As a consequence, we
do not reject the possibility that common specifications of EUT can be consistent with the
data. We also find that risk preferences of different order are empirically strongly related.
Probably surprisingly, hardly any variation in behavior was observed between gambles in
gains and in losses.
Section 4.2 introduces same theoretical concepts that are underlying the experimental
design. The specific design of our experiment is described in section 4.3. Results and their
robustness are discussed in section 4.4. Section 2.9 concludes.
4.2 Theoretical Prerequisites
In this section we outline some basic concepts and definitions that clarify what is precisely
measured in the experiment. It illustrates what we mean when stating that somebody
exhibits risk preferences of a certain kind.
Let y ∈ R be the level of wealth. Let k ∈ R, with k > 0, be a sure reduction in wealth.
ε˜1 and ε˜2 are random variables which are non-degenerate, independent of all other random
variables that affect wealth, and with E[ε˜1] = E[ε˜2] = 0. Now, we define the following
1See e.g. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) in their discussion of the isolation effect, Bernasconi (1994),
and Friedman (2005).
2Deck and Schlesinger (2010) use four choices by each subject to elicit temperance.
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standard gambles, where each element denotes an outcome and each outcome of a specific
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The definitions used in the theoretical literature are the following
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≤ 0 in EU models),
≥ 0 in EU models),
≤ 0 in EU models).
Note that these definitions are deterministic. They define preferences, which are under-
lying characteristics of the subjects. There are several approaches to relate these preferences
to observations. One way to proceed would be to state that preferences are to be called the
respective name only if all observed actions are in accordance with this definition. However,
then a single observation contradicting one of the definitions would lead to a rejection of the
concept. For instance, somebody who is choosing B3 over A3 in 27 out of 28 decisions, but
chooses A3 once, would be termed neither prudent nor imprudent. It becomes clear, both
from our experimental results as well as from those of Deck and Schlesinger (2010) and Ebert
and Wiesen (2010), that with such a strict application of the definitions, almost no subject
could be classified as having a certain risk preference. However, we think that the concepts
of risk aversion, prudence and temperance still are valuable to characterize individuals who
often but not always act according to the definitions above.
This leads us to a stochastic definition of higher-order risk attitudes, replacing the deter-
3We defined all gambles having a mean of y if k = 0 instead of 0 as in Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006).
We do so because only then complete gambles can lie in the domain of gains or losses.
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ministic definition. Both Deck and Schlesinger (2010) and Ebert and Wiesen (2010) do so
implicitly when making inferences from their results. We state these stochastic definitions
explicitly in order to clarify the concepts used to analyze the data. The notion that deter-
ministic theories only represent the structural part of preferences whereas the entire system
of preferences incorporates a random or stochastic part is widespread among researchers who
try to closely match theories and empirical observations. The fact that subjects of an exper-
iment sometimes make different choices on the very same decision problem and under the
same conditions is only reconcilable with stochastic theories.4 For a comprehensive survey
on the different variants of stochastic utility models consult Wilcox (2007).
Let P in be the probability that individual i prefersBn over An for a given set of parameters.




is the probability that i chooses
is the probability that i chooses




for given y, ε˜1,
for given y, ε˜1, k, and
for given y, ε˜1, ε˜2,
and we can state definitions for stochastically specified risk preferences.
Definition 5 Second-order stochastic risk preferences are defined by the relations
i is stochastically risk averse
i is stochastically risk neutral













Third-order stochastic risk preferences are defined by the relations
i is stochastically prudent
i is stochastically prudence neutral













4On experimental evidence on this see e.g. Camerer (1989), Starmer and Sugden (1989), Ballinger and
Wilcox (1997), and Loomes and Sugden (1998).
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Fourth-order stochastic risk preferences are defined by the relations
i is stochastically temperate
i is stochastically temperance neutral













These definitions will allow us to make statements on the risk attitudes of a single indi-
vidual. Sometimes, however, we will make interpersonal comparisons. For such comparisons
we need definitions that let us order subjects in terms of the level of consistency with a
certain risk attitude. We will say that
Definition 6
i is stochastically more risk-averse
i is stochastically more prudent
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∀ y, ε˜1, k,
∀ y, ε˜1, ε˜2.
The definition of stochastically more risk averse was formally stated first by Hilton (1989).
Recently, Wilcox (forthcoming) extended the definition for stochastic y. The definitions of
stochastically more prudent and stochastically more temperate were not stated explicitly
before but are a straightforward extension of the stochastically more risk averse definition
to higher orders.
It should be emphasized that the concepts of definition 6 are not to be confounded with
the definitions of higher risk aversion (or parallel concepts of higher downside risk aversion
etc.) as they were used in the previous chapter. Here, we define the level of consistency
with a qualitative concept whereas in the previous experiment we were concerned with the
quantitative strength of a risk preference. Only under very specific conditions these concepts
relate to each other in a one to one fashion. Observable actions can always be described
as being the result of stochastic preferences that are composed of a systematic and a non-
systematic part. If we allow the non-systematic part of preferences to differ between subjects
(e.g. some subjects make more errors than others) the measures of consistency and of intensity
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may yield different orderings of subjects. For instance, it is well conceivable that a subject
is very confident about rejecting a mean-preserving spread but is not willing to give up a
lot in order to avoid one. Another subject might be ready to pay a lot to avoid such a risk
in principle but has not thought about such decisions much and is therefore prone to make
many mistakes.
Definitions 5 and 6 are still in terms of underlying characteristics of an individual. How-
ever, using our observations we can make statistical inferences on these unknown character-
istics of the subjects. When labeling a subject as risk averse, prudent or temperate in the
subsequent experiment we imply these stochastic definitions.
4.3 The Experiment
The experiment was divided into two distinct dates for each subject. This was necessary
because the focus was to induce real monetary losses. Institutional restraints ruled out that
on a single-date experiment subjects could make real monetary losses not compensated by
any fixed payments such as the participation fee. However, by dividing the experiment into
two dates we were able to induce real monetary losses on the second date.
On the first date everybody made real monetary gains. These gains were the lower
bound of losses we could inflict at the second date. By letting the second date be separated
by several weeks from the second date, it seems likely that the gains of the first date were
internalized by the subjects. Furthermore, the first date demanded the completion of real
tasks by the subjects and payments were received in cash. The real gains of the first task
thus were likely perceived as rightfully earned and not as house money to gamble with at the
second date. The subjects also received the information that gains and losses were equally
likely outcomes of the second date. It is therefore reasonable to assume that the status quo
prior to the second date is the relevant reference point for decisions made during the second
date.
A similar approach to inflict real monetary losses was employed by Bosch-Dome`nech and
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Silvestre (2006). They restricted their experiment to the elicitation of risk aversion. Our
results for risk aversion resemble their results closely, but our elicitation of higher-order risk
preferences in the domain of real monetary losses has, to our knowledge, not been investigated
before.
Both dates of the experiment took place in the MELESSA laboratory of the University
of Munich. Subjects were recruited using the software ORSEE by Greiner (2004). At both
dates subjects first received written instructions. Then they answered control questions
ensuring comprehension of the instructions. Finally, participants made their choices through
a computer interface that displayed the options. The interfaces were programmed using the
z-Tree software of Fischbacher (2007). All random processes that determined the monetary
outcomes were realized through the drawings of numbered balls from urns by the subjects
themselves.5
4.3.1 First Date
72 subjects participated in the first date of the experiment, which took place on November
25, 2008. In each of the three sessions 24 subjects participated. They were randomly assigned
to seats in the laboratory. The first task the subjects conducted was to fill out tables that
measure intensities of risk preferences. These tables are not a topic of this thesis. However,
it is of importance that the subjects carried out a meaningful task, so that the payment at
the end of the first date can be perceived as rightfully earned by the subjects. After filling
out the tables, the subjects answered a detailed questionnaire on personal characteristics.
The most important feature of the first date for our present analysis is that subjects
received payments of 23.30 to 29.20 euros 31.96 to 40.05 U.S. dollars. These were payed out
in cash, in private and not by the experimenters. The payments at the first date include
both the participation fee for the first and the second date of the experiment. Answering the
5We chose not to let the randomization be done by a computer because we agree with Harrison and
Rutsro¨m (2008): “In our experience subjects are suspicious of randomization generated by computers. Given
the propensity of many experimenters in other disciplines to engage in deception, we avoid computer ran-
domization whenever feasible.”(p.133).
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task and the questionnaire, drawing balls from urns and paying participants took around 60
minutes.
4.3.2 Second Date
The second date took place exactly three weeks after the first date, on December 16,
2008, in the same room as the first date. Again, subjects were randomly assigned to seats.
67 participants (93 %) showed up at the second date. The five subjects who did not show up
at the second date could in principle have decided not to show up because of fundamentally
different risk preferences compared with the other participants. However, we have detailed
information on the subjects to check whether this is the case. First, we have the detailed
answers to the questionnaires, and second, we have the responses to the tables eliciting the
intensities of risk preferences. We found no systematic differences in the answers of those
subjects participating only on the first date.
Each subjects made 84 choices on the second date of the experiment. Each choice was
a binary decision between two options, called option A and option B. The framing was
always in final outcomes. That is, each option was represented only by the final outcomes
that could result if the option was played out. For a given decision, all stated outcomes
of a decision were realized with equal probability. Thus, a gamble can be fully represented
by the outcomes without stating probabilities separately. In the instructions the options
were described in a way that even subjects who are not familiar with the basic notions of
probabilities could understand how the outcome was determined. Only the comprehension
that each ball was equally likely to be drawn from an urn was needed. To assist those
subjects who are more familiar with representations in terms of probabilities we provided
additionally an alternative explanation. The order of appearance of the 84 decisions was
randomly chosen for each of the three sessions, hence we can check whether the order of
appearance influences results.
A key feature of the decisions was that their outcomes lie either in the domain of gains,
in the domain of losses or in a mixed domain including both. We classify a decision as being
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a decision in gains if all final outcomes that can potentially occur regardless of the actual
choice are positive values. Likewise, we define decisions as being in losses if all outcomes are
negative. We define a decision as being over a mixed domain if both positive and negative
values can result.
Table 4.1: Decisions eliciting risk aversion
dec- para- displayed outcomes in appearance %
ision meters Option A Option B do- in session of
no y ε1 A1 A2 B1 B2 main 1 2 3 B2
01 45 30 15 75 45 45 G 29 12 75 58
02 -5 6 -11 1 -5 -5 M 1 39 76 52
03 10 2 8 12 10 10 G 2 40 77 51
04 5 3 2 8 5 5 G 3 64 19 69
05 0 12 -12 12 0 0 M 57 41 49 55
06 57 5 52 62 57 57 G 30 65 50 51
07 28 20 8 48 28 28 G 4 66 20 51
08 0 9 -9 9 0 0 M 58 67 78 55
09 62 17 45 79 62 62 G 59 68 21 57
10 -9 3 -12 -6 -9 -9 L 31 13 79 51
11 -5 3 -8 -2 -5 -5 L 32 42 22 67
12 6 5 1 11 6 6 G 5 43 80 45
13 46 32 14 78 46 46 G 33 69 51 57
14 3 2 1 5 3 3 G 60 14 81 58
15 15 11 4 26 15 15 G 34 44 52 57
16 -6 5 -11 -1 -6 -6 L 61 45 23 51
17 0 2 -2 2 0 0 M 62 70 82 52
18 0 5 -5 5 0 0 M 6 15 53 64
19 -3 2 -5 -1 -3 -3 L 7 46 54 66
20 -7 4 -11 -3 -7 -7 L 35 47 24 66
21 5 6 -1 11 5 5 M 8 71 25 60
22 -1 10 -11 9 -1 -1 M 63 72 26 48
23 9 3 6 12 9 9 G 9 73 83 55
24 -10 2 -12 -8 -10 -10 L 36 16 55 49
25 -7 5 -12 -2 -7 -7 L 10 17 84 52
26 1 10 -9 11 1 1 M 11 18 27 70
27 7 4 3 11 7 7 G 37 74 56 55
28 7 5 2 12 7 7 G 38 48 28 54
28 of the decisions were designed to elicit risk aversion. With ε˜1 = [−ε1, ε1] the definition
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of risk aversion becomes
B2 = [y] = [y, y] % [y − ε1, y + ε1] = [y + ε˜1] = A2.
In order to make both B2 and A2 more comparable in terms of complexity we display B2 also
as a two-outcome of equal probability gamble, hence we chose the representation B2 = [y, y].
Table 4.1 describes the 28 gambles to elicit risk aversion both in terms of parameters (y and
ε1) and in terms of final outcomes displayed (A1, A2, B1, and B2). The values of y were
drawn from the range of -10 to 62, y also equals the expected value of both B2 and A2. The
values of ε1 were drawn from the range of 2 to 32, ε1 is also the standard deviation of A2.
This leads to final outcomes in the range of -12 to 79 euros. Column 8 of Table 4.1 states
whether the decision lies in the domain of gains, losses or in mixed domains (indicated by a
G, L and M, respectively). A decision eliciting risk aversion is in gains if y−ε1 > 0, in losses
if y + ε1 < 0 and in mixed domains if neither is the case. Of the 28 decisions to elicit risk
aversion, 13 were in gains, seven in losses and eight in mixed domains. Displayed in columns
9, 10 and 11 are the orders of appearance of the respective decision in the three sessions.
28 of the decisions were designed to elicit prudence. With ε˜1 = [−ε1, ε1] the definition of
prudence can be stated as
B3 = [y − k, y + ε˜1] = [y − k, y − k, y − ε1, y + ε1]
% [y, y, y − k − ε1, y − k + ε1] = [y, y − k + ε˜1] = A3.
Table 4.2 describes the 28 gambles to elicit prudence both in terms of parameters (y, k and
ε1) and in terms of final outcomes (A1 - A4 and B1 - B4), which were actually displayed
to the subjects. y is drawn from the range of -8 to 67, k from 2 to 15 and ε1 from 2 to
21. The expected value of both B3 and A3 is y − k/2, and it ranges from -10 to 61.5. The
standard deviation of both B3 and A3 is ε1/2 and ranges from 1 to 10.5. This leads to final
outcomes in the range of -12 to 72. Column 13 of Table 4.2 states whether the decision lies
in the domain of gains, losses or in mixed domains. A decision eliciting prudence is in gains
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Table 4.2: Decisions eliciting prudence
Dec- para- displayed outcomes in appearance %
ision meters Option A Option B do- in session of
no y k ε1 A1 A2 A3 A4 B1 B2 B3 B4 main 1 2 3 B3
29 -4 3 3 -10 -4 -4 -4 -7 -7 -7 -1 L 12 75 29 58
30 -5 2 3 -10 -5 -5 -4 -8 -7 -7 -2 L 39 76 1 49
31 10 2 2 6 10 10 10 8 8 8 12 G 40 77 2 49
32 -6 4 2 -12 -6 -6 -8 -8 -10 -10 -4 L 64 19 3 58
33 9 6 2 1 9 9 5 7 3 3 11 G 41 49 57 60
34 -6 2 4 -12 -6 -6 -4 -10 -8 -8 -2 L 65 50 30 49
35 57 5 20 32 57 57 72 37 52 52 77 G 66 20 4 54
36 0 6 4 -10 0 0 -2 -4 -6 -6 4 M 67 78 58 54
37 10 4 2 4 10 10 8 8 6 6 12 G 68 21 59 57
38 62 15 21 26 62 62 68 41 47 47 83 G 13 79 31 70
39 0 2 2 -4 0 0 0 -2 -2 -2 2 M 42 22 32 58
40 0 4 6 -10 0 0 2 -6 -4 -4 6 M 43 80 5 49
41 8 2 4 2 8 8 10 4 6 6 12 G 69 51 33 57
42 51 12 5 34 51 51 44 46 39 39 56 G 14 81 60 61
43 0 10 2 -12 0 0 -8 -2 -10 -10 2 M 44 52 34 55
44 67 11 11 45 67 67 67 56 56 56 78 G 45 23 61 51
45 -3 2 2 -7 -3 -3 -3 -5 -5 -5 -1 L 70 82 62 63
46 -3 6 2 -11 -3 -3 -7 -5 -9 -9 -1 L 15 53 6 52
47 -3 2 6 -11 -3 -3 1 -9 -5 -5 3 M 46 54 7 54
48 5 2 2 1 5 5 5 3 3 3 7 G 47 24 35 67
49 -4 2 5 -11 -4 -4 -1 -9 -6 -6 1 M 71 25 8 55
50 4 2 5 -3 4 4 7 -1 2 2 9 M 72 26 63 51
51 42 8 16 18 42 42 50 26 34 34 58 G 73 83 9 70
52 10 7 5 -2 10 10 8 5 3 3 15 M 16 55 36 52
53 0 6 6 -12 0 0 0 -6 -6 -6 6 M 17 84 10 58
54 -8 2 2 -12 -8 -8 -8 -10 -10 -10 -6 L 18 27 11 58
55 0 7 3 -10 0 0 -4 -3 -7 -7 3 M 74 56 37 48
56 0 2 10 -12 0 0 8 -10 -2 -2 10 M 48 28 38 42
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if y − k − ε1 > 0, in losses if y + ε1 < 0 and in mixed domains if neither is the case. Of the
28 decisions to elicit prudence ten are in gains, seven in losses and eleven in mixed domains.
Columns 14, 15 and 16 show the orders of appearance of the respective decision in the three
sessions.
Lastly, 28 of the decisions were designed to elicit temperance. With ε˜1 = [−ε1, ε1] and
ε˜2 = [−ε2, ε2] the definition of temperance can be stated as
B4 = [y + ε˜1, y + ε˜2] = [y − ε1, y + ε1, y − ε2, y + ε2]
= [y − ε1, y − ε1, y + ε1, y + ε1, y − ε2, y − ε2, y + ε2, y + ε2]
% [y, y, y, y, y − ε1 − ε2, y − ε1 + ε2, y + ε1 − ε2, y + ε1 + ε2]
= [y, y + ε˜1 + ε˜2] = A4.
We used the representation of [y−ε1, y−ε1, y+ε1, y+ε1, y−ε2, y−ε2, y+ε2, y+ε2] for B4 in
order to make B4 and A4 gambles with an equal number of outcomes and thus to make them
similarly complex. Table 4.3 describes the 28 gambles to elicit temperance both in terms of
parameters (y, ε1 and ε2) and in terms of final outcomes (A1 - A8 and B1 - B8) which were
actually displayed. y was drawn from the range of -8 to 62, it also equals the expected value
of both B4 and A4. The values for ε1 were drawn from the range of 2 to 22, those of ε2 from
the range of 2 to 12. Without loss of generality we chose ε1 ≥ ε2. The standard deviation of




2)/2 and ranges from 2 to
√
246.5 ≈ 15.7. The final outcomes
range from -12 to 84 euros. Again, the next column states whether the decision lies in the
domain of gains, losses or in mixed domains. A decision eliciting temperance is in gains if
y − ε1 − ε2 > 0, in losses if y + ε1 + ε2 < 0 and in mixed domains if neither is the case. Of
the 28 decisions to elicit temperance ten are in gains, seven in losses and eleven in mixed
domains. Also displayed are the orders of appearance of the respective decision in the three
sessions.
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4.4 Results
We observed 5628 binary choices that we can employ for our analysis, 84 choices for
each of the 67 subjects. A first analysis in subsection 4.4.1 treats all choices as independent
observations. This provides a first overview of the results. However, it neglects the fact that
subsets of 84 choices each are the actions of a single individual. Therefore, we focus in the
following subsections 4.4.2 to 4.4.4 on a within-subject analysis. Deck and Schlesinger (2010)
let subjects make only ten decisions (six eliciting prudence and four eliciting temperance)
and therefore have to refrain from an actual within-subject analysis.
4.4.1 Pooling Subjects
Table 4.4: Descriptive results pooling subjects
choices across within within in mixed
eliciting domains gains losses gambles
Risk-Aversion 56 % 55 % 57 % 57 %
(N) (1876) (871) (469) (536)
Prudence 56 % 60 % 55 % 52 %
(N) (1876) (670) (469) (737)
Temperance 56 % 58 % 54 % 56 %
(N) (1876) (670) (469) (737)
Table 4.4 outlines our results if we pool all subjects. All results are rounded to the full
percentage point. The second column states in how many decisions Bn was chosen over
An for each n = 2, 3, 4. In this column no distinction between the decisions were made
other than whether they were designed to elicit risk aversion, prudence or temperance. The
hypothesis that the probability of making a risk averse choice in a second order decision,
a prudent choice in a third-order decision, or a temperate choice in a fourth-order decision
is equal or lower than 1/2 is rejected by the three binomial tests with p-values rounded to
0.000000.
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In decisions eliciting third-order preferences, 56 % of the choices were in favor of the
prudent choice, that is B3 was preferred over A3. Both Deck and Schlesinger (2010) and
Ebert and Wiesen (2010) also observed a majority of prudent choices. At first glance their
results indicate a higher consistency with the concept of prudence since they found 61 % (in
Deck and Schlesinger, 2010) and 65 % (in Ebert and Wiesen, 2010) of choices in favor of
the prudent alternative. Note, however, that in their experiments subjects could only make
real monetary gains. The result which is comparable to their analysis best is reported in the
third column of Table 4.4. Here, we find that 60 % of choices in gains were in favor of the
prudent choice, quite close to the results of the other two experiments.
In decisions eliciting fourth-order preferences, 56 % of the choices were in favor of the
temperate choice. This is in sharp contrast to the results of Deck and Schlesinger (2010),
the only other experiment on temperance so far. They report that only 38 % of the choices
favor the temperate choice and thus individuals are on average intemperate. However, we
are confident that our results are robust since our design was in final outcomes only and
thus could be very easily understood by subjects and our analysis of temperance rests on
1876 observations (Deck and Schlesinger, 2010, used 396 observations to elicit temperance).
This differing result could have strong consequences since the results of Deck and Schlesinger
(2010) on temperance lead them to conclude that cumulative prospect theory better explains
data on higher order risk attitudes than EUT with CRRA or CARA functions. If we chose
only temperate choices in gains as the appropriate comparison to the results of Deck and
Schlesinger (2010) the gap in the results even broadens by two percentage points.
A striking feature of the results in Table 4.4 is the fact that the percentage of risk averse,
of prudent, and of temperate choices are so close that they all are rounded to 56 % (the
more exact percentages are 56.24 % risk averse, 55.70 % prudent, and 56.02 % temperate
choices).6 In subsection 4.4.3 we will explore whether this stems from the fact that the same
individuals who are risk averse, are also prudent and temperate.
6If we compute the 90 % confidence intervals of the underlying population percentages we receive 54.14-
58.14, 53.78-57.61, and 54.11-57.93, respectively. The fact that these intervals widely overlap again highlights
the possibility that the underlying percentage of choosing the ‘averse’ option may well be equal or very close
for different orders.
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Based on these first results we can summarize the following. If we would accept the
assumptions that individuals are homogeneous and observations are independent, we could
state with a high degree of confidence that the behavior of the representative subject exhibits
stochastic risk aversion, stochastic prudence, and stochastic temperance.
Column 3 to 5 of Table 4.4 state for each domain separately in how many decisions Bn was
chosen over An (for each n = 2, 3, 4). Choices eliciting risk aversion were very homogeneous
across domains. Also, choices eliciting temperance did not show much variation. Only
choices eliciting prudence seem to slightly depend on the domain they lie in. To make more
precise statements we refer to subsection 4.4.4, which explores the relations of preferences
in different domains in more detail. For each cell of Table 4.4 we conducted a binomial test
to determine at which level of confidence we can reject the hypothesis that the underlying
probability of choosing Bn is equal or below 50 %. All tests yield a p-value below 0.05 except
for choices on temperate decisions in losses where the p-value equals 0.069713.
4.4.2 Comparing Subjects
In this and the next two subsections we use the data to characterize individual subjects.
Here, we analyze risk preferences of different orders separately. In the following subsection
we investigate the relationship between risk preferences of different orders. These two sub-
sections have in common that we do not distinguish between decisions in gains, in losses,
and in mixed domains. Finally, in subsection 4.4.4 we check if risk preferences depend on
the domain the decisions are defined over.
Figures 4.1, 4.2, and 4.4 present our results on the level of the individual subject. We
count how often each individual chooses Bn over An for each n and show the relative frequen-
cies of subjects with a certain number of risk averse, prudent, or temperate choices. The red
distribution in Figure 4.1 shows the empirical frequency distribution of the number of risk
averse choices made by the subjects. The blue distribution shows the frequency distribution
that had occurred if every subject would have chosen randomly between B2 and A2. This
would also have been the distribution if every subject would have been stochastically risk
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Figure 4.1: Characterizing subjects: Risk aversion
neutral, since this is equivalent to the behavior of choosing B2 with a probability of 1/2. The
empirical distribution clearly does not follow random behavior. The median of the empirical
distribution (17 risk averse choices) is above the median of the random distribution (14 risk
averse choices). This indicates risk aversion. The empirical distribution also has fatter tails.
Hence, there exist both risk seekers and risk averters. However, more subjects are located in
the right tail than in the left. Therefore, the number of subjects who are clearly risk averse
is higher than the number of clear risk seekers.
In Figure 4.2 the red distribution shows the empirical frequency distribution of the num-
ber of prudent choices. The blue distribution again shows the frequency distribution if every
subject would have chosen randomly. As before, the two distributions are distinct. Again, the
median of the empirical distribution is higher in the actual distribution (15 prudent choices),
the tails are fatter, and the right tail is fatter than the left tail. This means subjects tend
to be prudent, but also that there is quite a significant level of heterogeneity. Another large
part of the subject pool is not distinguishable from being prudence neutral. Also, a small
group of subjects clearly seems to be imprudent. Compared with the empirical distribution
of choices eliciting risk aversion, the tails are less fat. Additionally, the dominance of the
right tail against the left tail is less pronounced than in the case of risk aversion.
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Figure 4.2: Characterizing subjects: Prudence
Figure 4.3: Deck and Schlesinger (2010, Figure 4): Prudence
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We can directly compare our results with those of Deck and Schlesinger (2010). In Figure
4.3 we replicate Deck and Schlesinger (2010, Figure 4). It shares the central features of our
empirical distribution, namely that the empirical median is above the median of the random
distribution (four versus three prudent choices) and significantly more mass is on the right
tail than in the random distribution.
Figure 4.4: Characterizing subjects: Temperance
Finally, Figure 4.4 shows our results of temperate choices against the distributions that
would occur under random behavior. It shows that individuals tend to be temperate, the
median individual chooses 15 times the temperate option. The left tail has only slightly
more mass than would be predicted under random behavior, indicating that the share of
subjects who are clearly intemperate is very low. In contrast, the right tail of the distri-
bution has significantly more mass than under the random distribution. While this distri-
bution might not look surprising when compared with our empirical distributions of risk
aversion and prudence, it is very different from the results of the only previous experimental
study on temperance. In Figure 4.5 we replicate the results of Deck and Schlesinger (2010,
Figure 3). The empirical distribution of Deck and Schlesinger (2010) is skewed to the right,
while ours is skewed to the left. Deck and Schlesinger (2010) conclude that subjects must be
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Figure 4.5: Deck and Schlesinger (2010, Figure 3): Temperance
intemperate.7 They deduce that conventional functional forms of EUT are not reconcilable
with individuals being intemperate. Based on our data on temperance we would come to a
different conclusion.
4.4.3 Relating Risk Preferences of Different Order
The observation that aggregate accounts of different order preferences closely resemble
each other (see Table 4.4), leads to the question of how tightly the risk preferences of different
orders are related. We can conduct a within subject analysis of this question, since we can
link the decisions of a single subject on different orders. The relation of risk preferences of
different orders is of interest because it indicates whether the elicited risk preferences of one
order can be a good predictor for the risk preferences of a another order. This has been
a standard procedure in many empirical studies on precautionary saving. In these articles,
measures of risk aversion were used to predict the amount of prudence and subsequently the
presumable optimal levels of precautionary savings.8
Figure 4.6 illustrates whether the same subjects that are risk averse also are prudent. We
7Whether the exact median of their observed data equals one or two temperate choices (versus a median
of two choices under the random distribution) is not inferrable from their reported data. They report that
50 % of subjects made either no or a single temperate choice. Since they analyze 99 subjects the median
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Figure 4.6: Relation of risk aversion and prudence
map each subjects relative frequency of risk averse and prudent choices. Each small point
represents a single individual and each larger point represents two individuals who share
exactly the same pattern. There clearly is a positive relation between the frequencies of risk
averse and prudent choices. The straight line represents a least squares regression line. It
has the functional form Y = 0.2758+0.5144X, where X represents the relative frequency of
prudent choices and Y the relative frequency of risk averse choices. The coefficient of deter-
mination of the regression line is R2 = 0.193 and the Pearson product-moment correlation
coefficient is thus r = 0.4393. However, since we deal with data measured on an ordinal
scale, for a quantification of the association, the Spearman rank-order correlation coefficient
rS is more appropriate. The Spearman correlation is rS = 0.4948, and if we test whether
rS is different from 0 we can confidently reject this with a p-value of 0.0000. We infer that
there exists a considerable positive relation between risk aversion and prudence.
has to be either one or two choices.
8For a survey article discussing this approach and its results, see Carroll and Kimball (2008).
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Figure 4.7: Relation of risk aversion and temperance
Figure 4.7 illustrates the relationship between risk aversion and temperance. Again,
each small point represents a single individual, each larger point represents two individuals.
The positive relation between the frequency of risk aversion and prudence is even more
eminent. The least squares regression line is Y = 0.0547 + 0.9062X, where X represents the
relative frequency of temperate choices and Y the relative frequency of risk averse choices
(with R2 = 0.5391 and r = 0.7342). The Spearman rank-order correlation coefficient is
rS = 0.6853, and if we test whether rS is different from 0 we can confidently reject this with
a p-value of 0.0000. This illustrates, that there is a very strong relation between the degree
of risk aversion and temperance of an individual, according to our data.
Finally, Figure 4.8 relates prudence and temperance. In this diagram we use three sizes
of data points. Each small point is the representation of a single individual, each medium-
sized point that of two, and each large-sized point that of three individuals. The least
squares regression line is Y = 0.2221 + 0.5978X, where X represents the relative frequency
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Figure 4.8: Relation of prudence and temperance
of temperate choices and Y the relative frequency of prudent choices (with R2 = 0.3216 and
r = 0.5671). The Spearman rank-order correlation coefficient is rS = 0.6795, and if we test
whether rS is different from 0 we can confidently reject this with a p-value of 0.0000. The
relationship between prudence and temperance is almost as strong as the one between risk
aversion and temperance, and stronger than the one between risk aversion and prudence.
The empirical distributions of the three orders of risk preferences seem very similar,
judging by the descriptive diagrams in Figures 4.1, 4.2, and 4.4. We also found a high degree
of correlation between the risk preferences of different order. The question arises, whether
the risk preferences of different orders might be drawn from the same distribution. Therefore,
we now analyze whether they are statistically distinct. Since we have a frequency of risk
averse, prudent, and temperate choices for every single individual we can employ a two-sided
Wilcoxon signed-rank test to compare a pair of two risk preferences. We report the results
in Table 4.5. The null hypothesis is that the underlying distribution of the risk preference
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to the left of a cell and the underlying distribution of the risk preference above a cell are
identical. All p-values are very far from any customary significance level. Closest comes the








Risk Aversion 0.094 0.119
(67) (67)
examination on whether prudence and temperance are different, but this is still quite far
from being statistically significant. Hence, we clearly cannot reject the null hypothesis that
the distributions of risk preferences of different orders are identical.
4.4.4 Comparing Domains
In this subsection we examine the question whether risk preferences differ according
to the domain the gambles are defined over: gains, losses, or mixed domains. This is of
interest because domain-specific risk preferences are a key feature of many non-EUT models,
including cumulative prospect theory (CPT).
We begin with the analysis of risk aversion. Since every subject answered all 28 questions
eliciting risk aversion we can again use the two-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank test. We report
results in Table 4.6. The null hypothesis is that the underlying distribution of risk aversion
is the same in the domain to the left of the cell and in the domain above the cell. We find
no pairwise comparison of domains where we could reject the null at the significance level
of 10 %. The classical literature on prospect theory found in numerous experiments that
individuals are risk-seeking in losses. However, these conclusions were predominantly based
on experiments with hypothetical choices. In contrast, the experiment of Bosch-Dome`nech
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and Silvestre (2006) finds a similar pattern as we do, subjects are risk averse in losses. Since
they also inflict real monetary losses on subjects, this feature seems to be driving the differing
results.










Table 4.7 reports the results of Wilcoxon signed-rank tests for the distribution of prudence
in different domains. The only statistically significant effect of domains on any measure of
risk preferences is found for prudence, between the distribution of prudence in gains and
in mixed domains. This confirms our conjecture from the descriptive results of Table 4.4.
We reject the null hypothesis that the distribution of prudence is identical in the domain
of gains and in the mixed domain with a significance level of 5 %. In contrast, it cannot
be rejected that the distributions of prudence in gains and in losses are identical. Neither
can the hypothesis be rejected that the distributions in losses and in mixed domains are
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identical.










Table 4.8 displays the results of Wilcoxon signed-rank tests for the distribution of temper-
ance across domains. Similarly to the analysis of risk aversion we cannot reject the hypothesis
that the underlying distributions of risk preferences of different domains are identical in any
of the possible cases.
To conclude, we do not find that risk preferences over decisions in losses are fundamentally
different than preferences over decisions in gains. Also, preferences over decisions with a
mixed domain do not substantially differ from decision which lie entirely in one of the two
domains. Note however, that this result should by no means be interpreted as a rejection of
the general concept of a reference point. The concept of loss aversion is not systematically
testable in our experimental design.9 Also, we are not in a position to test whether the
strength of risk preferences depend on the distance of outcomes to a reference point or not.
What we can conclude is that the direction of the qualitative concepts of risk aversion,
prudence and temperance seems not to depend on the domain of the decision. Therefore,
the functional form of the value function seems not to change radically at the reference point.
9If we examine the second-order decisions over mixed domains, we find some indications that loss aversion
is present. Subjects choose B2 noticeably more often (65 % versus 50 %) if this choice provides a sure gain
(decisions 21 and 26) than if this choice leads to a sure loss (decisions 2 and 22). However, the number of
decisions is to small to allow for a detailed statistical analysis.
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4.4.5 Cumulative Prospect Theory
In this section we examine whether cumulative prospect theory (CPT) can be a better
predictor of higher-order risk preferences than EUT with a commonly used utility function.10
This is a key conclusion Deck and Schlesinger (2010) draw from their experiment. They use
the parametrization of Tversky and Kahneman (1992) and assume that the reference point
is equal to the mean of the alternatives in a specific decision. With these assumptions, the
predictions of CPT over the decisions of their experiment is that subjects will always prefer
the prudent choice and will always prefer the intemperate choice. EUT with a commonly used
utility function predicts that subjects choose always the prudent and the temperate choice.
In all six decisions eliciting third-order preferences, more subjects preferred the prudent
choice and in all four decisions eliciting fourth-order preferences more subjects preferred the
intemperate choice. Therefore, while both CPT and EUT predict prudence correctly, the
finding of temperance is only predicted by CPT.
We carefully designed our experiment to implement the status quo prior to the second
date as the reference point. If we adopt the parametric assumptions of Tversky and Kah-
neman (1992), we find that there is a variety of predictions for each order. CPT predicts
in seven of our decisions eliciting second-order preferences that the risk seeking choice will
be taken and in 21 decisions it predicts that the risk averse choice will be preferred. Out
of the 28 decisions eliciting third-order preferences it predicts only one imprudent choice.
In the decisions eliciting fourth-order preferences it predicts twelve temperate choices versus
14 intemperate choices.11 We can compute in how many decisions CPT correctly predicted
the majority of choices. In 59 out of 84 decisions the prediction was correct. To receive
an intuition on the performance of this as a predictive theory, we compare it to the result
under EUT with standard utility functions. Here, 69 out of the 84 decisions were predicted
correctly.12 To summarize, based on our experiment, we would conclude that the parametric
10As commonly used utility functions we denote all functional forms that have derivatives with alternating
signs and positive marginal utility, such as CRRA or CARA utility functions.
11EUT is independent of domains. If we additionally assume a commonly used utility function, it therefore
predicts that subjects always make the risk averse, the prudent and the temperate choice.
12Choices in decisions 10, 11, 16, 19, 20, 25, 57, 61, 63, 64, 67, 68, 69, 71, 72, 73 and 83 were correctly
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version of CPT most commonly used is performing worse as a predictive theory than EUT
with any standard utility function.
If we would adopt our definition of the reference point to the experiment of Deck and
Schlesinger (2010), the two compared theories would predict exactly the same behavior. We
defined the reference point to be the status quo prior to the experiment. According to this
definition, all decisions in Deck and Schlesinger (2010) lie in the domain of gains. In gains,
the value function of CPT is identical to a specific CRRA function. In the decision problems
of Deck and Schlesinger (2010), the nonlinear influence of probabilities does not change these
predictions. Hence, both theories yield identical predictions.
Although we carefully designed our experiment to induce the status quo prior to the
second date as the reference point, one could argue that the precise nature of the reference
point is never verifiable. Maybe the predictive performance of CPT increases if other ref-
erence points are assumed. If we adopt the definition of the reference point from Deck and
Schlesinger (2010) to our experiment we find that in this case CPT predicts that subjects
always choose the risk averse, the prudent and the intemperate alternative. Only in 53 out
of 84 decisions the predictions of CPT would be correct. Therefore, if the mean of the alter-
natives in any decision problem is assumed to constitute the reference point, CPT performs
even worse than under our preferred assumption.
4.4.6 Robustness
In this subsection we investigate whether the sequence in which the decision problems
were displayed and answered by the subjects had any effect on the answers. In the three
sessions we conducted, the decisions were displayed in different sequences (all determined by
a random process). Therefore, we approach this question by observing whether the pattern
of answers differs between the three sessions.
In Table 4.9 we analyze if the probability of choosing the risk averse choice differs between
predicted by EUT but not by CPT. Choices in decisions 24, 43, 65, 76, 77, 80 and 84 were correctly predicted
by CPT but not by EUT. Choices in decisions 12, 22, 30, 31, 34, 40, 55 and 74 were wrongly predicted by
both theories. Choices in the 52 remaining decisions were correctly predicted by both theories.
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Table 4.9: Does the elicited risk aversion depend on the ordering of decisions?
% of K-S test vs. session 2 K-S test vs. session 3
B2 p-value D-statistic (N) p-value D-statistic (N)
session 1 61 0.061 0.3755 (45) 0.387 0.2727 (44)
session 2 52 0.251 0.2866 (45)
session 3 55
K-S test: Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for equality of distribution functions
the three sessions. In the second column we state the share of risk averse choices in the
three sessions as a first descriptive analysis. In all three sessions a majority of choices
were an favor of the risk averse option. In session 1 the share of risk averse choices was
highest, in session 2 it was lowest. In the following columns we report the results of three
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for equality of distribution functions. The null hypothesis is that
the underlying probability of choosing the risk averse choice is identical in two sessions. We
cannot reject this hypothesis in any of the three tests at a level of significance of 5 %. At
a significance level of 10 % we would reject the hypothesis that the probability of choosing
B2 is identical in session 1 and in session 2. In fact, this is the only rejected hypothesis of
equality at the 10 %-level in the whole subsection. Since we perform nine tests in total it
is not surprising that one indicates a significance at the 10 %-level. We therefore do not
conclude that the sequence of questions alters behavior in our design. However, we recognize
that if any sequence effect exists, it is most likely to be present in the decisions eliciting risk
aversion.
Table 4.10 displays the share of prudent choices in the three sessions as well as the results
of three Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests. The shares of prudent choices differ by six percentage
points at most. Also, the tests yield p-values that are far from any customary significance
level. We therefore clearly cannot reject the hypothesis that the distribution of the underlying
probability to choose a prudent option is identical in the three sessions.
Finally, in Table 4.11 we check for the robustness of temperance elicitation to sequence
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Table 4.10: Does the elicited prudence depend on the ordering of decisions?
% of K-S test vs. session 2 K-S test vs. session 3
B3 p-value D-statistic (N) p-value D-statistic (N)
session 1 54 0.313 0.2727 (45) 0.842 0.1818 (44)
session 2 60 0.954 0.1364 (45)
session 3 54
K-S test: Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for equality of distribution functions
Table 4.11: Does the elicited temperance depend on the ordering of decisions?
% of K-S test vs. session 2 K-S test vs. session 3
B4 p-value D-statistic (N) p-value D-statistic (N)
session 1 56 0.854 0.1621 (45) 0.632 0.1818 (44)
session 2 58 0.194 0.2984 (45)
session 3 54
K-S test: Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for equality of distribution functions
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effects. The maximum difference in the share of temperate choices is four percentage points.
Neither of the three Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests indicates that the hypothesis of identical
distributions can be rejected.13
4.5 Conclusion
We analyzed higher-order risk preferences, namely risk aversion, prudence and temper-
ance in a laboratory experiment. Each analyzed subject participated in two distinct dates of
the experiment, separated by several weeks. This allowed us to inflict real monetary losses
on subjects on the second date if decisions and chance determined that the pay-offs were
negative. Thus, we designed the experiment in order to clearly implement the status quo
prior to the second date experiment as the reference point.
Our findings for risk aversion are in line with the most recent results from other exper-
iments that use monetary incentives. Especially, we find no hint at risk-seeking behavior
in losses, a behavior that has been found in the early experimental literature relying on
hypothetical questions only.
Our results on prudence resemble those of the other two experimental studies that have
examined this matter. Prudence is the only risk preference analyzed that relies on the domain
the decision lies in, although the effect seems not to be very strong. Decisions in the mixed
domain reveal a statistically significant lower level of consistency with prudence than those
in gains. Note, however that this does not change the qualitative result that in all domains,
subjects prefer the prudent more often than the imprudent alternative.
The results of our experiment for temperance are clearly the most notable. There exists
only one previous experimental study on such behavior (by Deck and Schlesinger, 2010) and
our experiment yields almost opposite results. Since our set of data included more than four
13One may be puzzled by the results of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests between session 1 and 3 for third-
and for fourth-order preferences (in Tables 4.10 and 4.11, respectively). They yield the same D-statistic and
are based on the same sample size, yet they exhibit different p-values. The reason is that in Tables 4.9, 4.10
and 4.11 we report the exact p-values of the tests while the p-values directly based on the D-statistics are
approximations in case of ties (and are likewise both 0.860 for the two tests under consideration).
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times as many observations than that of Deck and Schlesinger (2010) we are confident that
our results are robust. This is of importance because the previous result of intemperance
was used to reject common specifications of EUT and to support cumulative prospect theory
instead. Our results, however, are better reconcilable with standard assumptions in EUT,
such as CRRA or CARA, than with their favored variant of cumulative prospect theory. Also,
we found very strong relationships between risk preferences of different orders. Standard
preferences, such as CRRA or CARA, predict that the higher the degree of risk aversion,
the higher the degrees of prudence and temperance.
So, the shape of gain-loss utility does not seem to be of a fundamentally different nature
for gains and for losses. As a qualification of our results, we have to state that the stakes in
our experiment are small compared to some decisions individuals face outside the laboratory.
If individuals are threatened by huge losses, they may be tempted to speculate on a series
of favorable outcomes of events and take risks they otherwise would shun. They might be
willing to aggregate risks in order to leave at least one possible outcome unaffected. This
unaffected outcome then could function as a glimmer of hope for the subjects. However,
behavior in reaction to monetary losses that do not stir such existential fears seems more
accessible to economic analysis. Although we cannot infer the functional shape of the value
function for all levels of stakes from our results, we can only dismiss the notion that at the






The general approach I followed in this thesis in order to contribute to the existing body
of literature is twofold. The first strategy was to extend established theoretical models that
represent the current frontier of behavioral economics. The second strategy was to develop
model-independent methods that allow experimental preference elicitations which can be
interpreted in a wide range of plausible models. Both approaches have their unique benefits.
Moreover, rather than being substitutes, they can complement each other.
In the attempt to extend existing theoretical models, the focus was on descriptive models
that are based on the consistent maximization of an objective function. This ensures that
the specified theories can be employed in a wide range of situations and are not limited to
particular contexts. Furthermore, the extensions concentrated on recently proposed mod-
els of reference-dependent preferences because of two reasons. On the one hand, models of
reference dependence are rapidly gaining acceptance among researchers in this field. This
indicates that the general importance of reference points for decisions under risk is becom-
ing an element of a consensus among scholars. On the other hand, theoretical models of
endogenous reference points are a relatively recent development. Therefore, for many well-
established strands of literature inside expected utility theory (EUT) it has not yet been
analyzed how equivalent concepts in models of reference-dependent preferences apply. How-
ever, the question whether these concepts can be reasonably applied in the new models is
interesting since the new models aim to achieve a level of universality comparable with that
of EUT.
In chapter 1, an analysis of the properties of higher-order risk preferences, such as pru-
dence and temperance, in reference-dependent models was presented. Concepts of risk pref-
erences beyond risk aversion have not been systematically analyzed before in models of
reference dependence. It was shown that the general pattern of higher-order risk preferences
is fundamentally different compared to commonly assumed models in EUT. Also, assuming
different types of reference points influences the results significantly. The assumption of
recent expectations as the reference point, as it has been proposed in the popular models by
Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006, 2007), explains two puzzles in the literature concerning higher-
175
Part IV: Conclusion
order risk preferences. First, the coexistence of a considerable amount of risk aversion and
modest levels of precautionary saving are consistent with this theory. Second, the demand
for costly insurance is predicted by this theory, even in the presence of buffer stock savings.
Other concepts of reference points were not able to explain these widely-observed phenom-
ena. This illustrates that the assumption on what shapes the reference point is essential for
predictions of the reference-dependent model. In contrast, the precise functional form eval-
uating gains and losses did not play a major role. The central conclusions in chapter 1 were
derived for very general classes of gain-loss utility. We concluded that expectation-based
reference points can constructively contribute to explain economic behavior which is based
on higher-order risk preferences.
Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009) proposed an extension of reference-dependent preferences that
allows the inclusion of anticipatory utility into the general framework. In chapter 2, I pre-
sented an alternative model that follows the same intuitive notions but allows for more
flexibility in the case of multi-attribute utility. This broadens the range of applicability of
the model beyond additively-separable utility functions. It was further shown that the two
models differ in predictions, even if risk-less preferences are such that both models are ap-
plicable. This shows that the alternative model is not simply an extension of the previous
model. Two scenarios were defined in which predictions of the two models differ. First, in
my model, different attributes of utility are more substitutable than in the previous model.
In particular, all changes that do not affect pure consumption utility have no influence on
decision utility in my model. Second, changes in beliefs concerning the correlation of risks
that influence different attributes have an effect on decision utility only in my model. The
aim of this analysis was to adjust the existing model in a way that preserves its numerous
advantageous features but allows for a generality of pure consumption utility functions that
is comparable to those in EUT.
The two contributions to the theoretical literature have in common that they analyze con-
cepts which are well-established in EUT, in models of reference-dependence. These concepts
were higher-order risk preferences and multi-attribute utility, respectively. The theoretical
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extensions have not necessarily to be confined to a single variant of a reference-dependent
model. For instance, we analyzed risk preferences of higher orders with many different ref-
erence points in the first chapter. Also, alternative possibilities to achieve a wider range of
applicability were explored in the second chapter. If we derive results in different theoretical
models, we can isolate the predictions that the models have in common and the predictions
that distinguish them. For instance, based on the analysis of chapter 1 it can be concluded
that for higher-order risk preferences it makes a substantial difference whether reference
points are formed by expectations or by feelings of regret. In contrast, only very general
assumptions concerning the functional form of the value function were made to arrive at the
conclusions.
The second strategy followed in this thesis was to employ features which many popular
models share, to design methods of empirical evaluation. These methods then can be used
in experimental studies and the interpretation of its results are not confined to narrowly
defined theories. Both proposed methods were implemented in incentivized experiments to
assess their empirical implications.
The first model-independent method proposed an experimental procedure to elicit the
intensity of risk aversion. Its design is based on the canonical definition of risk increases. The
concept of duality of risk aversion and risk was used. Namely, an individual is considered as
having a lower level of risk aversion if it is ready to accept more increases in risk in exchange
for a compensation. The used notions of risk increases and of duality have been applied in a
wide range of theoretical models, both inside and outside of EUT. Therefore, these concepts
can be labeled as model-independent. We experimentally implemented our proposed method
jointly with the most popular risk aversion elicitation technique. This allows us to assess if
our method yields different results, and hence, if the methodological issues are of empirical
relevance. It was found that the ordering of subjects according to their intensity of risk
aversion is fundamentally different for both methods. Also, if additional assumptions are




The second model-independent method outlined in this thesis is a design that allows to
investigate the higher-order risk preferences of individuals. Since this has only very recently
be implemented in laboratory experiments, there exist no established procedures yet. This
method was also applied in a laboratory experiment. We find that subjects generally tend
to be risk averse, prudent, and temperate. However, we also observed a considerable amount
of heterogeneity. A focus in the experiment was to induce real monetary losses for subjects.
Many theoretical models that deviate from EUT are based on distinctive evaluations of
gains and losses. In our experiment we were able to observe whether risk preferences differ
drastically between decisions in gains and in losses. This would be predicted if the value
function follows fundamentally different functional forms in losses and in gains. However,
we find no substantial differences in the qualitative direction of risk preferences in gains and
in losses.
The results of the experiment outlined in chapter 4 indicates that inside the domains of
gains and losses, the local properties of the value function seem not to differ in fundamental
ways. However, the value function could well have a kink at the reference point, representing
loss aversion. More substantially, the analysis of chapter 1 has shown that independently of
the functional form of the value function, reference dependence can influence decisions. In
contrast, the precise nature of the reference point has emerged as a primary factor that is
driving behavior.
Prospects for future research include applications of the two theoretical models. Numer-
ous examples of recent applications of the basic model of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006) were
provided in section 1.2.2 of chapter 1. However, most of these applications do not employ the
subtle differences of the model, such as the separation along different dimensions of utility
or the different concepts of personal equilibria. Remaining theoretical considerations that
go beyond mere applications are the precise timing of the adjustment of the reference point
to expectations or the principles according to which dimensions of utility are defined.
Even more promising seem descriptive theories of behavior that leave the concept of risk
behind. For a long time, such theories have been confined to very abstract and theoretical
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deliberations. But, as more ways are explored to derive testable predictions, these general
concepts of uncertainty increasingly allude to their considerable potential. These theories
have in common that they acknowledge the immense difficulties individuals have to capture
the multiple contingencies of the future in terms of risk. Examples are theories of ambiguity
and of case-based decision making. In theories of ambiguity, it is not assumed that individ-
uals form a single probability distribution representing their subjective beliefs. Instead, a
whole set of probability distributions is defined. The uncertainty over the right probability
distribution is additionally influencing the decision maker.14 In models of case-based deci-
sion making, observed situations of the past are compared to the present decision problem
in terms of similarity. Then, conclusions from the outcomes in these past cases are used by
the individuals as guidance for a decision in the problem at hand.15
Applying the tool kit developed and refined in the analysis of risk preferences for decades
to these theories, has the potential to yield many fruitful insights. Until now, these theories
have been characterized by a multitude of sets of axioms. In order to derive easily exercisable
versions, based on tractable functional forms, both theoretical and experimental methods of
risk preference elicitation could be adopted.
14For a recent comprehensive survey of the literature consult Gilboa and Marinacci (2011).
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